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Abstract 
The problem I wish to address is one that is widespread in analytic moral philosophy 
viz., that of transcending individuality in an attempt to develop theories and arguments 
that generally explain what occurs when we make moral judgements. I argue that 
none of these attempts is plausible on the grounds that moral judgements are 
necessarily personal, but in a way that still allows for moral objectivity. Such 
objectivity, I argue, is grounded in what it is for one's moral understanding to deepen, 
and involves considering morality as more than purely a guide to conduct. Moral 
subjectivity implies a lack of understanding of the meaning of one's actions in terms 
of the humanity of others, and also of what one becomes as a consequence of those 
actions. I reject the notion that objectivity can only be found through impersonal 
thinking such as that of propositions and mathematics, and suggest that the grammar 
of objective moral understanding differs from impersonal propositional forms insofar 
as it does not admit of external justification. On this basis I argue that the cognitivist I 
non-cognitivist models of moral thought are misguided. In support of my argument 
concerning the nature of moral objectivity, I draw on Wittgenstein's later conception 
of the nature of language, and use it to examine concepts such as trust, cynicism, 
sentimentality, love and maturity. I maintain that such concepts are legitimate and can 
be used objectively, even though they have no absolute standards and thus cannot 
admit of external justification. I argue that it is not rational to dismiss them in favour 
of formal argument or to try to impose formal argument upon them. The latter 
strategy, I claim, violates the grammar that gives them sense viz., (among other 
things) the context in which they are uttered that includes the individuality of the 
speaker. Thus I conclude that since moral judgments contain such concepts, it makes 
little sense to transcend individuality in an attempt to be objective or develop 
explanatory arguments based on theories. 
1 
Adrian Brockless (MA Thesis) 
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements 
Preface 
I had originally intended that this work should include an examination of aspects of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy - specifically, those areas relating to direct and indirect 
communication in Volume I of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which, I 
believed, could be linked to much of Wittgenstein' s philosophy in a way that would 
assist and clarify my argument. However, I subsequently found that I did not have 
room for a discussion of sufficient detail, and thought that anything less would lack 
transparency and beg too many questions. I therefore decided to omit it altogether. 
Nevertheless, many of the ideas contained within this thesis are heavily influenced by 
Kierkegaard's thoughts on communication and language. 
I hold a firm belief that philosophy is not a discipline that can be turned on and 
off at will. It is something that is inextricably linked to the individual engaged in it, in 
a way that does not allow for it to be put to one side after the department lights have 
been extinguished at the end of the day. It comes from the individual, and I hope that 
the spirit of this is reflected in the argument. 
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.U:NTRODUCTJION 
Scope, Structure and Themes1• 
In this thesis I argue that moral judgements are necessarily personal, but that 
they are not simply personal - that is to say, within them remains the possibility of 
objectivity insofar as we can appreciate value over and above our immediate feelings. 
The necessarily personal claim that I make relates to an individual's humanity and his 
ability to recognise and understand the manifestation of such humanity in others when 
making a moral judgement - a truly moral judgement relies on this; that recognition 
and understanding, I argue, takes time to achieve, and is part of what it is to live a 
human life. I also argue that it is not something that we can know in a formal sense. A 
simply personal judgement is one in which the humanity of another is not properly 
recognised or understood. In some cases this is of no consequence, such as when I 
have the simply personal desire for a coffee; in other cases, such lack of recognition 
and understanding of an 'other's' humanity can be of the gravest importance; for 
example, a violation of somebody else's life that entails the perpetrator of an action 
having not recognised the dignity and importance of another human being2. 
The mistake that is made, I argue, is that in claiming the existence of 
objectivity in moral judgements, philosophers immediately assume that there is an 
objective realm around which we can all unite i.e. (to use Thomas Nagel's expression) 
a view from nowhere. Now, it might seem odd to use the word 'unite' in this respect, 
but it is impmtant for later discussion to identify the difference between describing a 
chair in the next room i.e. something that exists as 'other to' the agent (and about 
which meaningful propositions and formal arguments can be produced) and an 'other' 
human being. The otherness of a human being is difficult to illustrate so early on, but 
I rule out at once the thoughtless argument that we can identify a human being in the 
same way as we can identify a chair in the next room- that is to say, we cannot point 
to another human being and state, "There is another human being!" in the same way 
that we can point to a chair and state, "There is another chair!" Now, of course, it is 
possible to point out other human beings like this, but that wholly misses the point. 
1 Where I use a source more than once, I refer to them using acronyms such as 'TPE' (The Personal in 
Ethics). In the bibliography the acronyms are specified next to the author's name. Where a source is 
used only once I give the usual bibliographic particulars next to the quotation, as well as in the 
bibliography. 
2 I do not yet have the conceptual apparatus in place to provide a succinct definition of 'humanity' 
without question begging. 
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What I am trying to say, is that a human being is not merely an object like a chair; he 
or she has (among other things) the capacity to move, be moved, inspire, wonder at 
the limits of another human life, love, make moral judgements, hate, appreciate evil 
and so on. These are not properties like the properties of a chair (four legs, used for 
sitting on or whatever) - they are not properties of a human being, they are (what 
makes) a human being. The human being is not separate from them and in this sense I 
have been paradoxical by referring to them as such (this should become clear). One 
might argue that one can identify a dead human being as a human being, and of course 
that is right- but that is also precisely why the word "dead" exists in our vocabulary 
namely, to describe such a form as distinct. 
I aim to decisively demonstrate that objectivity in moral judgements is not 
impersonal (or 'other to' the agent), and that it need not be so in order for there to be 
meaningful disagreement between individuals. I should make clear that I am not 
making any claims on behalf of the particularist, generalist, cognitivist or non-
cognitivist; in fact it is my aim to challenge the authority of all theories (or ideas) in 
moral philosophy by examining the point of theorising in ethics; that is, I see no 
reason for the assumption that there are genuine choices in moral philosophy 
(between, say, cognitivism and non-cognitivism or virtue ethics and 
consequentialism) - moral philosophy should limit itself to trying to describe what 
goes on when one comes to a moral decision, and to weeding out corruption in moral 
thought where it occurs. In other words, its chief concern should be to achieve greater 
moral understanding. I employ the term 'moral understanding' a great deal throughout 
this thesis- there is no strict definition for it, since its underwriting concepts (such as 
love, good, evil, remorse and the like) cannot be externally justified. However, it 
refers to the idea of an understanding of others as I understand myself- i.e. as a being 
capable of loving and suffering grief, despair, euphoria, emptiness and so on. I do not 
want this expression to be taken as 'understanding what to do', since that implies 
morality as simply a guide to conduct; neither do I want it to be taken as 
'understanding how the world works' or 'understanding general principles of 
psychology', since this could be understood as propositional knowledge - a position 
that, in terms of moral understanding, I am opposed to. I also argue that it is a mistake 
to consider morality purely in terms of a guide to conduct, but that is not to say that I 
think morality should not affect (or even effect) conduct. And I am not discounting 
the possibility of moral guidance. In short, my suggestion is that morality provides 
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certain limits to our actions derived from our recognition and understanding of the 
humanity of another human being; in other words, a profound moral understanding 
has a necessary and unavoidable influence on action. 
Consider, for instance, the phenomenon of racism: racism is (obviously) a 
form of exclusion and denigration; it is also a substantial moral issue. If one possesses 
a profound moral understanding, it is impossible to be a racist. As human beings we 
inhabit a common conceptual space (that allows for love, good, evil, remorse, grief, 
emptiness etc.) in which we understand others as being (potentially) subject to the 
same kind of awareness as ourselves. By seeing a gap between 'ourselves' and certain 
races -in the sense of 'us' and 'them' -one is automatically excluding and denying 
'them' access to such space. As such, one is not seeing 'them' as potentially subject to 
the same kind of life as 'us'. It is in this sense that I consider moral understanding as 
having a necessary and unavoidable influence on action that extends far beyond and 
deeper than an action-guiding instruction manual. One can, of course, look at 
psychological principles with regard to racism and use them to explain to the racist 
why he is in error, but such explanations can never show the full human being to the 
racist - i.e. they can never show the subject of their exclusion and denigration as (for 
instance) fully vulnerable to the same sort of despair at losing a loved one as they 
themselves are. Certainly, such explanations can (and do) state that all human beings 
can potentially "feel" as deeply as the racist himself- and one can be in possession of 
many such facts (or explanations), but this in itself is not enough to guarantee 
understanding. One can be in possession of many such facts, but (as I argue in 
Chapter 3 onwards) facts can (potentially at least) be given all at once, whilst moral 
understanding cannot be; I also argue that an accumulation of facts is not enough to 
grant depth or moral understanding. A racist needs to genuinely reform, and this 
involves more than simply tracing over a series of explanations again and again of 
why he should not be racist; he needs to wrestle with his own preconceptions about 
his victims and deepen his understanding in terms of appreciating their ability to love 
and grieve, and that is not something (as it is in science) that can be underwritten by 
external justification. In this respect, the understanding of the racist is personal (as 
only he could wrestle with his preconceptions), but not simply personal, insofar as full 
appreciation of the humanity of his victims necessarily involves a realization of a 
common conceptual space and consequently, a realization that many values that result 
from such understanding are extensively shared (if not always in the same way) by 
6 
Adrian Brockless (MA Thesis) 
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements 
others with an appreciation of the humanity of others. - And this is what I mean when 
I employ the expression (as I do throughout this thesis): 'personal without being 
simply personal'. 
Overall, the thesis has a Wittgensteinian theme and I draw on a number of his 
works, however I do not include much critical discussion of them, since my interest 
lies chiefly in his method of doing philosophy as applied to ethics. Within this, I 
follow closely arguments advanced by Peter Winch in his essays 'The 
Universalizability of Moral Judgements' and 'Moral Integrity', Raimond Gaita's 
essay 'The Personal in Ethics' and Rush Rhees's essays 'Religion and Language' and 
'What are Moral Statements Like?' I also draw considerably from Raimond Gaita's 
book Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. 
The first chapter is divided into seven subsections that focus mainly on the 
notions of subjectivity and objectivity within moral philosophy and the idea that 
moral judgements are necessarily, if not simply, personal. I begin to make the 
argument for the possibility of objectivity within moral judgements, and argue that 
such objectivity is not necessarily only contingently attached to individuals. I aim to 
demonstrate this firstly by examining themes in Thomas Nagel's book A View From 
Nowhere, in which Nagel sets himself up as an advanced exponent of objectivity 
necessarily being impersonal, and then, through the rest of the thesis, illustrate why 
this need not necessarily be so. I also highlight the difference between what is 
sometimes referred to as public morality (such as a democratic government's decision 
to go to war) and personal morality, and I examine what I believe to be problems that 
can often be taken to be moral when they are, perhaps, confused with political ones -
although I do not deny the existence of a link between the two. 
I also introduce the theme that morality should be considered as more than 
purely a guide to conduct as well as examining how far the scope of a moral dilemma 
extends. In chapter two I concentrate on morality as a calculus of action and develop 
the argument that sees morality as more than just a guide to conduct. I also examine 
the notion of the universalizability of moral judgements- and draw heavily on Peter 
Winch's essay 'The Universalizability of Moral Judgements'. Within this I begin to 
look at what the consequences of such universalization are for moral philosophy in 
terms of the personal nature of moral judgements. Chapter three examines those 
aspects of our lives that directly affect our moral sensibilities - such as the human 
capacity for being moved and an ability to appreciate mystery. It is in this section that 
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(by examining such aspects) I provide substance to my claim that moral judgements 
are necessarily, but not simply, personal and, within this, discuss what it means to be 
reasonable within ethics. 
Nevertheless, I do not want to be interpreted (early on) as advocating a kind of 
subjectivism. My position is not subjectivist, as I maintain that an individual with a 
understanding of the reality of the concepts that underpin morality such as love, evil, 
grief and the like, identifies them in the light of recognizing what it means to be a 
human being; as such, he possesses a sense of value independent of his will by 
accepting that all human beings occupy a common conceptual space in which the 
possibility exists that they can wrong and be wronged. Moreover, those with such 
understanding will necessarily share those values born from an appreciation of an 
'other's' humanity3. That said (and as I have already mentioned), the objectivity that I 
am advocating is not a kind that is only ever contingently attached to the individual 
i.e. impersonal. 
I then examine m more detail the notions of moral cognitivism and non-
cognitivism and try to show why neither is satisfactory in terms of providing an 
account of what occurs when we make moral decisions. I also begin to examine what 
it means to morally communicate and discuss the difference in grammar between 
speaking scientifically and morally and what it means to be conned. With regard to 
this I discuss Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions of language. In chapter four I 
develop this linguistic theme and connect it to earlier discussions about objectivity in 
moral judgments and how such judgements are not simply personal. I consider Rush 
Rhees's argument (in his essay 'Religion and Language') that specific aspects of life 
require specific ways of speaking and argue that there is, in this respect, a necessary 
moral language. I continue by suggesting that to violate such a language by talking in 
the third person corrupts its grammar and leads us to think in ways inappropriate to 
proper moral thinking - the latter point involves considering the language of academic 
moral philosophy. I also look at the concepts of wisdom and what is involved in its 
acquisition- why wisdom is not just a case of 'regularly getting it right', how wisdom 
might fall away, what is involved in getting it back, and why we should not see 
wisdom as just a case of propositional knowledge. The discussion of wisdom is 
necessarily late on in my thesis, as earlier on, I do not have the necessary arguments 
3 Although such values may not always result in similar behaviour. 
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in place to be lucid. I also reject the charge of relativism as providing a coherent 
objection to my argument. Finally, in chapter five I specifically examine what it 
means for a moral judgement to be corrupt. 
More generally, I argue that each one of us is necessarily embedded in a 
unique perspective. As a bald statement, this may sound facile, since everyone can 
only look at the world through his or her own eyes; no one else can see the world 
exactly as I do, due to my spatial and temporal position and so on. I would 
characterise this take on things as my point of view rather than perspective, and 
indeed, my point of view goes a long way in shaping my perspective; but a 
perspective is not just a point of view. My perspective is innumerable different points 
of view which are derived from (and go to make up) my biography. Thus the meaning 
of perspective I have in mind, is not one that has perspective as applicable to a precise 
or particular role in life (say a doctor); approximately (at this stage), it is one's whole 
perspective within which it is possible to have such different points of view or, more 
clearly, elements. For instance, a doctor will see a person's malady in a different way 
from someone with no medical knowledge; within the doctor's perspective there are 
symptoms and treatments, but this is not so with the layman. The doctor has, in this 
respect, been trained to see what is there, so why should we think that one cannot be 
trained in morality as in medicine? - Firstly, the doctor's training is founded on a 
series of facts and hypotheses that can essentially be put into propositional form and, 
as such, theoretically granted to anyone instantaneously (rather like transferring 
information from one computer to another). Consequently, such learning is 
contingently attached to the doctor, meaning that anyone with the requisite cognitive 
capacities could learn to recognise the symptoms of illness etcetera. Secondly, there 
can be nothing in a doctor's medical training that grants him enhanced and more 
sensitive access, or a better ability to deal with concepts such as love, hatred, grief, 
compassion, soul-searching and so on, despite the fact that advice such as how to 
break bad news to patients is often given in a doctor's training. Is it feasible (or 
sensible) to ask whether a doctor is better at love or hate than the layman? This can 
be illustrated well by an example that I use in more detail in the first section of 
Chapter 3: in his book A Common Humanity, Raimond Gaita describes how a nun's 
genuine compassion for incurable patients in a mental hospital shows up that of some 
of the doctors, who claimed non-condescending compassion, as less than fully 
genuine. The nun had little medical training, yet she was more sensitive to certain 
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aspects of humanity than the doctors. Thus, in terms of judging how to break bad 
news to patients, or relatives of patients, it is ultimately the individuality of each 
doctor that determines how they exercise the relevant skills. 
One further basic point of clarification needs to be made here (the essence of 
which I hope to demonstrate later on): one particular point of view may be better than 
another (for instance, the doctor's over the layman's when it comes to illness), but this 
has no bearing at all in terms of talking about perspective; in such terms, one 
perspective is not better than another as this equates to knowledge based on 
propositional understandings - something that I strongly argue against later on. I 
realise that my perspective claim is a strong one and also that the notion of 
perspective is philosophically treacherous, but I believe a sound case can be made by 
examining various themes concerning language and philosophical method in 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. I examine how our perspective can affect 
our moral outlook and the significance of the moral decisions that we make, and also 
how such significance can affect our outlook and change us as individuals. In 
addition, I consider how individuals relate to the world, and whether such a 
relationship is mediated through propositions; this examination also sheds light on 
how objectivity is not necessarily impersonal, and provides an account of the 
significance and status of ethics and moral judgements in the world in terms of what it 
means to possess moral understanding. 
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CHAPTER I 
1.0. Moral Judgements: Subjective or Objective? 
Traditionally, moral philosophy involves discussion of questions such as: is a 
moral judgement subjective or objective? - i.e. is it the privilege of the individual to 
declare what is right and wrong, or is there a realm of moral facts that exists 
independent of us? What ought we to do? What ought I to do?- Is there a question of 
community norm? I certainly believe that there is fellowship inasmuch as we are all 
human and thus subject to human grammar i.e. our ability to utter meaningfully, and 
receive and understand in a way that deepens our understanding of what it is to be a 
human being- in other words, to live a human life. To talk of community norms is, I 
think, a different question and should not be confused with what I have just said -
community norms do bear upon each of us (significantly) in terms of shaping our 
moral understanding, but it is a kind of secondary bearing, insofar as it plays a fairly 
large part in the development of our respective (individual) biographies- for instance, 
my attitudes to women and homosexuals depend on my having grown up in the late 
20th Century and not in the late 18th Century4. However, I argue that it is individual 
biography that is ultimately responsible for our moral outlook. I hope to have, in part, 
answered these questions by the end of this chapter. 
Such questions have shaped moral philosophy inasmuch as they have been 
responsible for the development of ever more ingenious and complex arguments (for 
instance, the ever more complicated arguments advanced by cognitivists and non-
cognitivists) that are increasingly abstract from the human being i.e. from what 
actually goes on. This might seem sweeping and unfair, but I aim to show in my 
discussions on the grammar of moral statements, that such abstraction actually distorts 
a proper examination into what goes on when we make moral judgements, and that 
much moral philosophy has suffered from such distortion. I believe that it is not, and 
cannot be (as will become clear later), the task of moral philosophy to further ideas of 
rightness and wrongness (bound up in this is the idea of ought and ought not); it 
should limit itself to giving an account of what goes on when a moral judgment is 
made and when two individuals conflict in their moral position concerning the same 
situation. Now, if I disagree with a particular individual relating to a moral position 
that he has arrived at and I voice my concerns, am I not also offering him guidance? 
4 Nevertheless, it is because individually achieved biographies are based on more than community 
norms that changes in such attitudes (and 'norms') take place. 
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That is dependent on the nature of my disagreement, but if it is a moral one (as I have 
suggested), then the guidance would be implicit in my attempt to achieve a greater 
moral understanding in my interlocutor. 
Generally speaking, in moral philosophy, subjectivist and objectivist accounts 
of ethics are pitted against each other - they are considered as conflicting and, 
accordingly, the idea that both are needed in the same explanation in order to 
demonstrate what actually happens, seems incoherent. This is not so. What ts 
forgotten is the character of the problem - i.e. the fact that a moral dilemma is a 
problem of different character and grammer to that of, say, a navigational one; when 
this is forgotten, deliberation becomes - as Raimond Gaita remarks, ' ... simply 
deliberation with a moral subject matter, that its being moral deliberation is external 
to its character as deliberation.' (Gaita.TPE. p.127 (emphasis orig.)). Nevertheless, 
why should we think the problems are different? Why not accept that the morality of 
the deliberation is external to the nature of the character of the deliberation? I address 
these questions throughout the thesis, particularly when I discuss individuality, 
character, and how they can affect the grammar of a (Wittgensteinian) language game. 
However, a good place to start is to take a clear example such as Sartre's student 
(featured in his lecture 'Existentialism and Humanism'), in which a student comes to 
him for advice over whether to fight in the war or take care of his mother. In this 
example, we are basically presented with two options. The cognitivist might say, 
"give me more detail about the situation and eventually we'll come up with the right 
answer, because there must be a right answer (e.g. my brother can look after mother 
while I go off to fight). - However, I could reply: "I can also provide more detail that 
would retain the equilibrium between the two obligations (e.g. my brother is not 
always reliable)". Thus the disagreement between the cognitivist and my position here 
comes down to a difference in optimism about whether compromise or compensation 
can always be found. I can consequently acknowledge that if the cognitivist is 
obstinately optimistic, my arguments are not going to get much purchase. In other 
words, to meet the cognitivist on his own grounds, I am required to use the same form 
of argument and, as such, there is no way I can refute his arguments. I do not want to 
do this. What I am appealing to is a reader who has enough experience of genuine 
dilemmas in his life, dilemmas where no solution was discernable before or after the 
choice, dilemmas where no further detail would be relevant enough to resolve the 
dilemma, dilemmas where there might be more than one respectable answer offered 
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by different people who were sufficiently informed, sufficiently rational, and 
sufficiently eager (serious) to look for a solution in the situation. 
Directly relating to this (and in support of it), is the understanding that the 
individual is aware of a moral dilemma when confronted by a situation, and in so 
being lends the situation its moral aspect. However, that is not to suggest a kind of 
blank canvas upon which we (as individuals) paint (or project) our moral aspects, nor 
is it to suggest that there is any kind of temporal issue contained therein. The situation 
is as we see it, but 'becoming aware of' can mean an aspect that we are subsequently 
made aware of. The awareness of another aspect does not mean that the situation has 
necessarily through time become something different - I may just suddenly 
understand (or see) something differently without entailing a gradual development of 
my fresh position. 
But what does this "becoming aware of' mean?- Certainly it sounds as if we 
have looked at the situation and then, scrutinizing it in more detail, have seen 
something that we had previously overlooked. By couching the issue in these terms, 
one is automatically predisposed to assume that the element which was overlooked 
was a part of the situation, in the same sense as, say, one of its subtler theoretical or 
physical attributes - an attribute that would be there regardless of the presence of a 
witness. - But suppose there is a human being lying at the side of a road in terrible 
agony and no one knows that he's there - what then? For the moment I shall only say 
that this human being is suffering. 
There is a crucial difference here between a moral and non-moral dilemma, 
firstly because of its implications for morality being used purely as a guide for 
conduct, and secondly because its character (grammar) affects the individual's 
relationship with the world. The most obvious and (perhaps) intuitive reaction to this 
is to suggest that one finds the appropriate and correct response to the moral problem 
in a similar way as finding out whether I should turn right or left at the next junction. 
This (again as Gaita indicates) is mistaken -for in a non-moral case I can defer to a 
third party or manual of some kind; it makes little difference which I defer to, 
provided the manual or person involved is an authority on the topic of my enquiries. 
In the case of a moral deliberation however, the problem is 'non-accidentally and 
inescapably mine' (Gaita.TPE. p.128) and, as such, it is essential that I deal with it. 
One might consider that the navigational problem I have is still my problem in a very 
personal sense, and that it is still my problem to decide whether I should turn left or 
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right. This however, misses the point: the choice as to whether I turn left or right is in 
one sense my problem, insofar as I am the person to whom such a decision matters (in 
the same way as I can add four and four together and come out with eight), but it is 
not my problem in the same sense as a moral problem. It matters in a sense that I find 
the best way (perhaps the quickest or least rough etc., etc.) to my intended destination, 
perhaps due to time constraints, or emergency, or my particular mode of transport etc., 
but the issue here is that there is a definite right answer to each of these requirements 
and, as such, precisely the same navigational problem could belong to anybody. 
Moreover, it can be related to propositional knowledge. My argument is that moral 
knowledge - I would prefer to call it wisdom- is not of this nature (which is why I 
would rather call it wisdom than knowledge) and, as such, personal in a profound way 
rather than an accidental way. The moral dilemma is mine and, consequently, that 
dilemma has embedded in it all the concepts bound up with my character that I have 
acquired during my lifetime, and that is what is meant when the moral problem 
(unlike the navigational one) is characterised as profoundly mine rather than 
accidentally mine. Nevertheless, it's not clear how 'concepts' can be bound up in 
someone's character. What does it mean for concepts to be 'bound up' in an 
individual's character?- The short answer (at this stage- it will be extensive later on 
- section 4.0. - when I discuss the necessarily public nature of concepts but with the 
possibility of privacy within some) is that if the concepts we hold are somehow 
incidental to our respective characters (i.e. not bound up in them), then it follows that 
our characters are superfluous to what it is to be a moral being; if this is so, then in 
follows that the recognition of another human being as a moral being, is in no way 
reliant upon his character. I aim to show that concepts are intimately bound up with 
the character of their holder, by arguing that to neglect character in an analysis of 
moral thought is to provide an incomplete account of what moral thought actually is. 
One of my main assertions in this thesis is that moral deliberation is of a special kind 
and, as such, possesses its own grammar that allows for objectivity of its own kind. 
However, I first want to look at Thomas Nagel's assertion that objectivity is 
necessarily bound to the impersonal and divorced from individual perspective, as I 
hope this will make my own position more transparent. 
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1.1. Nagel's Impersonal Objectivism 
Nagel considers that objectivity can only be achieved m the realm of the 
impersonal, 
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the 
individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of 
creature he is. The wider the range of subjective types to which a form of understanding is 
accessible - the less it depends on specific subjective capacities - the more objective it is. 
(Nagel, T. 'VFN' .p5). 
Intuitively, it seems that Nagel is probably right insofar as we cannot let our 
characters or emotions influence (for instance) scientific investigation. Moreover, this 
view is seriously tempting if one examines the way we talk. For example, "X is 
wrong" certainly sounds a lot like "X is blue"; "I wish I knew the shortest way out of 
the woods" certainly sounds a lot like "I wish I knew whether to lie to her".- It is this 
kind of similarity that is the guiding light behind the thinking that acquisition of 
objectivity involves transcending 'our particular viewpoint and [developing] an 
expanded consciousness that takes in the world more fully' (ibidi. - And indeed, 
Nagel believes that deliberation is of the same kind in the moral realm as it is in the 
scientific one - he compares the two: 
The standpoint of morality is more objective than that of the private life, but less objective 
than the standpoint of physics. (ibid) 
It is this kind of thinking that drives Nagel to perceive an underlying tension between 
the subjective and objective; he sees it as an impossible task to reconcile them 
completely in a way that allows for a 'unified world view' (Nagel, T. 'VFN' p4), and 
believes that one has to tolerate such an 'internal-external tension' (Nagel, T. 'VFN' 
p6). Nevertheless, that is not an excuse for philosophical idleness and, in some cases, 
(according to Nagel) it is necessary for the subjective to be in some way involved, and 
it is down to our cognitive capacities to deliver us (in the same way as one might 
ascertain the existence of planet X) and eventually determine to what extent. 
5 This is a very fine example of what Wittgenstein means when (in the Philosophical Investigations) he 
asserts that 'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' 
(PI: I 09). This is discussed in detail in section 4.0. 
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Even those who regard philosophy as real and important know that they are at a particular and, 
we may hope, early stage of its development, limited by their own primitive intellectual 
capacities and relying on the partial insights of a few great figures from the past. (Nagel, T. 
'VFN'. piO) 
This passage raises another interesting point viz., that philosophy is capable of making 
progress in the same way as science; it is interesting because it reiterates Nagel's 
belief that the kind of deliberation involved in both disciplines is identical, and 
presupposes the existence of concepts outside humanity that will make this possible. 
In other words, such concepts have to be underwritten by the possibility of external 
justification. One could certainly not use humanity itself as a form of justification, as 
part of what constitutes humanity is individuality and (consequently) it would leave us 
unable to distinguish personal from impersonal. 
Now, in terms of ethics, Nagel perceives that 'the duality of perspectives is too 
deep for us reasonably to hope to overcome it. A fully agent-neutral morality is not a 
plausible human goal' (Nagel, T. 'VFN'. p185); the 'duality of perspectives' (ibid.) 
being subjective (personal) and objective (impersonal) in constant conflict with each 
other. What we can hope for however, is a process in which we strive for objectivity 
and, in so doing, correct our formerly more subjective views that were based on more 
personal perspectives. Certainly, Nagel thinks, the more we manage to escape from 
the subjective and embrace the objective, the more likely we are to recognise agent-
neutral reasons for acting morally. 
From the objective standpoint, the fundamental thing leading to the recognition of agent-
neutral reasons is a sense that no one is more important than anyone else. The question then is 
whether we are all equally unimportant or all equally important, and the answer, I think, is 
somewhere in between. (Nagel, T. 'VFN'. p 171 ). 
Perhaps this is how we will be able to measure moral progress? - In other words, 
assuming we manage to achieve a reasonably objective perspective (without too much 
subjectivity) or, as Nagel puts it, without relying too much 'on the specifics of the 
individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular 
type of creature he is' (Nagel, T. 'VFN' .p5), we should be able to develop agent-
neutral and deontological reasons upon which we can fall back, and which go to make 
up a general platform of reasons from which we can move forward (thus making for 
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moral progress). -But, Nagel wonders, are we all 'equally unimportant or all equally 
important'? (Nagel, T. 'VFN'. p171).- He perceives the answer to be 'somewhere in 
between' (ibid.) and thinks that this has an influence on the development of agent-
neutral reasons inasmuch as he sees tension between the subject just getting what he 
wants, and values that come 'as close as possible to being universal' (ibid.); the latter 
he equates to the impersonal. 
It is Nagel's overall position concerning the necessarily impersonal nature of 
objectivity and the notion that there is only one kind of deliberation, that I 
fundamentally disagree with. Why - for instance - should we consider individuals as 
equally important or unimportant?- Why not instead base one's moral considerations 
on an appreciation of the capacities of other human beings to grieve, love, hate, 
forgive etc., in a way that one does oneself and, in this respect, pay attention to the 
particularity of individuals rather than attempting to develop a series of impersonal 
(Universalizable) reasons or principles that one can just fall back on and apply 
irrespective of the individuality of the agents involved? When one commits an act that 
is morally reprehensible and comes to an understanding of the dreadfulness of what 
one has done, as well as what one has become in the process, one's guilt represents 
more than the breaking of a few principles or moral directives - it is concentrated on 
the individuality of victim and perpetrator; indeed morality itself is, to a degree, 
informed by such individuality. If this were not so, where would we start? My 
argument is that moral deliberation is distinct from, say, scientific or mathematical 
deliberation, and that proper moral deliberation is not achieved through hoisting the 
grammar of scientific deliberation upon it. 
1.2. The Personal Character of Moral Problems I 
There is a curious, and largely ignored paradox when one sees morality purely 
m terms as a guide to conduct: What I have done (as the moral element in the 
situation) is to plant a moral obstruction in place and, through it, given myself the task 
of finding a resolution that overcomes it; it is generally agreed that if there is no 
human element involved, then there is no moral element either. So, 'would it not be 
far simpler and more rational to be shot of the thing altogether?' (Winch. MI. p.l73.). 
I think that Winch touches an issue here that is very important viz., that a formal 
argument which suggests a certain course of action or a certain conception of the 
nature of morality, is not always the reasonable (or rational) argument, or rather, its 
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conclusions are not ones that we would or should (as human beings and not merely 
rational agents) seriously consider adopting. There is a lot in the last sentence that 
needs to be elucidated, but for the moment I have (for the sake of clarity and because 
of the current lack of the necessary conceptual apparatus) to concentrate on the 
conception of morality as a guide to conduct. 
When I talk of "finding", it is in a different sense to the one in which I find the 
right answer to, say, my navigational problems - for although the notion of discovery 
is common to both, in the case of moral dilemmas the answer is not already out there 
waiting to be discovered - hanging on some objective realm as it were. Now, one 
might argue that the answer to my navigational difficulty is not 'out there' either, 
insofar as there are different paths or roads I could take; it only becomes a problem 
for me when I want to get home as quickly as possible. But the point is (and I touched 
on this earlier) that while getting home as quickly as possible is a problem for me, it 
need not be, in the sense that it is only accidentally mine; the nature of the reason as to 
why I have to get home quickly is irrelevant (it is a different issue). In other words, 
anyone else could have precisely the same problem. Now in terms of the answer to 
my navigational difficulty being 'out there', what I mean is that there is a definite 
right answer to - for instance - the question: "Which is the quickest way out of the 
woods?" One either knows, or does not know the answer and, in the case of the latter 
scenario, there are definite measures that anyone can take to rectify one's ignorance-
and the answer can be thus formed: "The quickest route out of the wood is X." 
1.3. Moral and Non-Moral Problems 
A moral problem and the deliberation involved in finding a resolution to it is 
distinct from that of a practical problem in the ordinary sense, such as the one I have 
been discussing. A practical problem (such as my navigational difficulty) has, at the 
end of it, a definite answer that can be put into propositional form; this is not so with 
the moral answer. Accordingly, the two should be treated differently; but is that to 
suggest that there are no right moral answers? The answer to this question is both 
'yes' and 'no' and I provide clarification of this assertion later on when I look at the 
nature of moral thought, and argue that the conception of such thought is often 
corrupt. For the time being it suffices to say that there are no absolute right moral 
answers if we treat moral thought and understanding as possessing the same (or 
similar) grammar as that of thoughts relating to (for instance) my navigational 
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difficulty; however, the answer is m the affirmative if we treat the two kinds of 
thought and understanding as grammatically distinct. To treat the two kinds of 
problem differently also rather neatly accounts for why there are many experts in the 
field of (for instance) navigation, but none in the field of morality - the latter being 
inherently personal. In this respect, evidence suggests that moral deliberations are of 
an extraordinary kind. The moral problem is a special kind of problem, the nature of 
which I shall try to make clear. 
1.4. Morality: Practical or Theoretical Problem? 
A practical problem is normally contrasted with a theoretical one, i.e. as in two 
kinds of problem; practical problems are essentially conceived of as involving action 
and agency, and moral problems seen as a kind of subset of the practical. Principally, 
on this conception, morality is seen as a guide to conduct. I have been trying to make 
the distinction between the non-moral (navigational difficulty) problem and the moral 
problem, which I believe has a special kind of character (although I have not specified 
it as such thus far). There is a clear sense, I have argued, in which there is an 
objectively shortest route out of the wood - whether or not I happen to discover it, 
whereas there is no similar sense of a singular answer to a moral problem. 
Now, there are forceful ways in which this distinction can be doubted. Firstly, 
there is a sense (it can be claimed) in which the consequences of my moral choice 
may reveal that I did do the right thing, in the same way that I can check a map when I 
have returned safely home to ascertain the shortest route out of the wood in which I 
was lost. Secondly, because both navigational and moral decisions are practical ones, 
and therefore involve action, all action is to be partly conceived as an appreciation of 
value in the world. Someone who supports this line would subsequently argue that 
even a trite non-moral example of choosing Ketchup X over Ketchup Yin Morrison's 
supermarket involves antecedent values (e.g. one being cheaper than the other) that 
allows such choice to be meaningful (in this case an expression of my desire to save 
money). Looking at it this way, my earlier navigational problem is only a problem for 
me when I seek the shortest way as opposed to the fastest or prettiest way, which is 
what others might be seeking. And in this respect, the traditional conception of a 
practical problem can be seen as having theoretical associations; that is to say, a 
solution to such a problem can be hypothesised in a theory that is made up of a series 
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of propositions which subsequently can be validated or invalidated. This is to miss the 
point however, as well as tacitly considering morality purely as a guide to conduct. 
I shall deal with the 'missing the point' charge and address my belief that 
morality should not be seen as a guide to conduct in a later section. As I have already 
mentioned, the problem need not be mine in any sense other than that I happen to be 
the unfortunate victim of my own navigational ignorance, and I put this in terms of 
the problem being accidentally mine. - I could say that it is mine by chance. I think 
confusion arises here as a result of believing that this issue is manifestly mine because 
at that time it happens to be mine and that because I have need to exit the wood by the 
shortest or quickest route, that that (other) need (whatever it may be) weighs in on 
behalf of the argument that such a difficulty or dilemma is mine in a profound sense6. 
Nonetheless, the need that necessitates I find the shortest way out of the wood may 
well be profoundly mine; but even if that is the case, it has no bearing on the nature of 
my navigational difficulty. The point is that the navigational difficulty need not be 
mine, and that it could be someone else's without any change in its character and 
without the character of the individual concerned having a bearing on it either. Now, 
in terms of antecedent values, we are dealing with a conception of thought in which 
everything is truth-valued against everything else. I think this is where the problem 
lies and I look at this in detail presently. 
Where does the answer to a moral dilemma come from? -If one says that a 
response to a moral dilemma is personal in the sense that one has (as Sartre famously 
thought) to choose and invent one's morality- and it is tempting to do this in light of 
the notion that the answer is not already out there - then, intuitively, it somehow 
seems to cheapen the value of the moral positions one arrives at. I feel that whilst I 
have sincerely committed myself to the right position, deductively speaking (i.e. from 
coming to understand that morality is wholly mine and that somebody else's morality 
is wholly theirs), it makes no sense to think or believe this. Nevertheless, Sartre 
supposed that this is precisely why moral judgements mattered so much. He saw that 
each of us uses freedom in different ways- including different moral ways - and that I 
(for instance) choose to see wrongness or offence in a particular act, whether as the 
perpetrator or the victim; I choose to allow my guilt to cripple me, to express 
6 The meaning of profound I have in mind, is one that suggests that there is no possibility of the 
problem being anyone else's in precisely the same way. Such a possibility does exist in terms of a 
navigational difficulty. 
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righteous indignation over an act, and so on. People choose differently in response to 
the same situation - hence morality is relative. Now, it matters insofar as when I 
choose in this way, i.e. for myself, I am also implicitly choosing for others; my action 
therefore constitutes a recommendation for others and, as such, matters greatly. One's 
decisions can also, in Sartre's view, matter personally as well. The example that 
Sartre gives in Existentialism and Humanism concerning the student who comes to 
him for advice over whether to fight in the war or take care of his mother, is relative 
in that there is no correct solution to the dilemma: "You are free, therefore chose -
that is to say, invent." (Sartre 'E&H' p.38). No matter what the final decision he 
makes, it will have huge implications for his life, not only in terms of the subsequent 
events that will transpire in choosing one over the other, but also in how he comes to 
see himself as a result of having done so (see difference between guilt and shame). 
Consequently his moral judgement mattered because, in this case, it will influence the 
framework against which he will make all other judgements in the future. His decision 
has, as it were, become a part of his individuality7• My area of disagreement with 
Sartre lies in the idea that we are free to rid ourselves of, for instance, crippling guilt. 
If one has, say, given way to temptation and consequently committed a morally 
reprehensible act for which one feels extreme guilt, one is not subsequently free from 
guilt. -One's guilt is a necessary manifestation of coming to a full understanding of 
what one has done and we cannot free ourselves from such understanding. 
Equally, one might take the view that if one acts in a wholly rational way in 
response to a moral problem, this will reveal certain independent moral facts; these 
facts might be derived from - for instance - the Kantian Universalizability thesis or 
the Consequentialist argument. I realise that the word 'rational' is a philosophically 
dangerous word, but I am using it here in a way that is, at least, a sign of formal 
argument; so, for instance, one might contrast a supposed paradigm of rational 
behaviour such as self-interest with that of moral behaviour8. Thus we might say 
(cheaply) that it makes sense to speak of acting from self-interest but not from moral 
reasons, since the use of concepts that exist within our moral vocabulary are purely 
emotive, irrational and highly subjective, while (it is said) we can argue objectively 
and in a 'logical' way which can be formalised in terms of our own self-interest; it 
7 Sartre is certainly not saying that anything you choose is acceptable, as I hope to have made clear. For 
one's choices matter in terms of how they matter for others, as well as for one's own future decisions. 
8 I am aware that Kant and many others would not agree with the content of this example, but that is 
not the issue. 
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makes sense to talk of self-interest as it is something that can be understood as 
selfishness. Both these answers have aspects in them that are correct. In the latter 
answer, for example, there is the desire for elimination of error through objectivity by 
way of appealing to deductive argument (often at the expense of the personal), and in 
the former there is a desire to place individual moral affection at the heart of any 
account of moral judgement. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not side with one 
or other camp, no matter how sophisticated their arguments. Moral judgements are 
necessarily, but not simply, personal; there is the possibility of genuine disagreement 
within ethics and thus of value and significance - implicit in this latter assertion is the 
possibility of objectivity and, accordingly, that an individual's moral position can also 
be wrong. But how is this so? In the following section, I begin to discuss what I see as 
incorrect conceptions of the nature of moral thought, and that such conceptions are 
born from fear of error; this will be a theme that I develop throughout the thesis. This 
is one of the major factors in my attempt to demonstrate that moral judgements are 
necessarily, but not simply, personal and that we should not consider morality purely 
in terms of a guide to conduct. 
1.5. Objectivity, Moral Thought ( 1) and 'Otherness' 
In order to dispel completely the notion that (moral) objectivity is necessarily 
bound up with the idea of 'otherness', and to allow for it in judgements that are 
necessarily personal, it is essential before moving on, to clarify the difference in the 
kind of thinking that takes place in a moral dilemma that is significant for an 
individual, from one that is no different from a practical one i.e. one that is set (for 
instance) as a problem for philosophy students. 
When I suggested in the previous paragraph that I wished to dispel the idea 
that objectivity is completely bound up with the idea of 'otherness', I was using the 
term 'otherness' as indicating something that exists outside the human. This form of 
'otherness' would, for instance, be characterised by a situation in which money had 
been stolen and everyone who was present at the time of its disappearance starts firing 
off about how awful it is that, in a trusted group of people, this sort of thing can 
happen and so on. Eventually, it is decided that the problem must be looked at 
objectively i.e. in such a way that each one of us "stands back from the problem" and 
allows for a general consensus to be reached concerning the best course of action. 
Now, this sort of thinking is perfectly legitimate provided that one (following Wiggins 
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in 'NVT' p173) finds the right amount of detachment with which to vtew it. 
Inappropriate detachment can result in cynicism, sentimentality and so on. This is a 
seemingly arbitrary process however, and is not one that can just be accepted without 
question; that said, I believe that 'appropriate' detachment as opposed to complete 
detachment is what marks the boundary between sanity and madness (I shall 
investigate these claims in detail later on). So what does this mean in terms of 
objectivity and 'otherness'? Essentially, what I am trying to get at is that a view from 
nowhere represents a purely cognitive view of the world by treating human beings as 
simply other entities in the world; as such, one separates the cognitive from the non-
cognitive. The idea of objectivity as equivalent to 'otherness' and the separation of 
cognitive from non-cognitive in this respect, can be demonstrated nicely if we 
consider an anthropologist who gives an overly emotional account of a particular 
culture or race of people, or a scientist who provides a flawed account of the lifecycle 
of a Puffin. In such cases one can extract the cognitive content from the non-cognitive 
content and, at the very least, see how and where each went wrong. Perhaps, for 
instance, the scientist studying Puffins found them particularly endearing birds and 
allowed his attempted objective account to suffer as a result of a tendency to 
anthropomorphise them. Now, one might still be able to extract the raw data from this 
account, or a new attempt at providing an account might have to be made. Whatever 
the case, such non-cognitive I cognitive distinctions are very useful in diagnosing such 
problems insofar as one can extract such subjective, human tendencies (such as the 
propensity to anthropomorphise) from providing a completely dispassionate account 
of the nature of something. That said, to anthropomorphise is part of what it is to be a 
human being and should not be dismissed as something we should always attempt to 
eradicate in order to be better human beings. That such a characteristic can be 
obstructive in certain situations, is doubtless true (as in above example) - but it is 
also, among other things, a vital tool in our conceptual apparatus that allows 
appreciation of other creatures, and can also afford us great comfort in times of 
loneliness even if such comfort is corrupt9. 
9 Consider, for instance, a young child and his favourite teddy-bear; that the soft toy can be imbued 
with human qualities is obviously a corrupt form of thought, nevertheless it can often bring great 
comfort to that child in times of need (e.g. parents rowing or divorcing, death of a family relative and 
so on). Would any reasonable person say to the child that he should stop being ridiculous and face the 
fact that such comfort is completely false, because of course the teddy-bear is purely inanimate? I do 
not think so. 
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Another way of viewing this characterisation of objectivity involves returning 
to my earlier example of someone with a navigational difficulty. In this case, the 
problem was only accidentally the problem of a particular individual and there 
definitely existed right and wrong answers to the question of the quickest or shortest 
route out of the wood. In other words, the solutions to such difficulties would have 
been identical for anyone lost in the same area of woodland, regardless of the 
character of the particular individual involved. As such, one can understand that the 
problem can be viewed objectively in the sense of excluding human characteristics, 
and in such a case it would make no difference whether we were human or computer. 
Nevertheless, the understanding just characterised is not the kind that I refer to 
when I consider the possibility of moral judgments being objective. However, that is 
not to say that one should make a definite distinction between two kinds of 
objectiveness - far from it. The character of objectivity remains the same, but the 
grammar of our understanding that allows for it may vary. A good way to begin to 
explain what I have in mind is to consider the idea that, whilst the above 
characterisation of objectivity allows for the increase of knowledge, it cannot be of 
any use in terms of the capacity for potential depth of character (and what it is to 
allow for one's understanding to deepen) that every human being has. In his memoir 
of Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm records some of the conversations he had with 
Wittgenstein. In one of these, Wittgenstein comments: 
Doubt, belief, certainty - like feelings, emotions, pam, etc. - have characteristic facial 
expressions. Knowledge does not have a characteristic facial expression. There is a tone of 
doubt, and a tone of conviction, but no tone of knowledge. (Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
A Memoir. OUP. p75). 
This, I think, helps to highlight the accidental nature of factual knowledge (such as the 
kind involved in my navigational example) insofar as it suggests that knowledge of 
facts does not require any particular individual - it is knowledge no matter who 
possesses it, and thus, on its own, is not enough to bring about an increase in depth of 
individual character. The otherness that I am trying to illuminate is that in which one 
clearly recognises another's humanity and, as such, recognises the 'preciousness' of 
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such a life 10. And this is not achieved merely through recognising another human 
being as a series of properties, even if one never treats those properties as means to 
ends. It must be sincerely recognised between one human and another that right and 
wrong, courage and cowardice, sincerity and trust, friendship and animosity and so 
on, exist in the world, insofar as they manifest themselves in humanity; yet they are 
not "properties" of a human being and, as such, should not be treated as knowledge 
that is propositional in kind. They are an aspect of humanity (as is shown in our 
critical vocabulary when, say, we talk of someone as a friend) that separates us from 
purely thinking things. Consequently, it should now be possible to grasp that one can 
appreciate the possibility of objectivity in a way that does not always require a purely 
cognitive view of the world. - But where does this leave subjectivity? -Surely all I 
have done is describe subjectivity and labelled it objectivity? I would answer that 
subjectivity in ethics should more or less be equated with selfishness; this selfishness 
would show up in many of one's moral judgements- such judgements can be said to 
have the property of subjectivity. Thus, if one is a selfish person, many of one's moral 
judgements will possess the property of subjectivity. More complexly, subjectivity 
conveys a lack of understanding of an 'other's' humanity, and I would suggest that 
these two characteristics are closely related; for although most people have at least 
one person in their lives who they respect, it does not necessarily follow that they 
accord that person the same capacity to grieve, be hurt and torn apart, love and so on 
that they have themselves. That is to say, a selfish human being does not see others as 
fully as he sees himself and, in this respect, I would equate selfishness with a lack of 
understanding; this I would label subjectivity. Gaita however uses the example of an 
individual suffering from a dangerous pathological condition who cannot grasp the 
reality of murders that he has committed, but who, nevertheless is aware of being 
wronged. Now, Gaita sees this kind of pathological condition as a kind of blindness to 
the reality of what it means to be another human being, and I would advocate that this 
is a kind of helpless subjectivity. This is some way removed from the average selfish 
person however, and I do not wish to be understood as equating the two. The point I 
am trying to make is that the possibility of objectivity exists in more than just taking a 
human-neutral approach and that, in the way I have just described, objectivity and 
subjectivity are possible within ethics in terms of selfishness and appreciation of what 
10 I borrow the term 'preciousness' from Raimond Gaita's book Good and Evil: An Absolute 
Conception. 
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it means to be an 'other' human being. This is what I meant when I said earlier that 
moral judgements are necessarily, but not simply, personal. They are not simply 
individual preferences (although they can be if one is selfish); rather they are 
necessarily personal in a way that involves full appreciation of an 'other's' humanity. 
I hope to have at least created doubt about the conception of moral thought that has 
everything truth-valued against everything else 11 • 
1.6. The Abstract Moral Dilemma and Public and Personal Morality 
What is confusing with abstract moral dilemmas, is that it is possible to give 
them to philosophy students and for them to spend time attempting to find the right 
position to adopt or thing to do, in the same sense as finding the right direction in 
which to travel when lost and confronted by a crossroads, or trying to find the right 
way out of the wood; they deliberate, discuss with each other, and attempt to find out 
what to do, and in most cases there is often a great deal of disagreement. Here, I think, 
it would be prudent to distinguish between two overlapping ideas viz., personal and 
public morality; although this is not a topic I wish to spend a great deal of time on -
since my main concern is describing what occurs when each of us makes moral 
judgments and that such judgements are necessarily but not simply personal - it is 
nonetheless necessary to address it to avoid certain objections. Needless to say, 
personal moral judgments are of the kind where a particular person is implicated in 
the choice. Public (or political) morality, by contrast, deals with a situation where no 
pru1icular person is implicated in the choice, but where a coherent public policy has to 
be adopted - the big issues in the media provide good examples of this. These kinds 
of problems must be worth discussing with philosophy students - indeed, with anyone 
come to that. 
Intuitively, it is tempting to speak of collective moral decision, and suggest 
that any such decisions are based on some sort of utilitarian mandate. Putting aside 
political cynicism, on this intuitive conception, government decisions in healthy 
democracies are generally based on affording the greatest satisfaction to the greatest 
number under its jurisdiction; whatever the case in terms of difference between 
political or public moral decisions and personal moral judgments, consequentialists 
will see no inconsistency there, insofar as they believe that this should be the case 
11 In the same way as (for instance in mathematics) 2+2=4 makes sense because of its relationship with 
2+ I =3 and 2+ 3=5 and so on. 
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personally as well. However, some philosophers reject consequentialism on the 
individual level, but endorse it politically i.e., they might believe that while 
individuals should never perpetrate acts of evil for a good outcome, politically 
speaking, acts of evil can be justified in terms of considering the greater good of the 
country as a whole. Indeed, some might speak of political obligation in this way, and 
would consider a government negligent or foolish if, when required, it refused to act 
in such a fashion. My point is that one cannot separate the political from the ethical, 
since one's conception of political responsibility itself relies on one's ethical 
conceptions; but that is not to deny that there are separate issues between the public 
and personal, nor is it to deny that political issues can throw up moral ones. 
Nevertheless, I would intuitively suggest, that to hold out for consequentialism 
politically but not personally, is to show that either one's view is inconsistent, or that 
one's whole ethical conception contains underlying consequentialist sympathies. Is 
this right?- Are we all, at the end of the day, consequentialists? There are similarities 
between fair and just politics and personal moral judgements, the most important of 
which I take to be the recognition of right and wrong in both moral spheres. One can 
judge the actions and motives of a government as being terrible or evil - consider for 
instance the regimes of Saddam Hussein or Adolf Hitler; these regimes chose to do 
evil rather than being forced into a situation where they were required to do it. One 
can also judge governments of other countries in terms of whether they acted in the 
right or wrong way towards such terribleness and evil. Perhaps one thinks of 
responses as proportional to the nature and depth of the wrong committed; certainly 
that is the case in terms of individual crime. If, for instance, we consider the crime of 
murder, generally speaking, the punishment for such a crime is life imprisonment; and 
this is not simply a shallow and thoughtless consequence of wanting to rid society of a 
dangerous lawbreaker, it is bound up with the very notion of what murder actually is 
viz., a form of evil which can only (without sentimental anthropomorphising) be 
attributed to human beings. Such evil is a violation of what is just, and an 
appreciation of evil or wrong done, and the demand for justice in the face of it, entails 
punishment. Thus punishment should be seen in the same light as good, evil, and 
justice - or indeed, as a part of justice. The consequentialist, I think, would employ 
political examples to show that, since one can establish definite connections between 
personal and public morality, that personal morality must be made of the same stuff. 
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In other words according to the consequentialist, we must at all ethics 'levels' be 
fundamentally consequentialist. 
If we accept this however, then it forces us to dismiss from consideration the 
possibility of the profound appreciation of otherness (i.e. over and above welfare) and, 
consequently, punishment would be merely a way of ridding ourselves of undesirable 
and I or dangerous elements in our society. Now, I'm not denying that part of the 
reason for imprisoning criminals is to stop them harming others, but if it were the 
whole reason, then why not imprison all criminals, from petty thieves to pathological 
killers, for the rest of their lives 12? After all, although it is possible that they might not 
re-offend once released, it is quite possible that they will, and thus still be a menace to 
society and, formally and inductively speaking, this might well be the way to proceed. 
But the point is that it is not the reasonable or just way to proceed, and that is because 
part of what it is to be human, is to have a sense of justice13. If the authorities were to 
act in the way just described, we would think them mad or insane - this is a very 
important point and one that I will return to when I discuss the nature of moral 
thought. 
Nevertheless, it seems that we are still faced with the idea that political 
decisions are fundamentally consequentialist, and also with the close connection 
(through concepts such as evil) between such decisions and personal moral 
judgments. I accept that there is a concrete connection between public or political 
decisions and personal moral judgment - indeed, I would argue that the existence of a 
politic is fundamentally ethical insofar as it has, pervading through it, a sense of right, 
wrong, and justice, and must have this in order to be political 14• However, that is not 
to say that all aspects of politics are brimming with justice - some are highly unjust, 
but they are recognised as such and (certainly in our political system), generally 
speaking, opposed. In oppressive totalitarian regimes there is very little, if any, justice 
in the upper echelons of power, and certainly no occasion for opposition as, by and 
large, the ruling despot seems to have very little understanding of the humanity of 
others (his subjects). Such despots must necessarily see their subjects as "not as 
human as themselves" in order to act the way they do, but that is not to say that they 
12 In many cases, pathological killers cannot be rehabilitated and so are imprisoned for life. 
13 Pathological killers are a slightly different and (interesting cases) in that they fail (as a result of 
cerebral malfunction) to recognise fully the humanity of another human - although they are quite 
capable of recognising when it is they who have been wronged. 
14 Such a sense of justice can often be corrupt (or corrupted) however, but that is a different issue. 
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would not be able to recognise their subjects as human beings from photographs or 
books on biology; rather, it means that they fail to understand what it is that makes a 
human life i.e. a sense of justice, right, wrong, courage, cowardice, the capacity for 
friendship, love and the appreciation of beauty et cetera. No doubt they recognise 
these traits within themselves when they occur, which is how (the way in which) they 
are so selfish (and subjective), and further authenticates the claim that they must 
necessarily look upon their subjects as "not as human as themselves". 
Naturally there will be times when, politically, a government is pushed into 
the disagreeable position where it has to decide between two courses of action that 
will involve the deaths of innocent people; such decisions consequentialists use to 
advance their argument. However, they miss what is important viz., that 
fundamentally, justice remains at the heart of the decision, even if those who have 
made the decision have only thought about it in terms of the best possible outcome. 
For in this case, the government is trying to come to a decision that will minimise the 
loss of innocent human life. The point I am making here is that whilst such extreme 
decision-making is in agreement with the consequentialist argument, not all decision 
making will be so; there will be times when the demands of justice conflict with the 
best outcome for the many. However, it is interesting to note how the consequentialist 
employs such extreme examples; they attempt to persuade us that a political situation 
in which some form of wickedness is necessary, is itself a moral consideration and 
that, as such, moral considerations are therefore consequentialist. I shall try and make 
this clearer. Suppose a political situation arises in which the taking of innocent human 
life becomes unavoidable. The politicians are thus forced to consider which course of 
action will spare the most lives, but that is not a decision that rests within morality - it 
is a political decision that is connected to morality only by a sense of humanity and 
justice. In such a case, morality is in opposition to politics (public decision making) 
because a moral consideration - i.e. one within morality - would never require 
wickedness. In this way, morality exists outside of politics -for one cannot (morally) 
weigh human life in terms of quantity saved; to do so would be to trivialise its 
meaning. This point can be extended to examples that are less 'public' or 'political', 
and in this respect I want to take an example that Nagel provides in his book A View 
From Nowhere. 
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You have an auto accident one winter night on a lonely road. The other passengers are badly 
injured, the car is out of commission, and the road is deserted, so you run along it till you find 
an isolated house. The house turns out to be occupies by an old woman who is looking after 
her small grandchild. There is no phone, but there is a car in the garage, and you ask 
desperately to borrow it, and explain the situation. She doesn't believe you. Terrified by your 
desperation she runs upstairs and locks herself in the bathroom, leaving you alone with the 
child. You pound ineffectively on the door and search without success for the car keys. Then it 
occurs to you that she might be persuaded to tell you where they are if you were to twist the 
child's arm outside the bathroom door. Should you do it? (Nagel, T. 'VFN'.pl76). 
Leaving aside the callousness of the grandmother locking herself in the bathroom and 
leaving her grandchild (she was supposed to be caring for) alone to face the perceived 
horror outside, the issue here is that Nagel's example is comparable to the political 
decisions I described that require wickedness. In other words (assuming that the only 
possibilities are that either the child's arm gets twisted or the passengers in the car fail 
to get to hospital), some kind of harm is necessary, and in this respect, whatever 
decision is made rests outside morality. Nagel invokes the call to morality at the 
wrong point. 
The consequentialist however, would argue that we should see the requirement 
to commit an act of wickedness as a moral requirement, in terms of choosing the 
option in which the fewest number of people are harmed or killed. In other words, the 
consequentialist sees a consideration that is in opposition to a moral consideration as a 
moral consideration. If we are to accept the consequentialist line as proper moral 
thought, then a necessary consequence is that human life is quantity-valued. And how 
can one weigh a single human life against ten or a thousand? 
In this section I have sought to show the difference between public and 
personal morality; public morality essentially belongs to the realm of political 
decision and, while much of the time the two happily harmonize, there are times when 
they come into conflict. When this happens, one must take care not to treat a political 
decision that requires necessary wickedness, as existing within the realm of the moral. 
So where exactly does the boundary lie between public (political) decision and 
personal moral judgement? To talk of exactness in this realm is, I think, misleading -
for we are then compelled to think in terms of propositions, i.e. in terms of finding a 
formula that establishes a standpoint from which all considerations can be determined 
as fitting into one or other camp. This, I think, is one of the classic cases in which one 
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should employ Wittgenstein's maxim for philosophical method in his Philosophical 
Investigations - namely: 'Don't think, but look!' (PI:66). In subsequent examinations 
of the nature of moral thought, I look at the role that the proposition plays in such 
thought and examine whether it has a part to play in moral objectivity. I also spend 
longer arguing against the notion that morality should be seen purely in terms of a 
guide to conduct. 
1. 7. The Scope of a Situation 
However, what is unique about a moral dilemma is that it is only truly vital to 
those actually involved in the situation in which the dilemma is apparent. 
Nevertheless, this surely depends on what one understands as the scope of the 
situation- for instance, I can be concerned about my 15-year-old daughter's choice of 
how to deal with her pregnancy without actually being involved in her choice. I would 
suggest that to consider my concern as a moral dilemma is to fall foul of an error 
similar to that of the one I described the consequentialist as making in the previous 
section. A slight variation exists here however, in terms of what counts as 
consideration. With the political example in the previous section, there was an actual 
consideration viz., to find a way to spare the largest number of innocent lives. In this 
case, I may be concerned that my daughter does the right thing in terms of herself and 
the unborn child and thus show my moral sensibility but, providing I do not interfere 
with her decision making beyond offering advice I am, so to speak, out of the moral 
loop. The moral requirement is on my daughter and, in this sense, the moral scope of 
the situation only extends as far as she does; the decision is fundamentally hers 15 • The 
politicians that were required to make a decision involving an act of wickedness were 
also outside of the moral loop in terms of moral consideration. This is essentially what 
I mean by moral scope. What causes confusion, as Gaita highlights, is that the kind of 
thought bound up in moral thinking is different from that involved in non-moral 
thinking, but is not conceived as such; rather, anything that doesn't come under the 
realm of impersonal thought is believed to be located elsewhere: 
The perplexity arises because one treats the difficulty of seeing what (morally) to do as a 
difficulty for thought which is no different in kind for the person whose problem it is than for 
15 Naturally one might say that, in a situation such as this, a father has a moral obligation to advise his 
young daughter. That is, no doubt, true, but in such a case the moral onus is on the father and not the 
daughter thus making it a different (albeit closely related) moral problem. 
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a class of moral philosophy students rehearsing an exercise in 'practical ethics'. And this is 
because of a general conception of what thinking is and of the way in which it is impersonal: 
thinking has to do with propositions, their truth-value and their logical bearing upon one 
another, and these can be assessed by anyone with the requisite capacities of mind, none of 
which make necessary reference to the individual who has them. Hence it is felt that, if we are 
to understand the way in which morality is personal, then we must locate its personal character 
somewhere other than in thought. (Gaita. TPE. p 130-1) 
What needs to be made explicit then, is in what sense moral thought is thought. 
Before this is done however, it is worth mentioning some of the consequences of 
believing that anything that is not thought, in the sense that it can be assessed 'by 
anyone with the requisite capacities of mind' (ibid.) is located elsewhere. Suppose 
that one is in a situation in which there is a deep-seated moral issue that one is wholly 
serious about, and that it is insufferably difficult to know what to do 16 - what often 
happens in moral philosophy is that while the existence of a moral dilemma is 
recognised, it is forgotten that the person who is actually involved stands in relation to 
a reality that a class of moral philosophers (or anyone else for that matter) do not, viz. 
access to that person's whole life in an intimate and profound sense 17• Now, this is not 
relevant to public or political decision of the kind I described in section 1.6, but it 
might be argued that a class of moral philosophers can have access to enough of the 
relevant parts of another person's life- for instance, if the person involved is a trained 
lifeguard or a doctor then they can expect him to do things that others would not - to 
be sufficiently connected to that person's life in terms of making such a decision. 
Moreover, it can be argued that in some cases, my close friends know me better than I 
know myself. I shall address this last point first. 
I have already highlighted the differences between practical problems such as 
navigational difficulties and moral problems; there are definite answers to 
navigational problems (consider the shmtest or quickest way out of the wood, for 
instance) that are propositional in form and can be remembered in a way that allow an 
individual to claim that he is knowledgeable. As such, I can be an authority on the 
navigational complexities of my local patch of woodland and it would be sensible to 
16 I use the word "insufferably" deliberately in order to convey how heavily the (moral) dilemma must 
weigh on the individual. Critical concepts such as this one are largely ignored in moral philosophy and 
wrongly so. I deal with this neglect in chapters 3 and 4. 
17 In the same way as (say) a man has access to his love for his wife in a way that no one else does 
(even if she had another lover). 
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ask me for advice on that topic if visiting the area for the first time. To ask my best 
friend (or anyone for that matter) for moral advice is a completely different story and 
can be demonstrated firstly, by the conspicuous lack of moral 'experts' and moral 
instruction booklets and secondly by the individual nature of moral response. I might 
later say that the advice I received from my friend was sound, but that is not the same 
thing as saying that my friend imparted knowledge to me. First of all, it was my moral 
response to the initial problem and, in the face of insecurity and uncertainty, I 
subsequently went to my friend for advice; I think this is why people often claim that 
moral responses are entirely subjective. To assert that my friend "knows me better 
than I know myself' is, I think, more an expression of admiration of the 
appropriateness of the advice he gave me (and that obviously includes admiration of 
his insightfulness into a particular aspect of my character). To suggest that he actually 
knows me better than I know myself is absurd since that would involve him having 
two characters mutually analysing each other (i.e. mine and his); moreover, the two 
characters would each possess unique biographies and, as such, exclusive historically 
achieved individualities. So, not only are the class of moral philosophers outside the 
scope of the moral aspect of the situation (as in the case of the father and his pregnant 
15-year-old daughter outlined earlier), but they have comparatively little insight into 
the character of the protagonists. As such, they will only be able to look at the 
problem in terms of seeing morality as a guide to conduct and for that they will no 
doubt appeal to various ethical theories. Seeing morality purely in terms of a guide to 
conduct is, I argue, mistaken since one cannot treat it as such and simultaneously see 
the human being as a sensitive moral agent able to understand the requirements of 
right and wrong and what it means to be wicked. Such moral affection is uniquely 
personal as is the guilt engendered by an action that is understood by the perpetrator 
as being morally suspect. Guilt itself is a phenomenon peculiar to morality and what it 
means to be a human being; everyone has the capacity for guilt, but it is not 
something that can be shared except in a sense of false fellowship. 
All the same, what about the sense of guilt felt by modern Germans for 
atrocities committed by their country in the earlier half of the 201h Century? - Surely 
that is collective? Such guilt, I think, would be better understood and characterized as 
shame; guilt is closely related to the actions and thoughts of particular individuals and 
manifests itself through an understanding (by the perpetrator) of the violation of his 
victim's humanity and, simultaneously, what he himself has become. -And this, in 
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turn, is intimately related to the particularity of the victim. However, the grandsons of 
those who were responsible for a country's misdemeanours share their grandfathers' 
sense of national identity- indeed it is such historical influence (among other things) 
that conditions a sense of national identity. The grandfathers provide their grandsons 
with a sense of heritage which is necessary for a properly conditioned sense of 
national identity; as such, the sons and grandsons can be (and indeed should be) 
ashamed of their grandfathers' participation in their country's atrocities 18.- But that is 
not to say that such (active) shame should persist forever - it should last no longer 
than three or four generations; for once more than three or so generations have passed, 
the acuteness of wrongs done begins to disperse and wane in the currents of cultural 
change. One can still acknowledge wrongs committed, but it would make no sense for 
me to feel actively ashamed of my country for acts committed two-hundred years ago, 
unless no (or inadequate) recompense had been given in the spirit of repentance; or 
unless shameful actions persisted. Ultimately, one can only properly take pride in 
one's country's achievements if one also accepts the possibility of being ashamed of 
its misdemeanours. 
Raimond Gaita describes the false fellowship of the guilty as 'a guilty 
collective' (Gaita, 'TPE' p.l29), and goes on to argue for the radically personal nature 
of guilt by pointing out that while it is possible for one individual to recognise 
another's guilt and share in it to the point where both parties realise they have 
perpetrated an immoral act, there exists only 'corrupt consolation' (ibid.) in such 
fellowship- the nature of the guilt itself being 'radically personal' (ibid.). The point 
that I am trying to raise is that the individual recognition of guilt displays the moral 
sensitivity of the agent, but also (more importantly) shows the moral understanding of 
that individual as being incomplete before he perpetrated the act that caused him such 
guilt. As such, morality and guilt are inextricably linked and consequently moral 
understanding extends far beyond the point of guiding conduct (unlike the 
navigational problem). For if one treats morality simply as a guide to conduct, then 
right and wrong become nothing more than another set of guiding concepts - the same 
as those involved in how to find the right way out of the wood; that is not to allow for 
deepened understand of the meaning of one's actions. Merely following a series of 
propositions does not in itself ensure understanding in this respect. 
18 And indeed, those who committed acts of wickedness should be haunted by their guilt. 
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Now, in terms of the argument that a class of moral philosophers can have 
access to enough of the relevant parts of another person's life to be sufficiently 
connected to that life to make moral judgements, it is an argument that still considers 
morality purely in terms of a guide to conduct. Certainly they can expect the lifeguard 
or the doctor to do things that they cannot not do, and maybe this will affect the action 
taken at the time a dilemma occurs. The point is however, that such concerns are 
extraneous to the moral problem in a similar way to the political decision (see section 
1.5.). The doctor or lifeguard may see it as a requirement to exercise their specialist 
skills, but the moral requirement is to try to save a life and this is extraneous to being 
a doctor or a lifeguard 19• This is quite clear if we consider that a doctor's or 
lifeguard's conception of good and evil is not radically different from our own. 
Granted, their biographies and capacity for depth may be different from yours or 
mine, but that is not a difference that is determined by whether they are a doctor or a 
lifeguard, and certainly has little effect (over and above their respective unique 
biographies and characters) on their potential for deepened moral understanding. Why 
not substitute the example of a doctor or lifeguard for that of a philosopher? Surely 
they have relevant skills in knowing what morally to do?20 
19 1t might be the case that a doctor or lifeguard is more likely to save a life in a particular situation, but 
this is a different issue. 
20 (I think not!) 
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CHAPTER II 
2.0. Misconceptions of the Nature of Morality and Morality as a calculus of action. 
One of the effects of considering morality as a guide to conduct is that the 
philosopher falls back on some form of universal theory such as the Universalizability 
thesis or Consequentialism: "Do what would bring about the most happiness and keep 
pain and unhappiness to a minimum etc., etc." - The point here is that this approach 
may very well not suit the individual concerned and any action based on it may leave 
him morally uncomfortable. Why is this so? This question will be addressed directly 
later on; for now, I wish to consider in more detail the effects that treating moral 
problems with impersonal thought - rather than allowing for a moral deliberation 
being of a special kind- has on moral philosophy. In considering these effects, I shall 
also make explicit in what sense a moral 'thought' is thought. 
The kind of impersonal thinking being discussed runs deep in moral 
philosophy and, in looking at it and its attendant consequences, I follow closely the 
arguments advanced by Winch in 'UMJ'. Winch concentrates his attack on the 
Universalizability thesis (i.e. that a correct moral position should be applicable to all) 
and in particular on the form developed by Henry Sidgwick in his book The Methods 
of Ethics; in doing so, he uses Herman Melville's story Billy Budd in an attempt to 
show that Universalizing moral judgements is not plausible21 • Sidgwick argues: 
We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong forB, unless we can find in the natures 
or circumstance of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for 
difference in their duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly 
judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my 
own in certain important respects. 
If a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for 
someone else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, other than 
the fact that I and he are different persons. (Sidgwick. H. The Methods of Ethics. P.384-5. 
Quoted in Winch. 'UMJ'. 1972). 
Sidgwick here maintains that I am obliged to be consistent in my (moral) judgement 
of actions perpetrated by different individuals; that is to say that if I act in a way that I 
deem to be right- having asked the question: what ought I to do?- and my best friend 
21 It should be noted that Sidgwick's version of the Universalizability thesis is derived from Kant's 
Categorical Imperative. Many of the objections made are equally relevant to Kant. 
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acts in a different way in a situation not relevantly different - then I cannot (unless I 
have changed my mind in the interim) judge my friend to be right also. Now Sidgwick 
might respond by saying that the situations are different and thus his 
universalizability still holds. If however one suggests that the situations are different 
purely in terms of the agent, then this negates the possibility of an applicable 
universalizability thesis since every agent is different; it follows that, in such a case, 
universalizability could only exist in a speculative theory with no practical 
application. I do not imagine that Sidgwick would argue for this, since he thinks that 
actions are only accidentally connected to particular agents. Winch however, argues 
that when an agent responds to such an ought question: 
[T]here is nothing in the meaning of the word 'ought' which logically commits him to 
accepting as a corollary: 'And anyone else in a situation like this ought to do the same'. 
(Winch. 'UMJ'. 1972). 
Now, if one takes what Winch says prudentially, then it is quite a simple matter to 
show that he is wrong; for instance, if it rains, I can say that "you ought to take an 
umbrella!" and this is a statement that can be applied to all human beings, given 
certain physical facts about them (and umbrellas). However, the argument only carries 
weight if one sees morality purely as a guide to conduct with every thought truth-
valued against every other. If this was the case, then one could be morally 
knowledgeable, as the right course of action would merely involve drawing on a bank 
of propositions or, at most, deducing the correct course of action from what one 
already knows. The mistake (as alluded to earlier) that Sidgwick makes, is that he sees 
moral dilemmas as being subject to the same kind of thought (grammar) that one 
employs with non-moral dilemmas (such as navigational difficulties). Such thought 
truth-values particular thoughts against all others and demands consistency. He does 
not believe that the kind of agent making the judgement has any logical bearing on 
what ought to be done. Of course, the identity of the agent is irrelevant to the 
correctness of the judgement that what he did was wrong: it was theft, and I don't care 
whether he is a prince or a pauper, it is still wrong. The question that needs to be 
looked at is that which asks why theft warrants moral consideration and moral 
condemnation. Winch comments: 
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For Sidgwick, ethics is a sort of calculus of action, in which actions are considered as events 
merely contingently attached to particular agents. (ibid.) 
It is the calculus of action, seeming neglect for the character of the problem, and the 
conception of morality that apparently has no room for what it means to deepen one's 
moral understanding (insofar as it is only considered as a guide to conduct) that are 
problematic for Sidgwick. One can see quite clearly that the condemnation of theft is 
not just the condemnation of an action; it is a remark that indicates an understanding 
of the meaning of an action - indeed it says very little purely in terms of the action 
alone. The perpetrator of a theft can be seen, I think, as a paradigm of the kind of 
subjectivity that I outlined earlier viz., that he will not have thought too much about 
the meaning of his (future) action or, if he has, then he has no more than a diminished 
understanding of the humanity of others. That is not to say however, that he would not 
consider stealing as wrong; if he were asked whether such behaviour was wrong the 
response would, most likely, be the affirmative. And he would, no doubt, feel 
aggrieved were something similar to happen to him. Now, if the thief is sensitive to 
the nature of the wrong he has committed, then he will feel guilty about his actions -
and he will see that what he has done extends far beyond the act to the disregarding of 
another's humanity; it hurts him also. If he is not sensitive to the nature of the wrong 
he as perpetrated then, either he suffers from a condition that prevents such perception 
(which is a different case), or he is supremely selfish and lacking in understanding. 
Such a condition can be changed by various means, but I think someone who suffers 
selfishness to the point where they do not feel guilt - providing they do not have a 
mitigating medical condition - discards all care for other human beings. - And I 
would suggest that in such cases, the perpetrator cannot be tempted, since this would 
imply an understanding, no matter how distorted, of the meaning of his intended 
action; he would realise that temptation means straying away from what he would 
consider as proper behaviour, or as something that would be in line with how he 
would normally act. Now, if one is tempted (and thus shows oneself to be morally 
aware) to commit an act that one believes is morally questionable, then it is often the 
case that one does not grasp fully the meaning of what one is doing. Gaita 
demonstrates this nicely in Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception when he talks 
about the evildoer 'getting more than he bargained for' (Gaita.G&E. p231). What this 
means is that by not fully understanding the meaning of the action one has been 
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tempted to commit, one acquires, or becomes, something that one had not considered. 
Someone who is tempted to steal (all the time realising that stealing is wrong), 
because they are bewitched by the prospect of becoming rich, whilst acquiring what 
they desire, also becomes something else viz., a thief. The understanding of what they 
have become is not something that they considered prior to committing theft; and 
even if they retain what they have gained through the theft, the money can be in no 
way be as sweet as first hoped, precisely because of the guilt (or remorse) weighing 
against such sweetness. The money becomes tainted with the reality of that fact that 
one has become a thief. In such a case, a good person forfeits what he thought he 
would gain through material wealth and thus hurts himself also. One might conjecture 
that if such an individual understood exactly what he would be doing to himself (as 
well as others)- and thus fully, then he would not commit the crime. 
I hope to have shown here, that ethics is far more than a calculus of action; it 
involves an understanding of the meaning of one's actions and, if one is sincere, a 
desire to deepen such understanding. But how does this show that actions are not 
'merely contingently attached to particular agents'? (ibid.). If actions were only 
accidentally attached to particular agents, then an understanding of right and wrong 
would not be necessary in each case; the agent would just need knowledge of a bank 
of right and wrong propositions from which they could deduce the correct course of 
action. The idea of an acquired maturity and character (something that cannot be 
granted through a series of propositions) would be superfluous, and this is why, in 
short, such an account can never explain what it means for moral understanding to 
deepen - for greater moral understanding is acquired through depth of character 
which, in turn, only comes with maturity. 
2.1. Moral Language and Learning by 'Being Moved' 
This is why we have different vocabulary to describe people, their depth of 
character, sense of justice, their love and so on. It is through such language that one 
can, for example, reflect on another person's life, learn and achieve a greater moral 
understanding. 
There is a profound (and simple) difference, for instance, between what we 
mean when we describe someone as immature rather than sensible, or mature rather 
than silly or juvenile. We might say that a child possesses a very mature attitude in the 
light of the death of his father, and this is to make the child an exception in our eyes. 
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His status as a child is, if only in terms of his attitude in the light of his father's death, 
defying his years, and this neatly captures what I am trying to say viz., that such 
vocabulary is not just whimsical expression - rather it is necessary and, as such, 
cannot be reduced without corruption. A child is distinct from an adult in the sense 
that a child is childish and there is nothing exceptional in this; an adult, whose 
behaviour or attitude falls short of standards of maturity that one might expect, runs 
the risk of being termed childish and here there is exception - there is the expectation 
of a level of maturity associated with adulthood. If an adult is incapable of exercising 
such maturity, then it is generally thought that they suffer from a condition which 
places them outside the norm, and appropriate vocabulary exists to describe this 
also22 . Our moral vocabulary is similar, in that it possesses at its most extreme levels, 
pure Good and Evil with various diluted versions occupying the ground in between. 
Paradigms of either are seldom if ever seen, and should be treated more or less as the 
umbrella terms under which meaningful moral discourse is possible; I think Gaita 
treats the Holocaust as the result of pure evil - and perhaps he is right, but even here 
there is debate, with various polemicists denying its existence. I am not going to stand 
on one side or other with this particular issue, but it does raise some interesting points 
concerning the nature of much western moral philosophy. One of the most significant 
is its propensity to try to avoid direct encounters with vocabulary such as "evil"; 
indeed, there are some who attempt to deny its existence altogether. My argument is 
that such modes of description should be actively embraced as, I believe, they occupy 
the same area of language as, say, the child whose attitude is "mature" beyond his 
years. One does not need to define such maturity in a child, one merely needs the 
sensitivity and relevant critical capacities to recognise such instances of it, and the 
light in which they occur; in the example above, it was maturity in the light of the 
death of the child's father. For absolute understanding and recognition of the child's 
mature attitude we also need to see the love that the child has for his father and 
appreciate that the child has a complete understanding of what his father's death 
means (these are the relevant critical capacities). This is not to find a universal amount 
of detachment from which we can all view and correctly criticise such scenarios - for 
that one would just require a theory or formula that could be put into practice at such 
times. Likewise, when I talk of moral understanding, I mean a kind of understanding 
22 There is nothing in what I have said here that should be taken as an opinion about how to behave 
towards such people. 
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in which we have been moved in a way we cannot call knowledge, in the same way as 
none of us can be said to have knowledge of maturity; we may possess a mature 
outlook and be sensitive enough and critical enough to recognise genuine 
manifestations of it in others, but that is not knowledge - although it might be wisdom 
that manifests itself in an ability to be rational. If one did have knowledge of maturity 
then it would be perfectly possible to explain it to others in the same way as 
explaining, say, the answer to a mathematical problem to a child. Thus, when I speak 
of moral understanding I am speaking of a phenomenon that is, in a sense, mysterious 
- not in a way that suggests we could have such knowledge if only we did not possess 
such limited intellects, but in a way that cannot be penetrated by explanation. - And 
this, I think, is where our capacity for moral understanding emanates from - that is, 
our capacity to learn by being moved. 
We can be moved by experience to become cynical and we can be moved in 
far more immediate ways, such as by beautiful poetry or music; and our respective 
characters are such, that we are not all moved by the same things. Our capacity to be 
moved by beauty or someone's love is, I think, a part of what makes us human beings; 
love is most certainly a human characteristic, though (as a phenomenon and as 
something from which we can learn) it seems to have been largely ignored in the 
realm of western moral philosophy23 . There are many ways in which we can be 
moved by someone's love- it may have nothing to do with love for ourselves, or the 
love we feel for another; we might (for instance) be moved simply to appreciate the 
sanctity of all human life by the recognition of one human being's love for another.-
And different people may be moved to recognise the value of life in different ways. I 
am not in any way suggesting that love is the only phenomenon from which this 
happens - there is awareness of justice and fairness (for example), but I think that 
they are all very closely associated. In relation to this (and the earlier example), I 
believe that such aspects of humanity come into play when we critically judge a 
particular child to possess a mature attitude in the light of the loss of his father. Thus, 
concepts such as love, fairness, and maturity are all concepts that are involved in 
moral understanding and, moreover, can (and should) be used critically. The more we 
critically exercise such concepts in pursuit of moral understanding, the greater that 
understanding will become (such understanding is not attained through the acquisition 
23 Kant, for instance, says very little about where the sanctity of human life actually comes from. 
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of propositional knowledge). Another example of how we learn by being moved is to 
consider the love that one human being has for another, and the power that such love 
has to move them (to marry for instance). If an individual loses someone very dear to 
his heart, then for a while at least, he may feel a great void in his life; this cannot be 
rationalised in a way in which he can completely account for his feelings of loss and 
emptiness. In other words, such things cannot be put into propositional form, no 
matter how complex. It is our being moved, in ways such as this, which accounts for 
our belief in the sanctity of human life. Those who fail to see such things can be 
considered as holding a subjective attitude i.e. not fully recognising the humanity of 
another and thus unable to be properly objective in moral matters -unless of course 
they have some medical condition. 
If we accept that one can learn by being moved - and I think one has to - then 
we are faced with the prospect of acquiring the capacity to judge through what we 
have learned in this way, and have come to believe. Wittgenstein comments: 'What 
we believe depends on what we learn' (Wittgenstein, L. OC: 286), and in such a sense 
our moral beliefs are likely to change over time; for learning involves far more than 
acquisition of facts. Suppose, for instance, that a child is told by its parents that a 
particular attitude or way of behaving is always morally wrong. The child may believe 
this unquestioningly for sometime; eventually however, he is forced to acknowledge 
that in a particular circumstance (to which he is privy) his parents are wrong - he is 
moved in such a way as to realise this and is certain that he is right and his parents 
wrong. Through this on-going process he achieves what Gaita terms 'an historically 
achieved individuality' (Gaita. TPE. p135) and maturity; and, depending on his 
sensitivity, a deeper moral understanding. 
2.2. Universalizability 
Another objection to Sidgwick (not made explicit by Winch) - in terms of his opinion 
that the kind of agent does not have any logical bearing on what ought to be done - is 
that I (the moral agent) have a problem that is non-accidentally mine, making it the 
kind of problem it is, and consequently (and necessarily), it has a particular shape (or 
grammar). Moreover, the Universalizability thesis necessarily requires that a 
particular problem has the same character for all members of the class directly related 
to it, which (if we accept that it is the agent who gives a situation its moral 
implications) must in turn, require that all those involved have identical conceptions 
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of right and wrong; if this is not so, then the problem is relevantly different. 
Nevertheless, one must be careful with such criticism insofar as the universalizability 
thesis can make room for people having different conceptions of right and wrong- for 
instance, that some of them are incorrect or incomplete. Since we cannot know 
whether this is the case or not, it seems difficult to see how we can apply the 
Universalizability thesis with any certainty. Thus if I decide I ought to do X in 
response to a situation and my friend, faced with a situation not relevantly different in 
the eyes of a spectator, decides that he ought to do Y, it may be- indeed it is probable 
- that the problem is relevantly different, insofar as it strikes my friend differently. 
This notion of striking is important; however, in order to provide a full explanation as 
to why, it is necessary to outline the story of Billy Budd to make clear the type of 
moral dilemma that we are dealing with; in short however, it is a kind of dilemma that 
exists inside morality - that to say it is a dilemma in which the person involved is 
faced with two moral 'oughts' pulling in opposite directions. 
Billy Budd is a sailor of upright character on board the English battleship 
H.M.S. Indomitable in a time when there was a high probability of mutiny; he is the 
victim of a ceaseless campaign of thoroughly unjustified persecution, perpetrated by a 
superior officer; this persecution takes the form of being falsely accused of attempting 
to incite mutiny. These events culminate in his being brought before Captain Vere (in 
charge of the ship) on such a charge. When questioned, Budd is struck dumb, and in 
frustration lashes out at his persecutor causing him to fall and hit his head - the blow 
kills him. Vere brings Budd before a court-martial, - charging him with hitting a 
fellow officer - he realises Budd in no way intended to kill his persecutor; however, 
under naval law at that time, even the hitting of a superior officer was an offence 
punishable by death. 
Vere is faced with a moral dilemma. Every law requires application and 
interpretation, and always allows for mitigation, extenuation and mercy. The other 
officers on board had misgivings about the haste with which Budd was executed -
indeed, it is probable that Vere could have had him locked up until they returned to 
port, and then handed him over to a proper court martial, without great risk to his 
career. Then, of course, it would not be his problem. But, it is his problem and this is 
what is so important; the problem was not one that - in a moral sense - could be given 
over to someone else for a 'crack at [its] solution' (Gaita, TPE pl30), and Vere, I 
think, felt that such delegation was not morally acceptable. Some might question 
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whether there is a difference between Vere handling the situation and a proper court 
mmtial back at port; but the important aspect to grasp is that Vere feels that he has a 
moral responsibility towards Budd insofar as he recognises that he (Budd) is 
profoundly innocent before God. Moreover, Vere was very close to Budd and 
believed that a court martial would find him guilty and hang him; consequently he 
thought that if Budd were to be hanged, the responsibility for the processes that lead 
to such an event should be laid at his door. I think this demonstrates that he is a 
morally serious character, and hopefully also shows what I mean by the phrase 'moral 
seriousness'. Nevertheless, there is always the danger that the phrase can be used 
trivially - for instance, if you ethically disagree with me, it is perhaps a little too easy 
for you to deflate my claim by suggesting that I am not being properly (honestly) 
morally serious. There are a few issues here (relating to 'UMJ') in terms of the 
universalizability thesis that I shall address in the following paragraph, but there is 
one important question that needs to be raised first: What are the criteria for 
distinguishing the morally serious from the morally trivial? I shall answer this 
question in full in the section on general grammar; for now it suffices to say that the 
worth of what is said relies not only on the communicator, but also on the sensitivity 
and trust of the receiver and his capacity (in such terms) to distinguish genuine belief 
from mere rhetoric. - And this, I argue, goes to make up the grammar of the situation. 
In such communication (i.e. moral communication), one cannot separate the content 
of a claim from the manner in which it is expressed. 
Yet there is a profound sense in which Budd is not guilty (before God) and 
Vere realises that the demands of martial law are in direct opposition to certain 
aspects of morality; however he 'does not see it as to be contrasted with morality sans 
phase, but as something to which he himself is morally committed.' (Winch. 'UMJ'. 
p.l56.). In other words, the dilemma that Vere possesses lies inside morality 
inasmuch as it is not a conflict between what ought to be done in a legal sense and his 
moral inclination - for then there would be no real dilemma for Vere. The point is, 
that Vere knows Budd to be innocent and is thus experiencing a dilemma between two 
incommensurable moral obligations i.e. two moral "oughts", rather than an obligation 
between his moral convictions and the law; he believes, he ought to acquit Budd and 
ensure justice is done, but he also ought to uphold the law: this is how his moral 
obligations pull in two completely different directions. It is not a case of making a 
choice between morality and the law - if this were so, then it would be just a simple 
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matter of following what the law stated ought to be done. An 'ought' in legal terms 
however, 'need have very little evaluative force; we may have simply a statement of 
facts about what is contained in the code'. (Winch. 'UMJ'. p.158.). Does this not 
leave open the possibility that Vere is just trying to make an exception in his own case 
to appease the guilt that he thinks he might feel afterwards? - It is this charge that 
Sidgwick avoids; for by maintaining that there is a right position to adopt and 
(consequently) a wrong one also, the Universalist leaves no room for an agent to make 
such an exception, yet: 
[T]here is nothing in the meaning of the word 'ought' which logically commits him to 
accepting as a corollary: 'And anyone else in a situation like this ought to do the same'. I am 
not denying that some men, in some situations, may want to go on like this; I am not claiming 
that those who do are speaking unintelligibly; I am not claiming that there are no cases in 
which anyone would be morally justified in going on like this. I am denying only that, in all 
cases, a man who refuses to accept such a corollary is thereby misusing the word 'ought' 
(Winch. 'UMJ'. P.l61). 
There are a couple of important points that need to be raised in connection with this: 
firstly, only in circumstances where the agent is not completely morally serious about 
the situation do we need to worry that they will try to make an exception in his own 
case; in such a case, it is clear that the agent is less concerned about finding the right 
moral position and more concerned about finding - and justifying - a way out of the 
problem in some way that avoids their avoidance being noted. Vere, for instance, 
could have just hidden behind the law. The important thing is that he did not do this -
being a man who was morally serious, he was sincerely concerned about finding the 
right position, but puzzled as to what it was. It is this kind of moral dilemma that I am 
concentrating on. Secondly, - and I'm thinking more of Kant with regard to this point 
-Vere' s dilemma involved two oughts and it is precisely this state of affairs that 
negates the application of a universal rule insofar as they ' ... are both taken as 
uncompromisingly universal.' (Winch. 'UMJ'. P.l62. (my emphasis)). 
It is interesting to note Vere's behaviour after Budd's execution when he 
himself is facing death (and thinking about Billy Budd); that he shows no sign of 
remorse for his decision to condemn Budd to death, attests to the assertion that he had 
indeed come to what he thought was the right decision. - But had he come to the right 
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decision? Winch maintains that, faced with the same dilemma, he would not have 
been able to condemn Budd to death: 
I believe that I could not have acted as did Vere; and by the 'could not', I do not mean 'should 
not have had the nerve to', but that I should have found it morally impossible to condemn a 
man 'innocent before God' under such circumstances .. .It is just that I think I should find the 
considerations connected with Billy Budd's peculiar innocence too powerful to be overridden 
by the appeal to military duty. (Winch. 'UMJ'. P.l63). 
In a moment I want to return to the difference in the kind of thinking that is involved 
in a moral judgement from that which is involved in a non-moral problem. Before I do 
however, there are two more things to be said here concerning the difference between 
Vere's and Winch's respective moral judgements on the same situation. Firstly, that 
by contradicting Vere, the Universalist necessarily maintains that Winch has judged 
Vere to have made the wrong decision, and secondly, that if one argues that this is not 
so, then surely it's just a simple case of relativism- in which case, it doesn't really 
matter. 
Now, in terms of the dilemma that exists within morality (i.e. of two moral 
oughts) and of Vere's wish (having arrived at his conclusion) to hold Budd's court 
martial prior to returning to port, one needs to examine what is morally possible for 
him and for someone (like Winch) who might disagree. First of all, as Winch remarks: 
If he [Vere] were asked to give an account of what the possibility or impossibility consisted 
in, he could only again rehearse the moral arguments which led him to his decision. But 
somebody else in such a situation, considering those very same arguments, might conclude 
that the moral possibilities were different without necessarily making any further judgement 
about what the corresponding possibilities were for Vere or for anybody else and without 
being committed to any such further judgement. (Winch. UMJ. p169) 
This demonstrates a possibility for learning that is more than purely propositional i.e. 
more than what it takes to explain, say, a mathematical problem to a child. Such 
learning, its consequent associated beliefs, and the kind of thought involved is derived 
from maturity. We learn, for instance, to be cynical if our biography is littered with 
particular kinds of occurrence in which our beliefs are found to be false - particularly 
those beliefs that are founded on trust. I am not in any way suggesting that our moral 
senses are founded on, or derived from either trust or cynicism - my point is that a 
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thought tainted with (for instance) cynicism or trust is not a thought that can be 
reliably entered into a system of thought that sees everything as truth-valued against 
everything else; moral thought, I think (and as I have attempted to indicate in earlier 
sections), is the same kind of thought. A cynical thought is different from a non-
cynical thought in a way that does not allow for the cynicism to be extracted and for 
the thought to become pure. Sometimes we can be too cynical or too trusting, and 
sometimes we have to exercise our skills in ways that rely on a form of judgement or 
criticism that does not have recourse to a theory or formula. David Wiggins remarks: 
Criticism often involves finding the right distance from the point of view of a direct 
participant; and there is no limit that can in advance be set upon that right distance, except that 
it must not reach into incomprehension. (Wiggins. NVT. Pl73) 
Now, in terms of finding (and exercising) the right amount of detachment, what does 
it mean to think properly?24 A good way to demonstrate that such judgement is 
necessary and - moreover - to show why sometimes one should reject intellectual 
purity, is to examine what goes on when one person introduces himself to another25 • If 
my response to people who introduce themselves to me is always to immediately 
question whether they are telling me the truth then, no doubt, I would be considered at 
the very least paranoid - and perhaps insane. Nonetheless, inductively speaking, it 
would make sense for at least a hint of doubt to exist inasmuch as I am aware that 
people occasionally lie. However, apart from anything else, this kind of thinking is 
generally thought of as bad, and indeed the vocabulary is there to show this - for 
instance "paranoid", "insane" and so on. 
Returning to the Winch I Vere disagreement and the universalizability thesis; 
we have two different historically achieved individualities and the emphasis placed on 
moral thinking by the universalizability thesis demands that either Winch or Vere is 
wrong. At this stage I shall advance no further arguments concerning the 
universalizability thesis, suffice to say that if we are to treat it as plausible, then there 
must be recourse to some kind of cognitive or formal theory. Now: 
24 I am not arguing for any type of sensibility theory such as those advanced by Wiggins or McDowell. 
25 I borrow this example from Chapter 17 of Raimond Gaita' s book Good and Evil: An Absolute 
Conception. 
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Since we cannot know everything about another actual person's concrete situation (including 
how it strikes him, which may make all the difference), it is nearly always presumptuous to 
suppose that another person's situation is exactly like one we have ourselves been in, or even 
like it in the relevant particulars. (Hare. R.M. 'Freedom and Reason', p49. Quoted in Winch. 
UMJ, p169) 
Consequently, even if we accept the universalizability thesis, the chances are that a 
particular - and relevant - aspect of a situation is different, for instance a person's 
disposition, personality and so on; if such things as character are indeed relevant in 
terms of individuals being struck by the same problem differently, then surely this 
makes it almost impossible to apply the universalizability thesis with any certainty. 
In this section, I have sought to lay the groundwork for the argument that 
shows that the kind of thought involved in moral judgements - and an individual's 
capacity for judgement - requires more than a purely formal (or cognitive) approach; 
it requires an understanding about what is required. 
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CHAPTER HI 
3. Moral Depth, Human Judgement and Mystery. 
When one thinks morally, what is it that one is trying to do?- I would argue, 
in line with Gaita, that it is in some sense an attempt to deepen one's moral 
understanding. Now, if one adopts, say, the Universalist approach to moral 
judgements, can this happen?- If we consider morality purely in terms of a guide to 
conduct - which the universalist must do, since they consider that there are 
Universalizable right and wrong answers to moral questions - then certainly we can 
develop and learn morally, since it can be reduced to a case of becoming acquainted 
with scenarios and being trained in which way to react. But if this is so, then there 
should be moral experts, since it is precisely the same sort of learning that is involved 
in learning to take a right turn just after the pillar box in order to take the shortest and 
quickest route to the pub. In other words, I learn morally in the same way as I would 
learn how to get to and from various places in London as a cabbie. Of course, (with 
this kind of thinking) it is not plausible to expect even a highly morally educated man 
to know what to do in every situation, in the same sense as it is not reasonable to 
expect a London cabbie to know all the quickest and shortest routes to and from all 
places in the world from any given location. The difficulty with this kind of thinking 
however, is that I don't really need more than a good memory in order to be morally 
aware. But in theory, at least, it would be possible for any cabbie to find out any route 
from any location. It should be noted however, that a good doctor (for instance) not 
only has a good memory of the relevant facts, but he has the relevant skills, and he has 
been trained to look at his patients in a special way. Such skills and ways of looking at 
patients and the ways in which they are exercised, make the difference between an 
ordinary doctor and a good (or great) doctor. But these are not skills that can be 
taught; they come with experience and maturity and are also the product of a kind of 
sensitivity and critical awareness of the medical problems about which one has learnt. 
Consequently some doctors are better than others, even if they have similar levels of 
medical erudition; they are better able to judge the needs of their patient. To speak of 
such judgement is to return to Wiggins's point that I highlighted earlier, concerning 
the right level of detachment required in order to make good judgements. 
Nevertheless, in opposing this idea of morality and the nature of moral thought (as 
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propositional and as a guide to conduct) associated with it, I am not saying that there 
is no such thing as moral knowledge, for none of us is morally ignorant. 
So what is it for one's moral understanding to deepen and why is it important in the 
sense of understanding the rightness or wrongness of a moral judgement? - Gaita 
maintains that: 
Much moral thinking is not thinking what to do and, even when it is, it is also an attempt to 
understand the significance of what one would be doing, which rarely means thinking of the 
empirical consequences of what one would do, or of how one's principles stand in relation to 
those consequences and to one another. It is, most often, an attempt to achieve a deepened 
understanding of the meaning of one's action. (Gaita. TPE. pl33.(emphasis orig.)) 
In Gaita's terms, it is now no longer problematic for Winch to argue that: 
... [I]f A says 'X is the right thing for me to do' and if B, in a situation not relevantly different, 
says 'X is the wrong thing for me to do', it can be that both are correct. That is, it may be that 
neither what each says, nor anything entailed by what each says, contradicts anything said or 
implied by the other. (Winch. 'UMJ'. P.I64. 1972.) 
In what sense is this no longer problematic? - Surely Winch still faces the charge of 
relativism26? What needs to be understood is, that being morally serious is attempting 
to understand 'the meaning of one's action' (ibid.) and where such understanding is 
achieved, one can be said to have arrived at the right answer. 
But is an attempt to understand enough to distinguish serious from non-serious 
in this context? I believe so, for the seriousness that I am describing is of a kind in 
which the problem really matters to the individual, as does finding the right moral 
position with regard to it. Whilst an individual who is not serious might give thought 
to a resolution, it would not disturb him in the same way - i.e. it would not be a case 
of coming to the right position at all costs. And, in such contexts (e.g. Vere's 
dilemma), we might consider the non-serious individual to have a diminished moral 
sensitivity and understanding. In terms of the meaning of one's actions, I assume no 
theory of meaning; to do so would mean adopting some sort of (testable) hypothesis 
and this would consequently remove the possibility of learning by being moved, since 
to be moved is the manifestation of a form of mystery, and rationalisation takes this 
26 I deal with the charge of relativism directly, later on. 
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away. The fundamental point here (as I have previously mentioned) is that morality 
should be seen as more than purely a guide to conduct. Nevertheless, to talk about the 
(moral) meaning of a human life in terms of ineffability is, I think, to describe those 
moments in life when one learns by being moved i.e. (in Gaita's terms) in a way one 
cannot fathom; but it is not a consequence of this that we surrender our critical 
faculties27 . This is an area in which we are often drawn into believing that one can 
only be critical if we have everything formally defined i.e. everything can be justified 
with each thought truth-valued against every other- one might describe this as a kind 
of philosophical scientism. There are however, aspects of humanity (to be explored in 
subsequent sections) that admit of no external justification and these aspects are often 
thought of as mysterious - such as the mystery involved when we love or wonder at 
the scope of a human life and its capacity for compassion in a way that does not in 
any way demean its receiver. Sometimes we speak of someone as a victim of 
compassion, and this, I think, describes a kind of faulty compassion that does 
patronise its victim. In A Common Humanity Gaita provides a very fine (biographical) 
example of both kinds of compassion comparing the compassion of a visiting nun 
with that of psychiatrists in an Australian hospital. Many of the psychiatrists, Gaita 
claims, treated their incurable patients 'brutishly' (Gaita, R. 'ACH'. pl8), but a few 
worked tirelessly to make life as good as possible for their incurables and these 
psychiatrists 'spoke, against all appearances of the inalienable dignity of even those 
patients.' (ibid. emphasis orig.). One day a nun visits the hospital and, 
' ... showed up the behaviour of those noble psychiatrists. She showed that they were, despite 
their best efforts, condescending, as I too had been. She thereby revealed that even such 
patients were, as the psychiatrists and I had sincerely and generously professed, the equals of 
those who wanted to help them; but she also revealed in our hearts that we did not believe 
this.' (ibid). 
This kind of recognition i.e. of the faulty compassion exhibited by the psychiatrists, 
as contrasted by the nun's genuine compassion, is an example of what I meant when I 
talked of some aspects of humanity not admitting of any external justification. In such 
a case as this (if one is sensitive), one is moved to recognise and learn from such 
things but not in a way that can be explained. In this sense what occurs is mysterious 
27 One must be careful, when using the term 'ineffability', not to employ it as a blanket term on which 
to uncritically dump things that we cannot rationalise. 
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and it is here where the concept of mystery occupies a legitimate place in the grammar 
of humanity i.e. it is a facet of our humanity. Compassion is not separate from moral 
sensibility i.e. it lies in an area of understanding in which we can see other human 
beings as irreplaceable. But I am not suggesting that we should treat such mystery as 
somehow beyond life - to do so would be, I think, to surrender in the face of 
deepening understanding; and certainly it makes no sense to speak of this kind of 
mystery as somehow emanating from beyond a human life. I just want to make one 
more thing clear here viz. that the kind of mystery I am talking about is not that which, 
with greater levels of erudition we could understand; neither is it, what I would call, 
"puff mystery" -that of ghosts and fairies. It is inherently mysterious insofar as it is a 
part of what makes us human, but at the same time cannot be penetrated by strictly 
cognitive faculties; it is what moves us in ways we cannot understand. 
Both Vere and Winch had reached an understanding of what their actions 
would mean i.e. the significance (meaning) of what they would be doing; 
consequently both reached a moral understanding about what they would be doing 
and, as such, discovered the right answer. It should now be far clearer as to why a 
moral agent might feel uncomfortable if he has, in desperation (and some might call 
weakness), fallen back on a universal theory such as the Universalizability thesis or 
Consequentialism28 ; moreover this also explains why every moral theory has failed to 
prove decisive, which is why there is continued disagreement in moral philosophy. Of 
course, moral theories can generate unambiguous answers but that says absolutely 
nothing in terms of being an objection to what I have just said. The point is that none 
are collectively accepted absolutely by all. 
3.1. Moral Thought, Sanity, Madness and Rationality. 
Why has moral philosophy seemed to fail to describe adequately what it 
means for moral understanding to deepen? - Gaita argues that it is because concepts 
such as madness, admiration, remorse, weakness, (moral) strength etc. are to a large 
extent overlooked as evaluative concepts. Now, at first glance, these concepts don't 
seem to add up to much. After all, madness could just be a lack of rationality. 
Admiration is the appropriate reaction to right action, and remorse to wrong actions. 
28 Where I use the term 'desperation' I am speaking of a moral agent who is so distressed by trying to 
find the right moral position that he eventually breaks down and recoils behind a theory in the same 
sense as Vere could have hidden behind the law (and might well have done had he been morally 
weaker). 
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There is much to be unpacked here, and I deal with corrupt forms of such concepts. I 
have already begun to prepare the ground for the argument that we should use 
concepts such as love, strength and madness etc., when I talked about the mature 
attitude of a child after his father's death in the light of his (the child's) love for his 
father; for now I wish to examine the concept of madness and consider how it sits 
with that of rationality. When one talks of rational argument, it is often the case that 
one thinks of entirely impersonal, objective argument untainted by subjectivity of its 
participants. In a sense this is right, and in a sense it is not. It is right in the sense that, 
in rational or reasoned debate, one tries to minimise subjectivity in order to give one's 
argument more weight on an objective level. The sense in which it is not right runs far 
deeper and is closely associated with what it is to be morally objective. A common 
(and I believe erroneous) conception of what it is to be objective hinges on the idea 
that it must be completely impersonal, devoid of any significant human input - and it 
is here, that I believe the confusion arises; for it does not take much to see that 
(seriously) adopting this approach would end in madness. In this sense, one takes 
objectivity as following an argument wherever it leads, even if one does not like its 
conclusions; it is almost a case of saying: "One must be brave!" 
There are many instances when such "objective" or (to use Gaita's phrase) 
intellectually pure arguments yield conclusions that, if seriously adopted, would result 
in madness. Here I return to Gaita's "name" example. If every time someone 
introduced themselves to me I automatically questioned whether they were telling me 
the truth I am, inductively speaking, perfectly justified in acting in this way because 
people do (sometimes) give false names; but humanly speaking (were I seriously to 
adopt this attitude as reasonable in all cases) I would be considered at the very least 
paranoid and possibly mad. This is where the difference lies i.e. between intellectually 
speaking and humanly speaking: I doubt I would be considered objective if I became 
a paranoid doubter in terms of believing people when they gave me their names but, 
strictly speaking, I am being impersonal and following an argument wherever it takes 
me. The point is that, in a case such as this, I have to exercise personal judgment- i.e. 
find the right amount of detachment - in order to be rational, and I hope that no one 
would seriously suggest that I am a paradigm of subjectivity for doing so (unless 
they're mad). It is perfectly rational that I trust (or unquestioningly believe, if that is 
the right way to put it?), that a person gives me a correct name upon introduction; it is 
also right that I have my sanity questioned if I do not act like this. Trust, I believe 
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(and this is explored later), plays an important part m the logic of rationality. 
Nevertheless, to wholly trust leads as much to madness as to continually doubt, and it 
is the capacity to judge when we should trust and when we should doubt or exercise 
caution that is part of what it is to be a human being and exercise rationality. 
In moral matters, the picture is more complicated. When I speak of something 
as morally reprehensible or vile (or perhaps of my friend as having 'moral depth') I 
am, you might say, speaking from a moral outlook; and I might be criticised for not 
being objective or rational. Some might say that what I say reveals how I saw an 
action and that there is no objectivity here; they are right if they believe objectivity to 
emanate only from intellectually pure argument. Now, I cannot answer such a 
challenge because it would involve abandoning my moral judgment (in a general as 
well as a particular sense) - and consequently my outlook also - and treating the 
concepts involved to intellectually pure analysis. Once this is done, morality would 
necessarily become propositional since, in order for it to be intellectually pure, it must 
become externally justifiable. The reality of this would mean that any mystery 
associated with morality - such as that of love or compassion -could be penetrated by 
our cognitive powers; and it would follow that one could then reasonably dismiss any 
moral learning acquired through being moved or in ways we cannot fathom, since we 
could be confident in the knowledge that, one day, our cognitive dimensions would 
deliver us and discover the facts. Moreover, if morality could be entirely penetrated 
by our cognitive capacities, then all moral problems would only be contingently 
attached to particular agents - anyone with the relevant knowledge and cognitive 
capacities could solve them. I think that abandonment to intellectual purity in this 
sense represents a damaging kind of cynicism and also an almost paranoid fear of 
error insofar as we cannot bear to trust our own judgement. I hope to have shown 
here, that it is not possible to consider moral judgements on purely intellectual terms 
but that, at the same time, it is not possible to argue with an intellectual purist on such 
matters on his own terms. 
Moral matters are among the aspects of humanity that I referred to earlier as 
admitting of no external justification, and my point is to highlight the possibility of 
madness if we consider rationality and objectivity in moral matters (although not only 
in moral matters) only in terms of intellectual purity. To do so, is to try and dismiss 
the human element altogether and thus avoid any charge of subjectivity; but to do so 
is also to wholly deny an aspect of our lives that makes us what we are. In fact, it is to 
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deny morality. If I talk about morality as merely an (subjective) illusion and advance 
arguments along the lines that good and evil are no more than that, and if I then act on 
these conclusions I would, doubtless, be guilty of terrible atrocities (naturally within 
the scope of practicality) and branded insane. I would not be practising normal human 
behaviour. Were an intellectually pure argument - i.e. one that (in Gaita's terms) 
could have been 'written in the sand by the wind' (Gaita, R. 'G&E', p317) - to show 
that I should radically change my life, there is very little chance of my immediately 
throwing away my old life and adopting it, simply because I would not be wise to do 
so. Is an intellectual purist (some might call him a sceptic) who advances such 
arguments seriously suggesting that we should not be (morally) held to account for 
acts of killing until a satisfactory and intellectually pure argument has been found for 
the reality of good and evil, and thus of what it means to murder? - If we suspend 
moral judgement, we suspend the possibility of justice. To call on someone to be 
rational is not to demand, on pain of subjectivity, intellectual purity - it is to ask for 
well judged, profound thought within the scope of what is reasonable, intelligible and 
sane. Naturally, there are occasions when rationality does demand intellectually pure 
argument, and the onus is upon us to judge when that is and, in many cases, the 
demands are in plain view. But in some (such as in moral matters) they are obscured 
by our own confusion that arises from a desire for objectivity; in this respect, differing 
individual judgements and beliefs only serve to heighten it. 
To meet the intellectual purist on his own ground in a moral argument one is 
required to use the same form of argument - i.e. argument that is propositionally 
based and (consequently) externally justifiable; in terms of human sensitivities - such 
as moral or aesthetic - argument of this kind cannot address the whole issue inasmuch 
as it has to rid itself of the human element, something that is simultaneously common 
to all of us. My point here is, that the grammar of intellectually pure argument is 
limited and abstract; to try to load it with human concepts is more than it can cope 
with and consequently, when one tries, corruption of human grammar occurs. One is 
trying to make abstract what is human. 
3.2. Conceptions ofThought. 
I believe this confusion to be a direct consequence of the perception of what 
thought is in (western) philosophy. It seems that, while it has been realised for some 
time that a complete account of language cannot be given in terms of words standing 
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for objects (propositions (sentences) standing for combinations of objects allowing 
propositions to be (given meaning and) shown as true or false etc., and various forms 
of logical inference to govern (or allow for) conditions), thought is still seen as 
operating in this way. In other words, although the logic of our language is far more 
complex than in the conception described above - and we now understand that our 
relationship with reality is by no means entirely mediated through the proposition -
we still treat moral thought (when under scrutiny) as though this were the case i.e. 
with a propositional logic, which does not rely on meaning and understanding being 
determined by use in the same sense as language29 • Nevertheless, it would be very odd 
if we continued to treat thought in this way in an everyday sense, for then our 
language would be more complex than our thoughts and that, surely, is impossible. 
What does this mean for moral thought? - In what sense can one be morally 
knowledgeable? First of all, if moral thought were propositional in form, then it 
would also be the case that we could not speak of a person possessing moral depth 
(unless we considered the notion of 'depth' purely in terms of knowing many facts). 
Nonetheless, what is wrong with that? - Surely one possesses greater degrees of depth 
with greater amounts of knowledge? A short and pithy answer (but one that I have 
great sympathy with) is that many of the computers in the world hold far more in 
terms of facts than any individual can be expected to learn in his lifetime, yet we can't 
speak of computers as possessing depth or of being wise - to do so would be absurd. 
Part of the reason for this is that, as human beings, our biographies are shaped in ways 
that are beyond propositional and beyond our cognitive capacities alone; we do not, as 
it were, remain exactly the same with an ever-increasing number of facts. We feel 
remorse, bitterness, euphoria etc., and we are moved to learn in unfathomable ways; 
these are not characteristics of facts or of just knowing many of them. A person may 
become cynical, but such cynicism is not merely a taint on the thoughts of an 
individual that can be removed to allow the genuine nature of the thought to emerge; 
one cannot, if you like, separate cognitive from non-cognitive content in the manner 
in which one might from scientifically flawed data. True, it might be the case that an 
individual's judgement is skewed (which is why they might be referred to as cynical), 
but one cannot suggest that cynicism is the cause of what is wrong with his thoughts; 
29 I will discuss this complex issue further in the following chapter when I look at what it means to 
make sense i.e. for meaning and understanding to be achieved and kinds of grammatical error that can 
occur (of the later Wittgensteinian variety). 
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rather cynicism is what is wrong with them and consequently his judgement. Now, it 
may well be that an individual has become a cynic through a series of circumstances 
in which he has come to form a number of inaccurate beliefs about the level of trust 
he can put in others; and he may believe that how he is, is the appropriate way to 
engage with the world. But cynicism is not in itself a belief and, as such, not truth-
valued against other beliefs30. Thus to see a cynic's judgement as false over its being 
cynical would negate the place that cynicism occupies in the logic of our language, 
since (under this conception) it need not be considered as anything other than false. 
We can treat the concept of moral depth in a similar way to that of cynicism i.e. not as 
a belief, or as something that admits of external justification, but as something that is 
historically achieved; and this is one of the main reasons why we cannot speak of 
depth as merely knowing many facts. When I assert that my friend has moral depth, I 
am not implying that the validity of my claim can be measured against a background 
of other propositions that make up what it is to be deep. 
Now, a question might be raised in terms of why an historically achieved 
individuality cannot just be a series of propositions that expands, as we grow older. 
Firstly, this question ignores what I have said above, concerning the nature of 
cynicism and how it cannot in itself be truth-valued; secondly - and just as 
importantly - there is individual loyalty to our respective pasts in terms of our 
appreciation that we have each lived individual lives and developed a unique maturity. 
Such maturity (like cynicism) cannot be determined by a series of propositions no 
matter how vast; it is not simply a case of, "I did x at a particular time and I thought 
this later. .. " with a purely contingent "I". It is a question of understanding and 
appreciating the meaning and significance of decisions that one has made and also 
attempting to understand what one has made of one's life. In this way, grammar of 
purely propositional knowledge is insufficient to wholly describe and understand a 
human life - this will be elucidated in the following section. 
Furthermore, words such as weakness, madness and remorse would be fairly 
unimportant, inasmuch as they would, like my discussion of cynicism above, just be 
treated as a cause of breakdown in a moral thought. Indeed such concepts are often 
treated as the breakdown of a moral thought, but that is only because one is 
erroneously trying to extract the cognitive content from the thought; such an exercise 
30 Despite the possibility that an individual might hold a number of inaccurate beliefs that have led him 
to it. 
57 
Adrian Brockless (MA Thesis) 
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements 
is futile, since to make such a division (between cognitive content and superfluous 
matter) is to make a false division in a moral thought. -Why? 
3.3. Language and General Grammar. 
In the following two sections, I briefly examme the two Wittgensteinian 
accounts of language in order to acquire a full picture of what I mean by General 
Grammar. It is necessary to see why the Tractarian conception of language fails and 
how meaning and sense are possible outside such a propositional conception. 
Essentially however, general grammar is a conceptual space in which the possibility 
exists for common understanding between all human beings. Naturally, there are cases 
in which human beings can be so removed from each other's value systems that, as 
they stand, understanding is impossible - but that is to miss the point. Human beings 
share a desire for language, they possess (at least some sort of) aesthetic appreciation, 
have a sense of right, wrong and justice, even if such senses are radically diverse and 
so on
31
. These are all (though not exhaustively) aspects of what I consider to be 
general grammar i.e. what it is to be a human being; I use this term because I believe 
that much of what it is to be a human being is far closer to language and meaning than 
is often realised; this should hopefully emerge in what follows. 
3.4. The Tractarian Conception of Language. 
Wittgenstein's conception of language in the Tractatus was, broadly speaking, 
founded (largely by Russell and Frege) on an established idea of how language 
operated - namely, words standing for particular objects and combinations of these 
objects forming meaningful sentences. Artificial entities such as fictitious characters 
were dealt with differently by Frege and Russell - for my purposes it is unnecessary to 
detail such differences, suffice to say that they developed different explanations of 
accounting for proper names and descriptions within an essentially propositional 
conception of language. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein developed his famous picture 
theory in which words formed a model or picture of reality; this involved using the 
word "picture" in a broadened sense. Analogously, one might take a London 
Underground map as a picture of reality, and how (for instance) the stations are in 
31 Nevertheless, I believe that with enough effort, two radically different individuals can come to (at 
least) a kind of understanding, even if they subsequently disagree in terms of each other's value-
systems. 
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relation to each other and to London32. Fundamentally then, a picture (like a 
proposition) signifies a possible 'state of affairs' in the sense that each component of 
the picture (words in the case of a proposition) represents an object; the overall 
picture representing objects in possible determinate relations33 . Consequently, on this 
conception, it is always possible to compare a picture or proposition to reality as the 
objects that are represented by it must necessarily exist; indeed, it could be no other 
way insofar as that would involve the subsistence of something illogical, outside the 
ordinary. This leaves two options that are exhaustive: 1. The depicted state of affairs 
exists. 2. The depicted state of affairs does not exist. Any proposition that transgresses 
either of these options should be considered as beyond the limits of sense. Ethical 
statements, on this model, all fall into the realm of nonsense, since many of the terms 
within them are not given strict meaning. Nevertheless, there are still problems of 
ethics and this draws Wittgenstein into making the distinction between saying and 
showing. 
'6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical.' (Wittgenstein 'TLP' p89) 
In other words, although propositions about ethics are beyond the limits of sense, 
what we try to say about ethics is shown by authentic propositions. Picturing the 
world in a proposition is only possible if it shares the same logical form as what it is 
attempting to represent - logical form itself cannot be put into a proposition and one 
cannot say what its relationship to reality actually is - it is something that can only be 
shown. There is no way of knowing what a proposition must share with reality that 
permits representation. 
'4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its 
reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we 
cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They 
display it. (Wittgenstein 'TLP' p31) 
32 There are problems with this theory however, such as how it deals with properties of objects- for 
instance, "my computer is large" only refers to one object and it is difficult to see how- on this 
conception- being large stands in relation to it (my computer). Largeness is not something that can be 
referred to, as it is a property rather than an object. 
33 The notion of possibility is vital throughout the Tractatus: '1.21 Each item can be the case or not 
while everything else remains the same.' This differs significantly from the views of Russell and Frege 
who both disliked thinking in terms of what might have been otherwise - they saw logic as 
fundamentally general. 
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Consequently, if I were to actually speak of an individual possessing moral depth, I 
would on this conception of language be uttering nonsense; nonetheless, in a sense, 
moral depth, cynicism and the like can be shown in the proposition (through logical 
form), but it certainly makes no sense to speak of increased moral depth or cynicism 
in an individual. Neither does it make sense to speak of a language that admits of no 
external justification. In his later work however, Wittgenstein concludes that his 
original account of language is inadequate, and that meaningful discourse rests on 
more than just terms standing for objects, with meaningful sentences constructed from 
terms representing objects in various combinations. 
3.5. Wittgenstein's later Conception of the Nature of Language. 
Wittgenstein's rejection of the Tractarian account is fairly comprehensive 
inasmuch as he rejects the majority of its fundamental ideas viz., that much language 
is responsible for confusion, insofar as it is logically flawed and hides the nature of 
reality. He also abandons the notion that some things cannot be said, only shown, and 
that philosophical propositions are, for the most part, nonsensical. Indeed, the new 
account of language and meaning is inextricably allied to his statement about 
philosophical method 'Don't think, but look!' (Wittgenstein. PI:66) and both revolve 
around his concept of a language game. In the following section I argue that one 
should treat language games and general grammar as virtually identical - i.e. that all 
language games possess particular grammatical forms that give them sense. 
Certainly there are some conspicuous problems with the Tractarian account -
for instance, what objects do the words "hello", "perhaps" and "help" refer to? If I say 
"hello", I could mean a number of different things- for instance, it may be a surprised 
exclamation in response to something unusual rather than a simple greeting; but there 
are also different kinds of greeting in which "hello" possesses slightly different 
meanings. Questions can sometimes be meant as commands such as the example 
Wittgenstein employs, 'Would you like to ... ?' (Wittgenstein, PI: 21). He then 
remarks, ' "What [is said] has the form of a question but is really a command" - that 
is, has the function of a command in the technique of using the language.' (ibid). In 
this sense, meaning is context dependent and this can be contrasted with the 
Tractarian conception of language in which context has no influence in terms of 
meaning - for instance, the grammatical form of a question would negate the 
possibility of its being used as a command. This notion of context dependence is 
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developed into the 'language game' and essentially represents Wittgenstein's attempt 
to understand how language functions. Language games are principally examples of 
snippets of human life i.e. they incorporate characteristics such as intentional states 
(conditions such as fear, rage, ambition, anger sadness etc.), the ways in which we 
express ourselves, how we act as individuals as well as in groups, and ambiguities of 
understanding (meaning) within language - for instance, where the same word or 
phrase can have a number of separate meanings; thus they provide the context 
(grammar) in which meaning is possible34. The meaning can be settled by following 
Wittgenstein's instruction of 'Don't think, but look!' (ibid.), but what exactly is it 
pointing us towards? Wittgenstein uses two examples in paragraphs 21 and 66 of the 
Philosophical Investigations to demonstrate. The first involves a situation in which 
there are two individuals compiling a report about the number of slabs in a pile -
person A writes down the information that is relayed by person B. 
'Such as report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or 
statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?- Well, it is the part which uttering these 
words plays in the language game' (Wittgenstein. PI: 21) 
In other words, the meaning of such an expression is determined by the role it plays in 
the situation (language game); one has to look at the situation that will then allow us 
to identify the use and understand the meaning of the expression correctly. The 
second example in paragraph 66 concerns necessary and sufficient conditions and 
demonstrates how, contrary to the Tractarian conception of language, meaning is not 
necessarily reliant upon strictly defined terms within a proposition. Wittgenstein 
argues that when, for instance, we ask what a game is, we should not attempt to find 
some characteristic that all games have in common; in other words, we should not try 
and think of a characteristic that all games have in common, rather we should look and 
34 Such snippets of life can include anything from specific little activities (the builders' exchanges at 
PI:2l) to much broader ones e.g. a loving relationship between two people; there are also specialist 
language games e.g. those of the sciences. Although loving is not in itself a language game, the 
manifestation of love in an individual can have a profound effect on the grammar of a language game 
and thus influence understanding. In other words, the individuality of the person involved can affect the 
grammar of a language game (and, as such, the nature of understanding in a particular case). In 
addition, language games are not necessarily (though they can be, as in science) abstract entities in the 
sense of being divorced from culture and/or forms of life - religious beliefs can influence language 
games, as can a religious culture (consider countries with, for instance, Islamic governments). 
However, speaking a language is not a language game, but a form of human life which is a 
precondition for there to be language games at all. 
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see if they do35• In terms of games, necessary and sufficient conditions common to all 
are hard, if not impossible, to come by; rather we are confronted with ' similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that' (Wittgenstein. PI: 66). Consider, for 
example, ball games (such as cricket or football), card games, board games, play-
fighting, and mind games - here we find that there may be common characteristics 
between some of the various games, but also that 'many common features drop out 
and others appear.' (Wittgenstein. PI: 66). Nevertheless, one might contend that 
competition is common to them all, but then how does one account for such games as 
solitaire or bouncing a ball off a wall and catching it? Consider play-fighting: 
sometimes (especially as a child) one has play-fights that suddenly cease to be games 
and develop into something more serious. In what sense does the fight cease to be a 
game? - How does the grammar change? The answer cannot be determined by 
thinking in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - rather we must simply look 
and see whether a play-fight remains a play-fight. Mind-games are different again in 
that they involve nothing material- and so we could continue. Thus, it is apparent that 
much of the grammar necessary for meaning and understanding emanates from within 
a particular language game. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Wittgenstein 
does not wholly reject his earlier conception of language, only the assertion that it 
provides a complete account; there are many instances (such as occur in scientific 
investigation) in which meaningful discourse is best accomplished in this way. In this 
kind of discourse, the grammar of an assertion transcends our individual humanity i.e. 
it does not rely on the grammar of a particular context. I think Wittgenstein would, 
nonetheless, call this a language game, but one in which the logic or grammar is very 
simplistic. 
There is one further brief point I wish to raise in connection with reducing all 
concepts down to a series of necessary and sufficient conditions. In The Big 
Typescript Wittgenstein remarks: 
... .The man who said that one cannot step twice into the same river uttered a falsehood. One 
can step twice into the same river. And that is what the solution of all philosophical problems 
looks like. Their answers will only be correct if they are plain and everyday. Provided you 
look at them in the right spirit, that won't matter. (Wittgenstein, L. The Big Typescript in (ed.) 
Kenny, A. The Wittgenstein Reader.p.265-6) 
35 Bravery is also a good example of where one has to look rather than think. There are no necessary 
and sufficient conditions associated with bravery (see Plato's Laches). 
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The question of whether one can step into the same river twice is the result of a 
philosophical confusion. It is thought that because the water in a river flows, one can 
legitimately question whether it is actually the same river as, at any particular point in 
its course, part if its make up (the water) is forever changing. - And this is precisely 
where the confusion occurs. Part of what is included in the concept of a river (i.e. 
what it is for something to be a river) is that the water in it flows; if the water was 
always in the same or similar place then we should not call it a river, but perhaps a 
lake or canal. In this respect, one has to judge as one sees ('Don't think, but look!' 
(Wittgenstein, PI:66)) - 'answers will only be correct if they are plain and 
everyday'(Wittgenstein, L. The Big Typescript in (ed.) Kenny, A. The Wittgenstein 
Reader.p.266)- and one must not 'try to grasp the essence of the thing.'(Wittgenstein. 
PI: 116). There is something incorporated in to the meaning of 'river' that allows for 
constant change whether it be in terms of water or perhaps occasional changes in 
course. Thus the river will always be the same - yet different in constitution; that 
however, is a river. - And that is what it is to look upon such problems i.e. 'in the 
right spirit' (Wittgenstein, L. The Big Typescript in (ed.) Kenny, A. The Wittgenstein 
Reader.p.266) 36. 
3.6. General Grammar 
The particular grammar of a language game can, if necessary (although not 
always), extend to the character of the individuals involved. For instance, the 
particular character of an individual and their role in life can govern how we 
understand them - it might be the case that I am more cynical when listening to 
particular politicians than charity workers. Now, one might argue that this is because I 
am naturally cynical in terms of political rhetoric and sympathetic towards charity 
workers. But I am well aware that there are honest politicians and dishonest charity 
workers. My point is that personal disposition and character are all important in terms 
of the grammar of a language game, and consequently it affects meaning and 
understanding. When discussing Winch and the universalizability thesis, one of the 
points that he (Winch) makes (and that I tried to emphasise) is how difference in 
36 Questions introduced to philosophy about whether- for instance - a 40 year-old man is the same 
person as he was at 4 years old (insofar as the cells he was composed of then have changed or been 
renewed) can be treated in the same way. They are misleading questions. 
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character can affect the way in which a situation strikes an individual. Now, that is 
also an aspect of the grammar of a situation and, as such, what occurs and what is said 
within it is (consequently) allied to it~ thus words and phrases are inextricably linked 
to the general grammar of a language game. Similarly, being moved, the possibility to 
learn through it and the mystery associated with it, has grammar of its own. Gaita 
remarks, 
In matters of value we often learn by being moved, and our being moved is not merely the 
dramatic occasion of our introduction to a proposition which can be assessed according to 
critical categories, whose grammar excludes our being moved as extraneous to the 'cognitive' 
content of the proposition. (Gaita. TPE, p 136-7) 
In other words, being moved does not just rest on novelty but, more importantly, the 
grammar associated with it sits outside a purely cognitive approach to meaning. 
Certainly, it is possible for people to be moved by the words of another- in a eulogy 
or an appeal for instance; the uncertainty in such cases lies in whether to take the 
words on trust. At times we can be mistaken - for instance, in a eulogy when we 
subsequently learn that the speaker may have disliked the person that he paid tribute 
to and only spoke as he did for political reasons; we may be offended by this and it 
may serve to increase our cynicism37• In other cases, the effects of being conned can 
be more harmful - for instance, there are many chronicled cases of people being taken 
in by those seeking dishonest financial gain through what appear to be desperate 
appeals. When we do take such words on trust and are then betrayed, we look for 
ways in which to (so to speak) plug the hole of possible failure and, unfortunately, this 
often bewitches us into attempting to find propositional content through which we can 
then determine the truth or falsity of a claim. As I have mentioned however, the 
grammar associated with propositional and cognitive content is simple and does not 
allow for (among other things) the possibility of learning by being moved. To 
abandon ourselves to finding cognitive content in everything we say wholly negates 
the role of trust and, more generally, judgement; and this in many ways leads down 
the path to insanity (such as questioning upon introduction whether a person has given 
their correct name). Gaita remarks, 'to trust is both to judge something worthy of our 
trust and to judge ourselves to be worthily trusting' (Gaita, R. 'TPE', p 137); when we 
37 Insofar as our disposition towards eulogies has been affected. 
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make mistakes, it is that we have perhaps been nai've or just young. In the latter case, 
this is what differentiates youth from the maturity expected of, and associated with, 
adulthood. Trust is a necessary aspect of human grammar (i.e. rationality) and the 
judgement that accompanies maturity (in terms of how much we do so) rests upon 
more than an ever-increasing bank of correct and incorrect propositions; for, as I have 
tried to show in previous sections, there is a kind of judgement involved that is not 
contingent upon greater amounts of propositional knowledge - rather, it is an 
individually achieved wisdom that is a characteristic of an individual's biography. 
All this, I believe, goes to make up the grammar of a language game so that 
the nature of the grammar within it is often contingent upon the individuals involved. 
Of course, it need not always be so, and whether it is or not depends on what is trying 
to be said and understood. But how does one know whether aspects of the grammar in 
a particular language game are contingent upon the individuals involved or, indeed, 
ascertain when to employ the simpler grammar of the Tractarian model of language? -
Finally, it is a case of applying Wittgenstein's maxim of 'Don't think, but look!' 
(Wittgenstein. PI:66) and by that exercising appropriate judgement i.e. finding the 
right level of detachment from the problem. The sensitivity of the receiver of a 
communication and his capacity for depth is also an aspect of general grammar - and 
this can make all the difference when listening to, or reading, something that requires 
such sensitivity in order to be appreciated properly. Consider for instance, George 
Meredith's poem The Lark Ascending. Now, I certainly see this as more than an 
elaborate description of the song of the Skylark, but I expect that to some that is all it 
is - merely an expanded series of metaphors and decorated adjectives in some sort of 
rhyme scheme. To me, it provides the perfect illustration of the Skylark's song; it was 
also, I believe, the inspiration for Ralph Vaughan-Williams' piece of music for violin 
and orchestra of the same name. The point here, is that the grammar of this poem is 
such that it demands a certain amount of sensitivity on the part of the reader or 
listener in addition to the skill and presence of the author- without both elements, the 
grammar would be incomplete. Those who fail these demands will find it essentially 
meaningless. - For meaning and understanding to be achieved, a grammatical scheme 
has to be complete and this can be demonstrated very simply even in basic sentences-
consider for instance, many of the grammatical errors that school children make 
(punctuation, word order etc.). But, as I hope to have shown, grammar is more 
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complex than mere syntax - and sense demands correct applications of it, no matter 
what its intricacies. 
3.7. Moral Expression 
In terms of moral expression, one must not consider dividing how the speaker 
utters his moral thought from what he actually says - i.e. one must leave his manner, 
the style of language he uses to impart his moral position etc., to hang together with 
what we would consider to be the content of what he was saying. This is where the 
difference between mere rhetoric and a genuine presence behind the words that one 
utters, lies. It is difficult to provide examples of such differences that we can all 
appreciate; however, in his memoir of Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm recalls 
Wittgenstein saying, 
'[T]hat once he [Wittgenstein] had tried to lecture from notes but was disgusted with the 
result; the thoughts that came out were 'stale', or as he put it to another friend, the words 
looked like corpses when he began to read them.' (Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A 
Memoir. OUP. p23) 
A more general example can be made. Consider for instance, the phenomenon of a 
"pseud" - i.e. a person who may act or say things in an affected way in order to 
cultivate a certain image or reputation. - But how can one identify a pseud? 
Ultimately, only by an individual who is genuine - a pseud can only be shown by 
example in the same way as a game (or cynicism or moral depth) can only be shown 
by example - it is another case of following Wittgenstein's maxim of 'Don't think, 
but look! (Wittgenstein. PI:66). An individual who genuinely stands behind the words 
that he utters - Gaita describes it as being 'present' in what one says - is trying to say 
something that is born deep down with no thought of image cultivation. That he is 
heard as genuine demands sensitivity (in terms of being moved) and trust on the part 
of the receiver; a cynic may be moved, but nevertheless spurn an individual's 
presence in his words - perhaps because he has been mistaken (and conned by the 
pseud) many times and is attempting to remove the possibility of error. In the case of 
the individual who stands behind his words, we should be moved to think of the 
words he utters as his words i.e. it is critical that we view them as inseparable from his 
individuality. -And this is how we can distinguish between someone who is morally 
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weary (or a pseud), from someone who is actively occupying their moral ground. 
Earlier, I mentioned that Wittgenstein did not wholly reject the Tractarian conception 
of language -he just saw it as incomplete, and as a model that did not recognise sense 
as ever dependent upon a particular context (or language game); it relied chiefly on 
picturing states of affairs that either were or were not the case. This model is ideal for 
science insofar as most (if not all) scientific thought primarily centres around 
hypotheses, theories and explanations. The main point that I wish to express here (by 
borrowing an example from Gaita's essay The Personal in Ethics) however, is that, 
due to its complete lack of dependence on the grammar of a context, a weary 
disinterested scientist - speaking on a scientific subject - is not necessarily 
compromised (in terms of his authority) to speak about it. Providing he is relatively 
up-to-date, his character is of no consequence insofar as any scientific utterance is 
only accidentally his and, as such, cognitive content can be easily separated from the 
manner in which it is expressed. If a scientist makes a new discovery, the fact that a 
particular scientist has made such a discovery has no bearing on the nature of it, or 
how we should understand it; such is the grammar associated with this way of 
speaking. When an individual is behind the words he utters, it means they come from 
the heart and have his depth of character within them. Someone else might say the 
same things and reiterate them over and over, but if they are tired, then no matter what 
effort the speaker imparts, his words will just remain words. Wittgenstein remarks, 
(Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus, 4.5.): "The general form of propositions is: This is how 
things are."- That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One 
thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is 
merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. (Wittgenstein. PI: 114) 
A good example of this (although not involving moral statement) was the England 
cricket team's response to press interviews in the aftermath of their Ashes victory. 
Immediately following the match at The Oval, the players were euphoric and, 
although many of them said similar things (along the lines of how fantastic it was and 
how fantastic their supporters had been etc.,etc.) and repeated themselves, one 
detected a certain energy that made what they were saying fresh and vital, despite the 
fact that they were mentally and physically exhausted. Certainly what they were 
saying was no different from what a thousand other sports stars have uttered hundreds 
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of times, but nevertheless their words were bright. The following day during their 
parade on a bus round London however, the story was a little different. There was a 
certain jadedness to what they were saying - not because they had been celebrating 
into the small hours, but because the immediacy of the euphoria surrounding the 
reality of what they had done had waned and dropped away. They were merely 
restating the words of the previous evening over and over again and, even though you 
could sense pride in their achievement, their words lacked the 'vital responsiveness' 
(Gaita, R. 'TPE'. P140) that carried them forward the previous evening. The grammar 
of their utterances had changed, and consequently the way in which they were 
understood changed also. Thus, the expressions of the English cricket team had a 
unique and genuine grammar, as did my capacity to receive what was said in a certain 
light - this, taken as a whole, reveals a unique language game. Nothing similar can be 
said of propositions because, as I mentioned earlier, their grammar is impersonal. 
3.8. Cynicism, Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism. 
In virtue of this, in many instances, we cannot (if we consider someone as 
standing behind what they say) separate what an individual says from the way in 
which he says it - to do so would be to violate the grammar of the language game and 
thus the meaning of his words and the sense in which they should be understood. If 
one accepts this, then there is the obvious possibility that we may be misled or - if 
that is not the case - misunderstand. As I mentioned a while back, trust is a necessary 
aspect of what it means to be rational, and certainly our lives are littered with 
examples of when we cannot be absolutely sure if we have been deceived (consider 
the example of being introduced to somebody). That said, in areas of life such as those 
of deeply held moral beliefs, trust seems less crucial for sanity i.e. if I am moved to 
believe that an individual is actively standing behind the words he utters in a moral 
statement, but abjectly refuse to believe what he says, then I am no worse than 
sceptical or distrustful (-but what if we all did this?). Moreover, there seem fewer 
compelling reasons to trust in this sphere of life than those upon which a smooth 
social structure depends. In other words, in terms of - for instance - believing 
someone when they give you their name, it is imperative for the sake of society that 
we do so insofar as if we doubted these basic requirements to trust, then any form of 
stability within a society would be impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, how do we 
judge precisely the levels of trust required for a stable society? Whatever the 
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conclusions we reach, there will always be those who will seek to cheat in some way 
and this, I think, is one of the factors that leads to scepticism over matters that do not 
require trust. Certainly if we all cheated (and were known to cheat), then social 
structures would break down, as trust would be impossible. But why assume that good 
reasons to trust only run so far as to enable a reasonably stable society to survive? 
Firstly, I don't think this is actually the case, as friends (for instance) put greater trust 
in each other than each would in the average person with whom they were 
unacquainted; moreover, such trust is not necessary to society in the same way as it is 
in certain areas - for instance, particular kinds of business dealings. In other words, 
friendships within societies act (among other things) as a kind of lubricant, but 
business dealings can be crucial to its stability. Secondly, and more importantly, were 
I to argue that reasons to trust only run so far as is necessary for the survival of 
society, then I would doubtless be accused of massive cynicism and also asked where 
the necessity for trust ends. Nevertheless, a hankering after enlightenment (and 
sometimes proof) through intellectually pure argument is evident. Certainly some 
moral philosophers, having noticed that words which occur in, say, mathematics -
such as 'understand', 'correct', 'right', 'wrong' and so on - are also present in our 
moral vocabulary, think that we cannot judge them as possessing the same level of 
profundity in the realm of the latter - i.e. that our using such words morally, lends 
them a kind of subjectivism that, on such grounds, detracts from their significance in 
terms of truth and understanding. But to do this is to simultaneously assume that 
moral understanding is not really a proper form of understanding and that there is only 
one form of understanding viz., that which is tied to factual truth. However (and this is 
important), the onus is on those who believe this to justify their beliefs. 
Earlier I attempted to make the distinction between strictly formal argument 
and rational argument. I maintained that, in some cases, following an intellectually 
pure argument to its conclusions had the potential to lead to insanity, insofar as one 
abandons one's judgement to it. When we abandon our judgement in favour of an 
intellectually pure argument, we make a conscious effort to do so - for example, we 
ask: "what reasons do we have for believing individuals when they tell us their 
names"? But, in everyday existence this does not happen. Why? One reason might be, 
that we cannot wear our intellectual hats all of the time, but I think this reason is 
trivial. More importantly, it is not rational to ask such questions, but not just because 
we think that it is more than likely that someone is telling us their real name, since 
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people generally tell the truth regarding such things (although, no doubt this is the 
case as well). Indeed, if we actually think that it is "more than likely" in such 
situations, then we are displaying the same kind of paranoid insanity (or at the very 
least mental illness) that is evident if we disbelieve them. In the same way, I might 
perceive that an individual is standing behind the words that he utters in a moral 
statement, but this does not call for me to think and decide between rational 
judgement and relying on formal justification in order to determine whether I should 
believe him. I have to look in the way that is suggested by Wittgenstein's maxim, 
'Don't think, but look!' (ibid.). - And indeed, it shouldn't even occur to me that I 
have to do either. Similarly, when I put my trust in an individual, I do not think that 
my trust reflects just as heavily - if not more so - upon myself as it does upon them 
(even though it does) -i.e. that such trust is as much a judgment about myself being 
suitably trusting as it is about them being worthy of trust. 
It is fear of error and being cheated (having one's trust abused) that is 
responsible for a great deal of cynicism - and certainly it is natural and reasonable to 
search for ways in which one can reduce the possibility of being conned. A cynic 
however, is recognised as not trusting enough; yet there is no benchmark by which 
appropriate levels of trust can be found. Fear of error, I believe, is responsible for the 
desire for formal justification insofar as such justification has the power to completely 
eliminate the possibility of error and this is also, I think, a manifestation of a form of 
unrecognised cynicism. The problem is that, in aspects of humanity that do not admit 
of external justification, the possibility of error and I or lack of understanding is 
always looming for that very reason. The confusion arises, because in science there is 
frequently a very legitimate argument (often a demand) for formal justification insofar 
as there is a requirement to prove theories and hypotheses true or false. The nature of 
such truth or falsity transcends the individual. - Consider the possible existence of 
planet X. Scientists have, for years, speculated about the existence of a large planetary 
body orbiting the Sun beyond Pluto, on the grounds that the orbital path of Neptune 
contains a number of anomalies that cannot be explained by the presence of Pluto 
(Pluto is too small to possess a gravitational force significant enough to produce such 
effects on Neptune). Sooner or later, a definite answer will be found; in such cases, 
formal justification will remove all possibility of mistakes; i.e. the possibility of 
erroneous statements on the matter can be removed by cognitive enquiry and is only 
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contingent upon us having the requisite capacities to carry out such an enquiry. The 
individual is extraneous to the grammar of the enquiry. 
Now, in terms of claims that require, as part of their grammar, sensitivity on 
the part of the receiver to discern whether what is being said should be believed or 
taken seriously, there is (as I have already elucidated) a need to take what is being 
said (and the manner in which it is said) as a whole. This does however, leave an 
extensive amount of room for error - there are for instance, issues surrounding the 
communicator, such as whether he is a fine actor; similarly, the receiver might be 
naive, an idealiser or cynic and his understanding be clouded by these characteristics. 
This, I believe, has resulted in a division in schools of thought in moral philosophy 
viz., cognitivism and non-cognitivism. 
Cognitivism suggests that there is objectivity within ethics, in a sense in which 
the objectivity requires the transcending of individual perspective and sees thoughts as 
truth-valued against other thoughts; the reality of ethics, on this conception, can be 
revealed through cognitive penetration i.e. the truth or falsity of our moral beliefs can 
be determined, since the cognitivist believes that moral properties are inherent in 
things or actions. By contrast, the implication of non-cognitivism is that of a 
supremely subjective ethics with the emphasis on feelings and instincts - there is no 
objective content that can be separated from the thought itself. Essentially, non-
cognitivist ethics reflects the likes and dislikes of each individual. Naturally, complex 
arguments have arisen to defend each school of thought. The non-cognitivist has the 
difficulty of explaining, for instance, the problem of moral reality, insofar as, if there 
is no moral reality then one's moral judgments cannot meaningfully be said to be true 
or false. Moreover, in aesthetics, there seem to be certain standards of correctness -
for instance, there seems to be a definite sense in which one experiences value even 
though, from person to person, different values might be attributed to different arts or 
different genres within the same art. For instance, I may place greater value on the 
works of J.S. Bach than those of Mozart- you may think differently. The Cognitivist 
however, has the problem of the belief-desire theory. This theory asserts that moral 
action cannot simply be put down to belief; a series of beliefs is not enough to justify 
action, there needs to be desire (instinct or feeling) to act as a motivating force. Surely 
this is not too much of a problem for the cognitivist - why, for instance, can he not 
accept the belief-desire theory while maintaining his position that moral opinion can 
either be true or false? If the cognitivist accepts this however, then he is forced into 
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the rather odd position in which he might believe a moral action to be necessary, but 
at the same time see no reason why he should act upon his moral belief. - And so on. 
I believe that this distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is a 
false one, brought about by the fear of en·or and a misunderstanding concerning the 
nature of moral thought. It represents, I think, a lack of trust in ourselves and 'an 
intoxication with a conception of reason' (Gaita. TPE. p146) that is intellectually 
pure. Both these schools seem to consider morality purely as a guide to conduct; 
moreover the nature of moral thought seems to have been divided into a cognitive 
objective and non-cognitive subjective model. Am I suggesting that moral thought is 
partly cognitive and partly non-cognitive? No. If I accept the cognitivist I non-
cognitivist model of the nature of thought, them I am implicitly asserting that I believe 
that thoughts are either truth-valued or mere subjective feeling; if I do that, then I am 
negating the possibility of (for instance) cynicism being any more than a cause of a 
thought's failure- more, I am asserting that thoughts must be essentially propositional 
in form. If this is the case, then I must be arguing that our epistemic apparatus is no 
different from that of automatons and that, as such, we have no capacity for depth, for 
reasons I outlined earlier. I am not arguing for this. 
One of the difficulties is, that cognitive thought is seen as necessarily 
transcending the individual; cognitive thought is accidental to any human being and 
non-cognitive thought is wholly concerned with the emotions and instincts of the 
individual, and is held to be mistaken by cognitivists. As such, one cannot speak 
cogently about not separating what an individual says from the manner in which he 
expresses himself. What I have said so far, particularly in this respect, probably 
smacks of having a foot incoherently in both camps simultaneously. What I shall try 
to show is that firstly, for something to be a cognitive utterance it does not 
(necessarily) have to express a belief that is a belief in the sense that it is truth-valued 
against other beliefs (if we assume cognitive to mean comprehensible and intelligible 
to others). Secondly, and more importantly, that the grammar of language games is 
significant down to the minute - for instance, the fact that I think person x says 
something significant and that it holds more weight than person y (who says the same 
thing) means that it carries more weight purely because the grammar of the language 
game is affected by the persons involved. Perhaps we might think person y is a pseud. 
Certainly, in terms of the belief-desire theory, we can treat it in a similar way 
to cynicism. I argued earlier that cynicism is not merely a taint on one's thoughts that 
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can be removed in order to reveal thought proper: it is the thought. The belief-desire 
theory can be considered in much the same way; its conception being the result of an 
approach to critical thinking that divides thought into primary and secondary modes. 
If we abandon this model then we find that belief and desire need not be divided up, 
and (certainly in the case of moral action) that there is no sense in trying to extract 
cognitive content (belief) from non-cognitive content (desire). In other words, there is 
no thought (belief) that needs something added to it (desire) in order for action to be 
taken. A thought that one wants to stop the wrong one is witnessing on the street is the 
thought in the same way as cynicism is not a taint on one's thought - it is the thought. 
One cannot separate cynicism from the thought's content and (similarly) one cannot 
"cognitively" separate belief from desire in a case such as the one above. Someone 
who said that they thought the occurrences on the street were wrong, but had no 
inclination to stop them because they lacked the desire that is required to accompany 
their belief would be seen, I think, as absurd38. 
To treat a moral action as the result of thought is similar to treating the 
manifestation of cynicism as the result of thought, and not merely as a cause of its 
failure or as an emotion that is external to it. Since there is no absolute benchmark for 
cynicism, it is (therefore) not possible to independently measure what counts as 
cynical thought and, as such, not coherent to make a distinction between cynicism and 
thought proper. One cannot "cognitively" extract thought from cynicism, banality, 
sentimentality etc., so why should one attempt it with moral thought and action? -
How then, can we distinguish between cynical and non-cynical thought? 
In any case, our moral thoughts are informed by concepts such as love, 
cynicism, sentimentality etcetera, so it would seem odd if we treated moral thought 
in a different way to its constitutive concepts, i.e. in a way that divided thought from 
desire. 
3.9. Violation of General Grammar. 
Qualities such as cynicism, sentimentality and so on, manifest themselves in 
the grammar of a language game- thus sense is shown; consequently, if the grammar 
38 This is distinct from thinking something to be wrong, but knowing one is unable to do anything 
about it. I might see a beggar being beaten and stabbed to death by a bunch of knife-wielding thugs, 
know the wrong in my heart, but realize there is nothing I can do. - And one could not lay the charge of 
cowardice against me for not risking sacrificing my life in an attempt to save the beggar; an attempt 
that I know would result in almost certain failure. 
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is changed then it is possible that the sense of the language game will change also39. 
Thus there is nothing that can be separated in terms of - for instance - cynicism and 
thought; the grammar of a language game (i.e. all its components) determines sense, 
and such sense may manifest cynicism. The very fact that we recognise examples of 
cynicism and sentimentality in others, attests to this and, to be shown by example, 
such qualities require a certain kind of grammar in a language game. Concepts such as 
cynicism, sentimentality etc., are not irrelevant aspects of our language that can be 
mopped up and dismissed from proper consideration with more careful thinking. In 
the Investigations Wittgenstein remarks, 
When philosophers use a word- "Knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" 
- and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever 
actually used in this way in the language which is its original home? (PI: 116) 
Wittgenstein is talking of a metaphysical reductionism that is necessary if we try to 
cognitively extract or separate the content of thought proper from, say, cynicism or 
sentimentality. What happens is that we try to pull such concepts into the abstract in 
order to develop a universal standard of meaning and this, in turn, requires universal 
standards. Now, I have already indicated that such a model is ideal in scientific 
investigation insofar as, generally speaking, the grammar of such investigation is 
relatively straight forward and rests on true and false propositions that can be arrived 
at through empirical research or theoretical investigation (e.g. advanced theoretical 
mathematical models of the universe). This is the grammar of the impersonal. As 
discussed previously, the grammar (i.e. that which provides sense and meaning) of 
some language games is more complex. Whilst no reduction of concepts is required in 
the scientific model, in terms of a language game in which, for instance, cynicism or 
sentimentality is made manifest by example, reductionism is necessary to extract 
cognitive content from the cynicism or sentimentality. Thus, in order to remain 
faithful to a concept of reason that believes cognitive content to exist outside the 
contingencies of a human life, there exists a requirement for reductionism. 
Consequently, such reductionism would never consider any individual as having an 
important effect on the sense of, say, an ethical statement; a particular individual 
39 Again, this can be related back to Wittgenstein's maxim (concerning philosophical method) of, 
"Don't think, but look!" (ibid). 
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would not be seen as a grammatical constituent i.e. as something that could essentially 
and profoundly influence meaning. The responsibility however, is on those who 
maintain this conception to explain why they think that what is truly cognitive can 
only exist at an impersonal level. 
By separating or neglecting certain aspects of a moral utterance we are, I 
argue, damaging the intended meaning and de-valuing its significance (not least 
because, with its reduced grammar, we won't understand it correctly)40 . We are 
violating the grammar that gives sense. An agent's utterance, if genuine, is bound up 
with his character and, as such, with the kind of moral expression he makes, and only 
with this kind of expression; the expression, if sincere, is his expression. The 
difficulty arises in terms of judging sincerity; it is not possible to do so (as it is with 
the non-moral utterance) in terms of assessing the cognitive content as being true or 
false etc .. Now, it seems trivial to suggest that the words have to come out of the agent 
and perhaps untrue that such words must be bound up with the agent - for instance, 
my rejection of slavery doesn't have anything to do with slavery per se because I have 
never experienced it. But my zeal or energy associated with my rejection and sense of 
justice (my presence in what I am saying) - i.e. the manner in which I speak about it -
is what I am asking to be considered here41 • It is this kind of zeal and presence that 
(like cynicism and sentimentality) reveals, by example, false impressions of it. To 
speak of a kind of genuine authority (or presence) in what someone says would mean 
nothing if there did not exist bogus forms of it, and the question of whether someone 
really means what they're saying or whether they're a pseud would never arise. It is 
this genuine presence in what one says that, I maintain, must be bound up with an 
individual's character; if I learn something through being moved and my trust in such 
stirrings proves well founded, then (in understanding something I previously did not) I 
employ my critical faculties in a way that appeals to concepts through which I try to 
establish that I have not been taken in. In this way, the acquisition of my 
understanding is necessarily personal and, as such, when I speak about something in 
which such understanding is inherently a part, my individuality is necessarily bound 
up in that speech. 
40 Incidentally, when the general grammar of (for instance) a moral statement is violated and it becomes 
unintelligible, it shares something with a proposition in which the terms have not been strictly defined. 
41 I reject slavery because I have an understanding of an 'other's' humanity- i.e. I appreciate that a 
slave is no different from me in terms of his ability to grieve, love, wonder at the richness of life, have 
his life fall apart, and so on. In this respect, I understand that he should not be treated as a 'lesser' 
human being. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4.0. Rush Rhees's Language of Love and the Language of Academic Moral 
Philosophy 
In Rush Rhees's book Without Answers, he speaks about the "language of 
love" - he is not, I think, describing a specific language, but rather highlighting a 
particular and vital aspect of language viz. its ability to allow individuality to be 
bound up within speech; and this relates directly to what I said in the previous chapter 
about being present in what one says. In this sense, I want to use Rhees to show how 
there exists, as well as necessary religious language or a language of love, a necessary 
moral language and how such a language cannot be reduced. This kind of language 
not only allows the individual to be bound up in his utterances, but also has the 
capacity to move others - thus providing us with an idea of what it is to communicate 
morally. 
If we speak of the language of love, this is not because it has a special vocabulary. (It is not as 
if we had been referring to a technical language.) It is because the language is used in a 
particular way. The sense of his 'I love you' is bound up with so much else in his life now. It 
is only on that account that it does mean anything .. .It is not saying that anything has 
happened, and it is not describing anything. Nor is it the expression of a sensation or feeling. It 
is the expression of love. (Rhees, R. 'R&L'. p123). 
Rhees's point is that the language of love expresses something that cannot be fully 
replicated in any other way i.e. it cannot be put into any other form and not (in some 
sense) be corrupted; to do so would be to violate its grammar i.e. that which supplies 
it with a particular sense. It can express something from deep within an individual. In 
this way, the language of love is more than simply 'words on paper' (Rhees, R. 
'R&L'. pl25)- its grammar is bound up with its speaker and 'is all it means to him in 
using it and to her in listening.' (ibid.). Of course, one can, as Rhees puts it, 'learn the 
language of love' (Rhees, R. 'R&L'. p124) and this holds in it the possibility of 
deception in which the receiver has to be sensitive to the thought that he may be 
conned by a skilled orator. In genuine cases however, an individual has a unique 
relationship with the words that he utters i.e. he is a part of that particular language 
game and is a part of the grammar that gives language - his words - sense; no one 
else can know his thoughts as he knows his own - such as the significance and 
profundity of his love for his wife. 
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Now, it might appear that this conflicts with Wittgenstein's private language 
argument, insofar as I have asserted that an individual has an intimate relationship 
with the words he utters inasmuch as they are tied to his thoughts. I do not believe that 
there is any conflict here. A private language (according to Wittgenstein) is one that 
only the individual whose language it is can understand; accordingly, it would be a 
language made up of wholly private rules (invented by the individual) that determine 
how particular words are used. Now, any language is rule governed, inasmuch as rules 
define how particular concepts are to be used and, as such, it must be possible to 
break or disobey them. The need for rules (as Wittgenstein highlights) negates the 
possibility of a private language in the following ways: 1. It makes no sense to speak 
of a person violating rules that only he can know.- For what method is there to check 
whether he has made a mistake in rule application? 2. If there is a defined system of 
rules then it is possible to explain them to another - thus such a language is 
potentially public, insofar as the nature of rules and concepts is necessarily 
transparent. The confusion that might arise in the light of what I have said is, I think, 
born from my argument that impersonal models of moral philosophy are inadequate, 
and of my insistence that moral thinking is necessarily (if not simply) personal. It is 
also perhaps, a result of seeing the emphasis on the necessarily public nature of 
concepts in Wittgenstein's private language argument as a call to understand such 
publicness purely in terms of the impersonal i.e. to view others from an impersonal 
standpoint and conceive publicness (i.e. others) in this way. My point however, is that 
(as people) we meet and interact with each other in public space - and that the 
concept of such a space is conditioned (and recognised) by the possibility (and 
presupposition of the possibility) of meaningful encounters between individuals; 
indeed, it is what allows us to distinguish between an individual's inner life (his 
relationship with his thoughts etc.,) and his public life. Nevertheless, it is individuals 
(people) who exist within such space and, on account of their individuality, each and 
every one represents a unique perspective within it. In this way, individuality (namely 
recognition of what makes an individual) is dependent upon a conceived public space 
i.e. a space in which shared understanding is possible insofar as it allows us to 
recognize other human beings as realms of sense, value, significance and so on. As 
such, there is nothing I have said that conflicts with Wittgenstein's private language 
argument. 
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Within the language of love there exists the capacity to recognise the humanity 
of another human in more than the third person - when someone genuinely utters the 
words, "I love you!" they are not, as Rhees points out, 'describing anything [or 
expressing] a sensation or feeling' (Rhees, R. 'R&L'. p 123 ), they are reaching into 
their own humanity and appealing directly to that of another for understanding, in a 
way that is necessarily personal: they are expressing something essentially human. In 
this way one cannot extract the cognitive content from words of love, because the 
manifestation of love and its declaration are not aspects of life that can be anything 
but personal (yet we still understand them). It is this essentially human (and 
necessarily personal) aspect of life that has its own language; to attempt to describe 
love in a way that abandons the language associated with it, in an effort to make one 
person's love universally intelligible, is an attempt to reduce the scope of our 
language to that of the impersonal, while still getting it to do the same job. In other 
words, such a reduction is an attempt to convey the personal nature of one man's love 
to a third party without any alteration in its meaning, significance or profundity. 
Obviously this project is unsound insofar as we are all individuals. 
In short, I think what Rhees is trying to say is that language incorporates 
humanity - or rather it is a necessary aspect of humanity, but one which cannot go 
beyond that; and neither is humanity greater than its limits. Its limits are humanity 
itself. From this, I think the mistake that is made - and this returns me to a point I 
made earlier about individuality providing a crucial part of the grammar of a language 
game - is that we try to completely separate the phenomenon of language from each 
individual and suggest that it is only something that we all share i.e. we treat language 
as made up purely of words, phrases, sentences and so on. Of course we do all share 
it, but it is also something that cannot be separated from the individual (insofar as it is 
also his language) - consider separating an individual from the manner of his 
expression of love. Gaita remarks, 
It is important that [a] child grows in its mother's body, that her body changes with its growth, 
and that these changes can appear to us as beautiful, for this provides a focus for love's 
tenderness without which there could be no love ........ .Its being 'of her own flesh and blood 
is an expression that plays an important role in our understanding of her love, but it is an 
expression in the language of love rather than one that pre-scientifically gestures towards 
something underpinning that language.' (Gaita, R. G&E. pl 19. Italics orig.). 
78 
Adrian Brockless (MA Thesis) 
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements 
He continues by suggesting that in a 'scientifically sophisticated community' (ibid.) -
such as that described by Aldous Huxley in A Brave New World, in which all humans 
are conceived in test tubes, as it were, asexually - the expression of a child being of 
its mother's 'own flesh and blood' (ibid.) would evaporate without needing to be 
replaced. The point being that such an expression describes the love between mother 
and child in a sense that allows the possibility of third parties to become aware of, and 
understand, the mother's love in a way that makes them sensitive to the genuineness 
(or otherwise) of her expressions of love towards (and about) her child. The 
expression is over and above a purely biological one, and the possibility of such 
expressions is given by the awareness of the existence of love. Naturally, it is possible 
to emulate expressions of love to the point where others might be taken in, but the 
point remains that without the manifestation of the genuine article, such expressions -
i.e. such a language - would be flat or not exist at all. - And one should not try to 
employ kinds of language that do not hold the possibility of sincerely expressing the 
love of one person for another, if that is what is required. 
Similar things can be said about moral expressions. In his article 'Kant and the 
Language of Reason' Mario von der Ruhr attacks Gaita for his criticism of Kant's 
moral philosophical language. 
Rather than helpfully elucidating important features of moral phenomenology, Gaita claims, a 
Kantian account seriously distorts these features, itself betraying a lack of moral 
understanding. In this connexion, Kant's philosophical terminology is said to be both 
expressive of, and at the same time instrumental in propagating this distortion of moral 
thinking. Gaita is primarily thinking of expressions like 'categorical imperative', 'rationality 
in others', 'principles' moral maxim', etc., all of which combine, in his view, to yield what 
would strike many as a caricature of moral discourse. How, Gaita asks, are we to describe the 
character of a murderer's remorse for his deed, for instance? (Von der Ruhr, M. 'Kant and The 
Language of Reason' in Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. Ed., Alanen, L., Heinamaa, 
S. and Wallgren, T. MacMillan. London. 1997. P386-7) 
The main disagreement with Gaita lies, I think, in the idea that Kant's style and the 
kind of arguments he employs, is an impediment to achieving a deepened moral 
understanding. Rhees argued that there couldn't be love without the language of love, 
and Gaita's claim is that the same holds for moral understanding and moral 
communication 1.e. there cannot be moral understanding without moral 
communication and language to match (and vice versa). Now, der Ruhr is not 
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disputing this, but he does claim that Gaita's further argument - that Kant fails to 
fully appreciate the connection between moral understanding and natural language -
is gratuitous. I am not in agreement with Gaita here, inasmuch as I think his assertion 
is presumptuous, but neither am I assenting to der Ruhr's point. Kant certainly accepts 
the autonomy of the individual, indeed individual autonomy is at the heart of his 
moral philosophy, as is the sanctity of human life, but I think his talk of principles, 
moral law and rational beings is unhelpful for two reasons. 
Firstly, as Gaita indicates in A Common Humanity, to utter phrases such as, 'I 
have transgressed most terribly! I have violated my principles!. .. I have broken the 
Social Covenant!' (Gaita, R. ACH. p.32) in remorse, is at best a parody of it and, at 
worst, meaningless inasmuch as they show the speaker to have an incomplete 
understanding of the humanity and, as such, the particularity of his victim. Whatever 
case, such expressions are not in the grammar of moral language - indeed, they 
violate it and show the agent who uttered them to have a feeble grasp of what he has 
done (or his remorse to be counterfeit), provided we accept the argument that moral 
understanding and the existence of a moral language are cohesive. In the same way, 
one might violate the language of love by talking to one's spouse in purely 
scientifically biological terms relating (perhaps) to the mutual attraction that they feel 
for each other. One of the reasons that this violates grammar is because it expresses a 
sentiment that allows for its meaning to be only accidentally or contingently attached 
to the agent; it attempts to reduce one's love to something that can be understood in 
precisely the same way by anyone- and of course, one person's love for another is 
necessarily an individual (personal) phenomenon42 • I am not suggesting that there is 
an inevitable link (although I think there might be) between the love of two people 
and morality, but I am claiming that the language associated with each is necessarily 
irreducible. Thus, I think it is difficult to learn anything valuable concerning the 
nature of remorse, love, religion etc., from a "translation" of their natural language 
into a more formal academic language. 
Secondly, the essence of a formal language is that its grammar is 
fundamentally propositional in form i.e., is made up of true and false propositions 
punctuated with forms of valid and invalid inference. To break down a moral treatise 
42 This assertion does not contradict the possibility of concepts such as love existing in the public 
domain. Part of what is publicly intelligible about such a concept is that those who love, are 
experiencing something personal and private. Similar things can be said about remorse, guilt etc .. 
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into such a language, I believe, is to try and rationalise morality in a way that is 
incompatible with what it is to be morally rational or rational in love, insofar as I do 
not consider that the demands of rationality can be formulaically determined. 
Sometimes, for instance, it is rational to trust and at other times not - if we get it 
wrong, then the results can vary from mild consequences such as cynicism or nai"vete 
to severe consequences such as insanity. 
Nevertheless, this still does not adequately address the question of why one 
cannot take works written in such a way just as a 'conceptual recollection, rather than 
as a catechism of what is right and what is wrong' (von der Ruhr, M. 'Kant and the 
Language of Reason.' p.394). Now, the reason that I believed Gaita to be 
presumptuous in terms of his assertion that Kant fails to fully appreciate the 
connection between moral understanding and natural language, is that Kant 
specifically addresses such concerns - he is greatly concerned with individual 
happiness and, as der Ruhr indicates, ' it is difficult to see how a responsible moral 
agent could fulfil this duty adequately without being sensitive to what would promote 
their happiness, and thus to who they are as individuals - to their natures, likes and 
dislikes, preferences and aversions etc.' (von der Ruhr, M. 'Kant and the Language of 
Reason.' p.397 (italics orig.)). Thus, implicit in what Kant says, is the assertion that 
one has to be responsive in every way to the individuality of others, and this of course 
often involves dialogue in a language sensitive to such individuality. -So Kant was, 
at the very least, aware of it. It is not my intention to criticise Kant's actual moral 
philosophy, but I do want to highlight why I believe the style in which it is written, 
while not displaying a lack of understanding of the relationship between morality and 
its natural language, is unhelpful in terms of illustrating the requirement of deepened 
moral understanding (or wisdom) in terms of, for instance, moral obligation. My 
criticism is aimed at a style of writing common in academic moral philosophy. Such a 
style (as I have already mentioned) is in the language of the impersonal and whilst it 
is possible to describe the importance of a moral language or language of love in 
connection with moral understanding and love, it makes it very difficult to wield 
concepts that exist within them, such as good, evil love or hatred, insofar as such 
concepts have their home (i.e. hold their proper meaning) in their natural languages. 
To remove them and place them elsewhere constitutes a form of reductionism that 
cannot wholeheartedly illustrate the deepening of moral understanding or wisdom. -
To embody what it is for one's moral understanding to deepen, one needs to speak in 
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a language that is appropriate to deepened moral understanding i.e. one in which the 
grammar is in accordance with everyday moral expression. So, one cannot 'point and 
say 'that is the being in love, and this is the difference that it made' ... ' (Rhees, R. 
'R&L'. p123). To do so is to try and extract cognitive content from thoughts of love, 
and to write about morality or love in such a way encourages us to do this. Indeed, I 
think this one of the ways in which Wittgenstein meant 'Philosophy is a battle against 
the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' (PI: 109)- in other words 
(in the case of religion, love or morality) the way that something is linguistically 
presented to us can affect the way we think about it. If one does attempt to extract 
cognitive content from thoughts of love or moral thoughts, then one is faced with 
questions such as, "What reasons do you have for marrying your girlfriend?" -And 
while one can list qualities that one finds attractive in one's spouse, such reasons only 
run to a point. In the final analysis all one can say (unless one is corrupt) is that the 
wish to marry is a consequence of love.- And if one's love relied purely on a series 
of reasons (such as having brown hair and being interested in music) then it would 
only ever be contingent. Certainly such an impersonal way of speaking (i.e. in terms 
of reasons) is misleading as it draws us towards a conception of reason, 
' ... which deems the grammar of its constitutive categories to transcend our humanity, and, 
indeed, any particular form of life. This conception of reason provides its own edification, and 
indeed its own 'winged words' (Gaita. TPE. pl46). 
This is where I think language of the kind Kant and many others employ in their 
moral philosophy is misleading. It is a kind of language that draws us towards 
considering morality in a propositional (impersonal) sense, that at the same time can 
often make us feel philosophically uncomfortable in a way we cannot quite pinpoint. 
It is also a kind of language in which the grammar is in accordance with an 
impersonal (humanity transcending) form of thinking, in the same way as love and 
religion have their own natural language that is in accordance with a particular way of 
thinking. This, I believe, supplies the reason for the discomfort. Now, in terms of 
Gaita's objection that Kant does not adequately appreciate the connection between 
moral understanding and natural language, - I think that it is not quite right, insofar as 
Kant's moral philosophy focuses heavily on individual autonomy and specifically 
points out that detailed characteristics of situations are of vital importance. For 
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instance, Kant believes that it IS every individual's duty to promote happiness m 
themselves and to encourage it in others. 
To secure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discontent with one's 
condition under many pressing cares and amid unsatisfied wants might easily become a great 
temptation to transgress one's duties. But here also do men of themselves already have, 
irrespective of duty, the strongest and deepest inclination toward happiness, because just in 
this idea are all inclinations combined into a sum total. (Kant, I. Groundwork. 399). 
In promoting the happiness of others, Kant would surely have been aware - given the 
importance he imparts on individuality - that the way one person expresses himself to 
another is something that cannot be ignored. Thus it is, if not evident, implicit that 
Kant does, at least to a certain extent, appreciate the concordance between language 
and certain ways of thinking and living43 . Nevertheless, der Ruhr's point that the 
language of the Groundwork is of little significance, if we take it purely as 'an 
exercise in conceptual recollection, rather than a catechism of what is right and 
wrong' (von der Ruhr, M. 'Kant and the Language of Reason.' p.394), fails to 
recognise the possibility of how language can affect how we think about things. In 
other words, in terms of moral philosophy, a tract written in an impersonal manner 
about, say, moral obligation, duties etc., and how we can determine what they are ~ 
no matter how acutely observed and argued - can encourage us (bewitch our 
intelligence), through its language, into thinking that it is appropriate to treat - i.e. 
think about- individual moral problems (and how we approach finding the answers to 
them) in the same way, even if it is implicit within the work that this should not be 
done. Earlier on, I mentioned that some moral philosophers do not consider words 
such as 'understanding', 'correctness' and so on as carrying the same significance in a 
moral context as they do in, say, a mathematical one. The problem - they think - is 
that the meanings of such words are identical both in mathematical and moral realms 
which results - through not being able to wield their mathematical meanings 
effectively in moral philosophy- in a belief that moral understanding is not really a 
proper form of understanding. And I think that moral philosophy written in an 
impersonal style draws us into this kind of confusion insofar as its grammar is of a 
43 However I disagree with Kant's assertion that rationality is purely an a priori concept. I do not have 
space to articulate my objections in this thesis, but I think the essence of my disagreement can be 
grasped by returning to the section in which I talked about rationality necessarily demanding trust and 
not necessarily being formal. 
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propositional kind and incompatible with that of the moral; consequently we are 
persuaded to consider vocabulary such as "understanding" and "correctness" 
propositionally. In other words, our treatment of such vocabulary bewitches us into 
thinking that moral understanding is not a proper form of understanding like (or in 
comparison with), say, mathematical understanding. Accordingly, although Kant's 
moral philosophy in the third person emphasises the importance of the individual (and 
implicitly the importance of individual expression), the fact that it is in such a form 
draws us into considering the meanings of words such as "understanding" and 
"correctness" in a sense that sees their meanings as identical in both the moral and 
mathematical realms. It is - as Wittgenstein emphasizes - the task of philosophy to 
guard against this kind of bewitchment. 
Thus, the position I am adopting concerning the respective positions of Gaita 
and der Ruhr, is that Gaita is hasty in accusing Kant of failing to appreciate the 
relationship between moral understanding and natural language- while der Ruhr (and 
Kant) fails to recognise the possibility that the language in which an academic tract is 
written can have a profound effect on the way in which we think about the subsequent 
problems contained therein - and this is where I believe problems do exist in 
academic philosophical writing. In terms of Kant (although one can make the point 
more generally), despite his emphasis on individual autonomy and so forth, the textual 
rationalization of morality does, I believe, stand in the way of the possibility of its 
allowing the attainment of deepened moral understanding in those who read it, as its 
grammar is not in tune with that of actual moral thinking. 
There is one final point I wish to make dear before moving on, involving what 
happens to the meanings of words describing non-externally justifiable concepts such 
as love, cynicism, evil, right and wrong (in their moral capacity) and so on, when they 
are moved into the abstract. Such concepts make sense in ordinary language, insofar 
as one can comprehend what is meant when we speak of someone as cynical or 
sentimental or evil or loving; in other words, the sense of a sentence describing 
cynicism, love, sentimentality etc., acquires its meaning from the possibility of its 
opposite. I can describe an individual's reaction to Diana's death as sentimental 
because I can imagine his reaction as not sentimental, and this can be linked to the 
idea that such concepts can only be shown up by example. If we drag such concepts 
into the abstract - or at least try to form meaningful sentences about them in the 
abstract (which pretty much amounts to the same thing), what happens? 
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Fundamentally, one needs a series of necessary and sufficient conditions associated 
with the concepts (love, sentimentality, cynicism etc.,) that one is talking about, in 
order to provide a standard by which all possible instances of them can be measured; 
in other words, such concepts need to be truth-valued against others in a way that 
allows them to be externally justified (i.e. impersonally, like mathematical and 
scientific propositions). This however, is not possible - if it were, then every 
individual could (for instance), in principle, understand one man's love for a woman 
in an identical way. In other words, they would understand in such a way that would 
mean they love the woman as he does - for there could be no way to understand such 
love in an identical way that did not involve this. This makes no sense, and is a 
mockery of the concept of love - i.e. what it means to love. Two (exhaustive) 
alternatives now become clear in terms of what occurs when we attempt to form 
sentences involving such concepts in the abstract: either (1) - for meaning to be 
possible - there needs to be a series of necessary and sufficient conditions from which 
we can determine an absolute standard and thus have the possibility of external 
justifiability (which, as I have demonstrated, is not plausible), or (2) (if there are no 
such conditions) such sentences are nonsensical and meaningless, insofar as there is 
nothing in the structure of abstract grammar that allows for sense. Nevertheless, we 
can still talk sensibly about rationality and irrationality in terms of love and other 
moral concepts, and this reveals that rationality does not always demand external 
justification and that sometimes it can only be shown up by example and used in 
language in the same way as, say, sentimentality or love. This is what makes 
rationality a distinctly human phenomenon. 
The following section provides illustrations that what is reasonable and 
rational is not always impersonal. 
4.1. Moral Significance, Moral Obligation and The Individual. 
In this section, I take the arguments I have made so far and employ them to 
consider the importance of an individual voice, and associate this with moral 
significance and obligation for the individual. 
Firstly, I want to consider the importance of an individual voice on the model 
of thought that always separates cognitive from non-cognitive content. Certainly, (in 
philosophy) much is made of the importance of the individual voice, but how 
compatible is this with the cognitive I non-cognitive conception of thought? If we take 
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cognitive thought as that which can be separated from the individual without any 
harm to the meaning (i.e. as that which transcends the individual), then there are some 
conspicuous problems with viewing the concept of the individual voice as supremely 
important. If cognitive content is only accidentally the individual's, then surely this 
negates the importance of an individual voice. For although one can make an 
argument to respect the feelings of another, it can also be seen that, on this 
conception, non-cognitive phenomena (such as feelings) have, in themselves, very 
little evaluative force insofar as they are supremely subjective. If this is only what 
separates one individual from another, then it is rather at odds with the notion that 
each individual voice should be treated with utmost respect44. On this theory, an 
objective argument cannot be made that supports the thought that an individual voice 
can be profoundly individual. To do so, it would have to speak of concepts such as 
depth and maturity in a way that allowed for them to be employed (and deployed) as 
cognitive concepts; as such, it would have to incorporate aspects of an individual that 
mark him out as distinct from all other human beings. In terms of moral significance, 
this is important, and the forthcoming discussion of significance and obligation should 
make transparent what I have said here. 
When I make a moral decision, I do not make a decision that can be evaluated 
as right or wrong, in the way I can about a decision over which violin I should buy. 
The decision about which violin to buy is independently correct of the individual, 
while a moral decision is not. In the case of the violin, I make a decision based on a 
particular method that will ensure an outcome that I desire. In terms of significance, a 
decision of this kind ultimately rests on whether I am well enough acquainted with the 
facts - so, for example, if I were to buy a new violin, I would examine the quality of 
sound it produced, the merits (and reputations) of the various violin-makers and so on. 
I would also be well advised to take someone else with me who was knowledgeable 
about violins. Were I later to find that the violin I purchased was unsatisfactory, then I 
could chastise myself for not having been thorough enough in my research. I might, 
for instance, have allowed my emotions to influence my judgement - perhaps I let the 
look of it (rather than its underlying quality) sway my decision. - And here one can 
see an association with my earlier discussion concerning cognitive and non-cognitive 
content. The correctness or incorrectness of decisions such as this one, lies in the 
44 Of course, I am not suggesting that individual voices should be treated with respect unconditionally-
one considers, in each case, how deserving of respect an individual's words are. 
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thoroughness of the research conducted and, consequently, a correct or incorrect 
decision remains the same over time; they are no more significant for one person than 
they are for another. In other words, correctness or incorrectness of this kind is only 
accidentally an individual's- anyone could have made the same mistake i.e. not carry 
out the necessary research to ensure correctness. There is a definite (externally 
justifiable) logic here: the violin that I purchased is either of good, reasonable, or poor 
quality and my decision can be measured in that way. Thus we have a decision that 
can be measured as correct or incorrect against the procedure that was involved in 
making it and, in this respect, the decision will always remain either correct or 
incorrect. There is however, another dimension to the decision to purchase a particular 
violin viz. that of external contingency. It might be the case that I have recently been 
offered (and taken) a position in the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra and that, on such 
grounds, have decided to acquire a new violin. I now have a commitment to a world-
class orchestra and desire a fine violin to match my position and I make the necessary 
procedural arrangements to ensure I purchase the best violin I can afford. - But 
suppose, later on, the orchestra's arts subsidy is cut, and they are forced to let me go; 
in this case, the correctness or incorrectness of my decision to buy a violin rests on an 
external contingency. If I remain in the orchestral wilderness forever after, then it can 
be said that although, in terms of my research, I acquired the best violin available for 
my money, things did not turn out as I expected and that, in this respect, the decision 
was not as correct as I might have wished (although I am in no way blameworthy). 
What can be seen here is that the correctness or incorrectness of some decisions relies 
on external contingencies beyond my control. 
A moral decision, by contrast, is non-accidentally an individual's and I wish to 
relate the following discussion to a claim that I made early on in this thesis viz., that a 
moral problem or judgement has, embedded in it, all the concepts bound up with my 
character that I have acquired during my lifetime, and that this is what I mean when I 
speak of a moral problem as non-accidentally or profoundly mine rather than 
accidentally mine. The decision to buy a new violin will notfundamentally change me 
as a person - I may be upset that things did not turn out the way I had hoped or I 
might be very happy that my orchestral ambitions have worked out and vindicated my 
decision to spend thousands of pounds on a new violin, but these are not deep 
identity-conferring changes. Consider the following scenario: I meet someone and 
develop romantic feelings for them, they do the same for me - however, neither of us 
87 
Adrian Brockless (MA Thesis) 
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements 
feels at ease with anything more than a tacit acknowledgement of the state of affairs 
that exists between us. Eventually it becomes apparent that the situation as it stands is 
fast becoming unworkable and so I elect to ask her out. We both decide to give it a go 
and, to begin with, everything runs fairly smoothly - after a while however, things 
between us become strained and finally, after about four years, we break up. Was my 
decision correct, and what was the significance of it? Unlike the violin example, it 
depends when I am asked - for instance, the day she accepted my invitation to dinner 
I would have said that it was one of the best decisions I had ever made; but if it was 
the day after we had parted company, I would probably answer bitterly and rue the 
day I made the decision to ask her. A year or two after the event, my perspective 
might be different again and perhaps I would see it as just one of those things that 
happens to people. Thus, it is apparent that no standard of correctness exists in the 
same way as the decision about buying a violin. In terms of the significance of my 
decision - it is not firm, but that is not to say that there are not boundaries to it; for 
instance, it must tally with certain cold facts about our relationship such as what we 
did and when. In this way (unlike the violin example) one cannot make an assessment 
of correctness based on an impersonal or 'cognitive' evaluation of the facts. And it 
cannot be an evaluation in which I try to separate cognitive from non-cognitive 
content- i.e. it cannot transcend my individuality. That is not to suggest however, that 
I do not understand the significance of my decision at any given time and that I am 
not capable of recognising the possibility of changes in significance later on45 • So, 
does this mean that we should just see such (personal) significance as fairly irrelevant 
insofar as it appears to be capricious - liable to change at any moment in a way that is 
contingent upon future unknown events and my reaction to them? Given that I don't 
know how the significance will manifest itself in the future, should I really consider 
my decision in terms of significance at all? Only if I accept that true significance lies 
purely in an impersonal model upon which decisions can be weighed as correct or 
incorrect by anyone, i.e. in a sense in which correctness or incorrectness is 
independent of (or only contingently linked to) the agent. Obviously this only allows 
for the kind of significance that was manifest in the earlier violin example and, as 
such, there is a definite parallel between this and my previous discussion concerning 
cognitive and non-cognitive content with regards to moral judgements and problems. 
45 Once again, the burden is on those who believe that something that is truly cognitive must be 
fundamentally impersonal. 
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Indeed (in terms of my decision to ask the girl to dinner), with hindsight, I might think 
that I could (or even maybe should) have made another choice, but - and this is 
important - at the time I made the decision it was the only decision I could make46. 
And this is why wisdom takes time to achieve and moral decisions are necessarily, but 
not simply personal. I shall try to make this clear in the light of what I have just said. 
Insofar as wisdom takes time to achieve, it is bound up with the significance of the 
decisions that we make, inasmuch as they develop our understanding of who we are; 
often these decisions are of a personal kind (such as the example above), the 
significance of which cannot be impersonal. Consider for instance the idea of a pre-
nuptial agreement47 • An agreement such as this provides a clear and interesting 
example of the difference between impersonal and personal significance and also 
demonstrates the importance of personal significance in terms of what we feel obliged 
to do. Essentially a pre-nuptial agreement is a form of insurance policy like - for 
instance - property insurance; I have ensured the contents of my college room against 
theft because I understand that there is a certain risk. Now, in terms of marriage, from 
an impersonal perspective it makes sense to say the same kind of thing - there is a risk 
that my marriage will fail and, as such, it seems right to insure it. - But to insure my 
marriage (as it were) is to admit the possibility that it might end in divorce, and that 
contradicts my decision which is bound up with my certainty (assuming that I'm 
serious) that I want to spend the rest of my life with one person. To take the decision 
to get married carries with it massive significance, but its significance - as I have 
tried to show - is different to that of something impersonal such as the move to insure 
the contents of my college room, insofar as the grounds for certainty are entirely 
different. The certainty of one can be externally justified, but the other cannot be. I am 
certain that it is possible that some of my possessions might be stolen during my time 
in college and, on these grounds, I take the prudent measure of buying insurance. I am 
also certain that I want to commit and devote the rest of my life to one person and, on 
those grounds do not need to take out insurance, but in this case, I cannot appeal to 
possibilities -or anything else, apart from my love - as a means of justification. 
46 And in any case, I have no way of knowing the possible significance had a different decision been 
made. 
47 The pre-nuptial agreement has no legal force in British law. 
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The point is that the person in love is different; life is different for him, or the whole world is 
different for him. But in this there is not anything to which you can point and say 'that is being 
in love, and this is the difference it has made'; the difference is being in love. (Rhees, R. 
'R&L'. p124) 
Consequently, the significance of my decision to marry can never be impersonal and 
neither can the obligation associated with it i.e. "for as long as I live". Nevettheless, 
that is not to say I don't understand my certainty or the obligations bound up with my 
love and commitment to marry. And this is why, with a moral problem, we cannot 
defer to a third party for an attempt at its solution, as each individual has a unique 
relationship with it. I wish to return for a moment, to the case of Billy Budd and 
Winch's declaration that he would have found it impossible to act as Vere had done 
and have Budd executed. In such a situation, it would make no sense to say to Winch 
that perhaps he should have a bash at acting in the same way, just as it makes no sense 
for a lover (unless he is corrupt) to marry whilst at the same time admitting that there 
is a good chance that his marriage will fail. Conceivably, later on, his understanding 
of the significance of his decision might change and he may later feel, as a result, that 
it is possible to act (or that he should have acted) in a way that he could not have done 
previously. The same, of course, could be said of Winch. However, the judgement 
that Winch made at the time of writing his essay was the only one he could make. 
Whatever the case, the significance of decisions must (on pain of insanity), in some 
sense, be tied to cold facts despite the possibility of changing significance. 
Nevertheless, significance is crucial in terms of how it influences our understanding 
i.e. how it affects us conceptually, how we learn and how it shapes our individual 
outlooks that make us the persons that we are. Such influence often determines the 
kinds of subsequent decisions that we make and this is why wisdom takes time to 
achieve. 
A final point I wish to raise in this section is that the above shows that people 
do change, and that the person entering into deliberation is not the same person that 
emerges. The marriage and girlfriend examples provide very good illustrations of the 
sort of thing I mean. The significance of such decisions changes a person insofar as 
they represent far more than simply the satisfaction of a desire; one cannot be a 
husband, wife, girlfriend or boyfriend just for an instant - these are necessarily 
aspects of one's life that one must live with (at least for a while). Thus the agent is not 
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changed immediately or completely - such changes take place over time, and this is 
also tied in with the claim that wisdom takes time to achieve. In the case of my violin 
example, any change that takes place will be transient, inasmuch as I acquire the 
violin and move on - perhaps I fuss over its maintenance, but this is not identity 
conferring. A decision to marry, or a moral decision continues to change me insofar as 
the understanding associated with it (i.e. understanding of what I have done, and what 
I have become) influences my understanding of subsequent moral problems and 
decisions, and such decisions may also influence the significance of earlier decisions. 
In the Vere I Winch example, the significance of Winch's judgement (that he found it 
impossible to have Billy Budd executed) may change over time and, as I pointed out 
earlier, there may have been a time later on when he thought differently - this could 
have been due to many things. The necessarily (but not simply) personal nature of 
such judgements means that change in significance and change in person are 
interconnected and inseparable; the significance of, for example, my decision to ask a 
girl to dinner is uniquely tied to me. As I change, the significance of my decision will 
change also, but the change in significance also influences me as a person. Suppose 
we grow apart and things collapse into a bitter and spiteful break up; in this case it is 
clear to see the significance of my decision changing over time. To begin with I was 
happy that she agreed, later on when I was in love with her, it was the best decision I 
ever made, at the time of our split it was the worst decision and so on. The fact that 
she was my girlfriend meant that we adapted to each other's company and I saw her -
after a period of time - under the light of my love as I saw no one else. Thus the 
significance of our decision to be together and our falling in and (later) out of love 
with each other changed us as people, and such change altered the significance that 
these decisions had for us. From here, it is apparent that an obligation at a particular 
time in one's life need not hold for all time- as significance and personhood changes, 
one's obligations do also. 
4.2. Relativism 
However, ultimately, are not all such judgements and decisions merely relative? 
Surely the decision that I want to marry Matilda is relative insofar as that is simply 
how I feel? -Certainly such a judgement admits of no external justification. Similar 
things can be said about the respective differences of Winch and Vere concerning the 
execution of Billy Budd; their judgements, it can be argued, are relative insofar as 
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they are individual responses that are, at best, contingent upon cultural and historical 
factors. Thus, it is easy to claim that one cannot critically assess moral judgements 
because there are no solid and conclusive criteria by which this can be done. Worse, it 
could be argued that since this is so, it is inappropriate to pass judgement on those 
from vastly different backgrounds. 
The first point to be made however, is that we do not experience moral claims 
relativistically. Indeed, what I am arguing for can be interpreted as a kind of 
relativism, but one that is not harmful, providing one understands that the decisions 
and judgement of the agent are no less significant or important (or indeed cognitive) 
as a result. Granted, there is certainly cultural and historical influence involved insofar 
as an individual is necessarily going to inherit aspects of the cultural setting in which 
he was brought up - it is something that is an ingredient of his biography and 
doubtless affects his outlook, but it is not something that wholly determines his 
individuality (although it is certainly enough to mark him out from individuals of 
other cultures); that, as has already been discussed, is shaped by (among other things) 
the decisions that he makes and their significance. Nevertheless none of this precludes 
the possibility of meaningful disagreement, as the nature of concepts is necessarily 
transparent and, thus, public. The point is that moral decisions matter to the agents 
who makes them and, as such, it is improper to try to look at them from an impersonal 
personal perspective; to do so brings us round (again) to my previous discussion of 
cognitive and non-cognitive content and violation of grammar. In relation to this, we 
can also appeal to the discussion of the significance of marriage. I shall attempt to 
cash out what I have just said more clearly. To examine moral judgements from an 
impersonal standpoint i.e. one in which one makes a cognitive I non-cognitive 
distinction, is to attempt to examine a phenomenon that does not fit into such a model; 
as such, an examination of this kind violates grammar insofar as it denies important 
aspects of the individuality of an agent's moral thought that give particular decisions 
and judgements sense. It attempts to apply moral thought onto a pre-conceived 
conceptual model of the nature of thought which, as I have already discussed, is 
inappropriate for an accurate account of moral thinking. An attempt to do so will 
finish up - for instance - with part of a thought being treated as a whole one if we try 
and hoist it onto the conception of 'cognitive' as it exists in the cognitive/non-
cognitive model I have described. Thus we cannot talk of relativism in terms of moral 
judgements in a really meaningful sense, since it involves taking an impersonal 
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standpoint and, even though what I am argumg for is a type of relativism, the 
individuality contained within such thought (i.e. its grammar) means that to judge it as 
'merely relative' neglects the relevance of the grammar provided by the individual, 
and also denies that individual's claim on seriousness and authority. Thus, to 
explicitly present this as a charge against my argument misses the point. This can be 
further demonstrated by referring back to the marriage example in the previous 
section. While the decision to get married is essentially relative, this takes nothing 
away from its significance for the individual, nor does it provide anything useful in 
terms of evaluating correctness or incorrectness of the decision; as such, we (as 
individuals) do not experience such decisions relativistically. To dismiss a decision to 
get married as "merely relative" might, strictly speaking, be true, but it is also absurd. 
His conception of love is slightly different to hers, but it's just a relative standard, just 
as her conception of good is just a relative standard and so on. The point is, that like 
marriage, moral decisions matter to the individual. 
4.3. A further look at 'Being Moved' 
I now wish to address a worry that was omitted earlier for the sake of lucidity 
viz., that the idea 'being moved' is not as authoritative as I give it credit for; the very 
notion of, for instance, sentimentality involves being genuinely moved by the wrong 
things. Therefore, why not bypass talk of being moved and go straight to talking about 
the nature of the things that it is appropriate to be moved by? Firstly, I want to make 
some comments about the character that such an enquiry would have. An 
investigation into the nature of appropriate things that we should be moved by would 
immediately demand a series of necessary and sufficient conditions showing why we 
should let certain things, as it were, slip through the net and others not. This, I believe, 
is the wrong way to approach the problem, since it does not allow appropriateness to 
be determined by a language game - i.e. one has to have a watertight impersonal 
preconception (with strict propositional grammar) of what is, and is not, appropriate 
in all possible situations and contexts. The enquiry must take into account - for 
instance - the characters of individuals involved in a particular situation and so on. 
Moreover, such an enquiry would demand that we are all moved by the same things in 
similar ways, and I think one of the problems is that we should not think in terms of 
being moved by things. 
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Rather, we should accept that our being moved is the product of a particular 
language game (one that includes ourselves) i.e. one in which the possibility of our 
being moved is made manifest in, and is itself a part of the language game. Now, in 
terms of sentimentality, an individual is genuinely moved to look upon something in a 
sentimental manner; and that he is moved is a product of a belief (or beliefs) that 
whatever he is moved by is appropriately telling of his relationship with it. Consider 
the death of Princess Diana. Many people were moved by Diana's funeral, some in 
ways that could be regarded as sentimental - for instance, those who truly believed 
they knew her just from watching her appearances on television (and were 
"devastated" by her death). One can say that their reactions were sentimental because 
seeing a person on television is quite different from actually being acquainted with 
them personally- yet they trust that their being moved is appropriately telling of their 
relationship with her and justify this with statements such as, "I felt like I knew her!" 
Now, there is an important sense (as discussed in previous sections) in which beliefs 
such as these are not beliefs that can be truth-valued; sentimentality needs to be 
shown up by example and as such one cannot see reactions such as those to Diana's 
funeral as wrong or false - only sentimental. One can only see sentimentality for what 
it is, and not necessarily as a cause of a thought's failure. 
What is interesting is that many people have come to see their own reaction as 
sentimental. How did this change come about? The question returns me to a point I 
made earlier viz., that wisdom takes time to achieve since it is bound up with the 
significance of aspects of our lives that often revolve around decisions that we make, 
or are the results of events of which we are victims. Such significance develops our 
understanding of who we are. Perhaps one way in which someone who was 
sentimental over Diana's funeral comes to see their sentimentality for what it is, is 
when they later lose a very close relative - someone whom they loved very much and 
were genuinely close to. It takes this event - and the significance of it for them 
personally - to draw the contrast between relationships mediated through journalists 
and a television set, and an understanding of what it really means to lose someone. 
Possibly such an event afforded them the understanding of what a truly personal 
relationship actually means which, until that time, had not been made clear to them-
i.e. they had been naive. And this is a good example of one way in which wisdom is 
acquired. 
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4.4. Wisdom 
A while back I talked about age and maturity, and how its necessity, in terms 
of understanding certain things, compels us to differentiate between children and 
adults- certainly we can credit a child with a mature attitude, and that is to make him 
an exception by highlighting his behaviour as beyond that expected of his years. 
Similarly, we can accuse an adult of having a very immature attitude and so on. Thus, 
age is not a sufficient condition for achieving understanding (or wisdom) - for 
instance, it is possible that an individual who reacts to Diana's funeral in, for example, 
the way made explicit in the previous section, may not see his reaction as sentimental 
even in the light of the death of a close relative. Certainly there are plenty of old fools 
about - so are we supposed to think in terms of understanding and wisdom corning 
from the right kind of experience or appropriate kind of reflection on experience? 
Firstly, I am not sure that the word "right" is, in this context, suitable, as it draws us 
towards thinking of kinds of experience in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions with an aim to establishing criteria for rightness. I would be inclined to 
favour the latter option viz., appropriate reflection on experience. With the concept of 
appropriateness (in terms of reflection on experience), we can see whether a person 
has, for instance, displayed a mature attitude, or whether they have been na'ive or 
sentimental; once again, consider the 'Diana' example- a sentimental reaction can be 
seen to be inappropriate, as can a thoroughly cold one. In the previous few sections, I 
have attempted to illustrate how I believe wisdom can occur and have implied what is 
incorporated in it as a concept. Nonetheless, wisdom and understanding still seem 
dangerously subjective concepts: I think my Auntie Dorothy is very wise, but her 
husband does not. Here, I think, we encounter relativism in a similar way to that 
present in moral judgements and decisions such as those to get married; it might be 
the case that I am nai've or uneducated and, as such, easily impressed, or it might be 
that my Uncle is a dreadful cynic and sees his wife as just being full of cliches. And in 
the end, like concepts such as cynicism, maturity and sentimentality, wisdom can only 
be shown up by examples of what is not wise. Thus, to see someone as wise, in itself 
requires wisdom i.e. a sober reflection on their words and deeds; such reflection 
demands a degree of trust in the person being judged, and in oneself as being worthily 
trusting. Serious reflection of this sort is of the same kind that is required in moral 
deliberation which, as previously discussed, need not be entirely subjective insofar as 
one attempts (in such deliberation) to understand and fully appreciate the humanity of 
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another person in a way that matters and runs very deep- consider the earlier example 
of a thief coming to an understanding of what he has done and in the process realising 
that he has got more than he bargained for - this is, of course, being wise after the 
event and one cannot say of the thief that he possesses wisdom. Now, in terms of 
recognising wisdom in another, one has to examine the various actions, decisions and 
judgements that an individual has made during his lifetime, look at the significance 
that they have had for him, and whether he has learnt from such significance and 
responded to it in appropriate ways. So, for instance, in the case of Diana's funeral, if 
an individual reacts in a very sentimental way and subsequently does not see his 
reaction as such in the light of the death of a close relative whom he loved very much, 
we can say that he has not seen (or perhaps learnt from) the significance of the death 
of his relative. Accordingly, we can see that the concept of wisdom is of a form that 
cannot be arrived at through purely cognitive or non-cognitive means (assuming the 
"traditional" cognitive non-cognitive model of the nature of thought), since cognitive 
thought demands an impersonal propositional grammar, and non-cognitive thought is 
purely subjective. Some might suggest that a mix of the two is what is required, but 
once again, this begs the question of why we should only consider as cognitive (and 
objective) those things that are impersonal. -And we would certainly not identify an 
individual as wise if we believed he just relied on his feelings to make judgements or, 
conversely, if he never relied on them. Such a cognitive/non-cognitive division 
encourages us to think in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the 
right proportional combinations of head and heart, with what it takes to achieve 
understanding and wisdom. And what proportions (or combinations) of each 
determine whether we are thinking properly critically? 
Returning to the theme that age is not a sufficient condition of understanding, I 
want to look at the possibility of one's understanding (or wisdom) falling away, 
before moving on to the next section in which I discuss moral corruption. I have 
already made a case for the notion that deepened understanding takes time to achieve, 
but I want to stress that such progress in understanding in no way precludes the 
possibility of its subsequent decay. How can this be, considering that I have argued 
that understanding and wisdom necessarily take time to achieve - thus requiring age? 
My answer is that one can achieve a clear kind of understanding before having it 
corrupted by certain experiences - for instance, going into politics (which may 
involve becoming selfish) or being sent to Iraq as a soldier (which may require the 
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ability to kill without guilt or remorse). Thus, a certain effort is necessary in order to 
hold and retain one's understanding and keep it fresh, or to advance it further. If one 
fails here, jadedness will set in and one can repeat what one has learnt through one's 
previous understanding time after time and never be truly standing behind what one 
says - often in such cases, one feels obliged to look for reasons, and once this has 
happened such understanding has virtually lost its hold. For an example, I wish to 
consider the kind of person who started off attending church as a result of genuine 
religious conviction, but who, over the years, has become jaded i.e. the importance of 
such conviction has waned and perhaps the social factor has become more important. 
Nowadays, he attends church each week and repeats over and over the words in the 
service, but with little understanding of what he is saying - the words which once had 
a profound meaning and significance for him are now idle. The point here, is that his 
understanding of his faithfulness to God and its relationship to his church-going and 
the service, has either just diminished through a general kind of malaise and languor, 
or perhaps been corrupted through the enjoyment of social factors which he found his 
church provided. The issue I am raising, and one that I shall expand upon in the 
following section, is that one's deep, long term, identity-conferring choices (career, 
marriage, religious conviction etc.) can never be fully justified with reasons. If, for 
instance, I lose my religious conviction (for whatever reason), I cannot regain it 
through incessant repetition of arguments that, at one time meant something to me. 
This returns me to a comparison that Gaita makes - one that I highlighted earlier -
between a jaded scientist and someone who is morally exhausted; a jaded scientist is 
not necessarily compromised (in terms of his authority) to speak about a scientific 
subject, as cognitive content can be easily separated from the individual. In this way 
scientific understanding can be regained through repetition of cognitive processes that 
lead to the formulation of theories (that one has forgotten), since they are of a form 
that admits of external justification and, as such, are only accidentally the 
individual's. This is not so with a morally jaded individual; authority wanes with 
jadedness and, m this respect, the agent is the '[limit] within which 
justification ... take[s] place.' (Monk. R. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. 
p.571 ). Wittgenstein remarks, 
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"But this is how it is - " I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if only I could 
fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the 
matter. (PI: I 13) 
Reasons for understanding in - for instance - a moral or religious sense are somehow 
not enough; the authenticity of an individual's religious or moral convictions (and his 
proper understanding of them) demands more from him than proclaiming a series of 
reasons. The sincerity of his religious and moral convictions and their associated 
expressions cannot be verified by going over and over those proclaimed reasons -
genuine expression (as has been discussed) can only be shown by counterfeit 
examples.48 . Thus in terms of moral or religious understanding falling away and the 
effort that is required if this is to be avoided, there is a dynamic in one's conception of 
such things that cannot be reclaimed simply by listing the relevant facts or beliefs on a 
piece of paper in case they are later forgotten. 
Of course, one can attempt to recover understanding of the religious or moral 
kind and sometimes succeed, but this cannot be done exclusively through appeal to 
reasons - the individual featured in my church-going example would, for instance, 
have to re-examine his relationship with God and Christian teachings, and realize 
what kind of a religious life such a relationship demands. Moreover, failures in one's 
understanding - laziness, sentimentality, optimism, cynicism, and so on - are all 
concepts that are factored into our understanding of what it means to be wise. 
Certainly, wisdom is not acquired independently of these things i.e. we cannot 
become wise if we have never, in one form or other, encountered them, and we must 
have wrestled with such thoughts and won49 . One could not, for example, say of 
someone who had no acquaintance with such concepts that they were wise, no matter 
how appropriately they acted, because they would not have had to overcome them to 
act in the way they did. Their actions would have to be purely accidental. Thus, when 
I am anxious about what I ought morally to do, this does not mean (as I made clear 
earlier in a different way) that, at bottom, there is an answer that I can discern 
cognitively and that my main problem is to find it. Both the problem and solution are, 
in a way, conditioned by past encounters I have had with concepts such as laziness 
48 And although I might be able to recognise such counterfeit examples, that does not mean that I could 
successfully articulate the difference, and not because language does not possess the necessary 
vocabulary. Such understanding is determined by the particular grammar of the particular language 
§.ame that one is involved in. 
9 And this again shows why wisdom takes time to achieve. 
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and sentimentality, how I have dealt with them, and what I have learned from them50. 
-And, assuming I'm not morally jaded and that my wisdom has not fallen away or 
been corrupted, every fresh problem of this kind presents me with the possibility of 
deepening wisdom51 . This is why, although all moral problems have something in 
common, it does not follow that there is a shared or universal point around which we 
can all discuss them on the same level. Nevertheless, that is not to say that I cannot 
meaningfully criticise another's actions or views- I can try to understand his thinking 
and perhaps condemn it as sentimental or cynical, and attempt to get him to see this 
by showing why. 
50 This also changes me as a person. 
51 Thus to say, "I understand that to act in this way is wise" is to articulate more than "I felt like acting 
in this way"- the latter expression could just be a personal preference; this clearly illustrates the 
difference between subjective and objective action, even though both decisions to act are necessarily 
personal. The former is not simply personal. 
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CHAPTERV 
5.0. Moral Corruption. 
But what is it for a moral thought to be corrupt? Suppose for instance, I fall in 
love with a woman, I propose to her, she accepts and we set the date for our wedding -
a couple of years hence. However, in the intervening period my love for her begins to 
wane, but not for any particular reason (such as my finding another woman). The right 
thing to do for both of our sakes is, at the very least, for me to discuss this turn of 
events with her; however, I choose not to as I believe that it will hurt her terribly and, 
on such grounds, I arrive at the conclusion that the best thing to do is to stay silent, 
hope that my love returns, and continue with the engagement as planned. In such a 
case my moral decision has been corrupted by cowardice. I will, later on, doubtless 
regret not having raised the issue having married unhappily and, no doubt, will hurt 
my wife even more by finally coming clean with her and filing for a divorce. At the 
time however, I believed in my decision and considered it the wisest thing to do, even 
in the light of the realisation that I no longer loved my girlfriend as I once did 
(although I had qualms about my "wisdom"). Other instances of corruptness might 
involve my falling out of love with her, but still deciding to marry her because she is 
rich or perhaps well-known. Gaita considers that 'conjectures about what we may be 
capable of are based upon an assessment of what is within our power to achieve' 
(Gaita, R. G&E. p203). In this respect, I ought to be ashamed of myself for having 
allowed cowardice to dictate my decision, i.e. allowed it to seduce me into thinking 
that the best course of action was to continue with the engagement and hope against 
hope that my love for my girlfriend returned. Nevertheless, the cowardice had its roots 
in thoughts of nobility, no matter how corrupt, inasmuch as I was desperate to spare 
her dreadful heartache. In the final analysis my qualms were doubtless the 
consequence of knowing, in my heart of hearts, that I had done the wrong thing, but 
my cowardice had prevented this from surfacing. This could not be said if I had 
elected to continue with my engagement because my girlfriend happened to be very 
rich or famous - in this case I could still be acutely aware of the hurt I would cause if 
I declared that I no longer loved her, but my cowardice (perhaps born in nobility) 
would itself be quickly fouled by the realisation of what I would lose in material terms 
(money or reflected glory). Here, moral thought has been polluted to such an extent 
that it has all but collapsed- I hesitate to say completely, as it is still possible to trace 
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honourable origins. There are two further points that need to be made in connection 
with the above examples. 
Firstly, that the corruption of my thought implies an incomplete understanding 
of what I become if I allow cowardice, greed etc., to prevent me from acting properly 
and, just as importantly, displays a lack of understanding of the humanity of my 
fellow human beings (in a sense, these two kinds of understanding are closely 
connected). 
Secondly, to think and act morally demands varying degrees of courage in the 
same way as thinking rationally requires varying degrees of trust (there is no 
benchmark). Courage, as Gaita emphasises 'is an ethical requirement, and its absence 
is a proper cause for shame ... '(ibid.). Nevertheless that is not to say that to forsake 
courage in the face of adversity is necessarily, or always shame-worthy - it is not 
shame-worthy, for instance, to occasionally have allowed cowardice to influence 
one's thought, but it must be in the knowledge (and understanding) that the demands 
of courage were well and truly beyond what one was capable of. Of course, corruption 
is possible here too, insofar as cowardice may influence one's perception of what one 
is really capable of and, in this respect, it is important that one possesses no qualms. I 
do not think - for example - that anyone would consider a victim of the London 
Underground bombings a coward just because he had qualms (that overwhelmed him) 
about re-entering the tunnels after his own escape, to assist his fellow passengers. If 
he displayed shame at his cowardice, it would not be reasonable for anyone to impress 
his shame upon him. That said, one might hope that he would not instantly abandon 
feelings of shame - for in that case, it might lead to suspicion that his confession of a 
lack of courage was phoney and that he was just (only) glad to be out of there. An 
analogy can be made with Bernard Williams's famous lorry driver example 
(Williams, B. 'Moral Luck' in: Moral Luck, CUP. 1981.) - Williams employs it to 
demonstrate the difference, in terms of evil, between intentional and accidental 
killing. The example revolves around the unintentional killing of a young child by a 
lorry driver who was driving within the speed limit and in a vehicle which was 
deemed wholly roadworthy. The child ran out in front of the lorry and there was 
nothing that the driver could do; nevertheless, he is wracked with guilt, even though 
he is in no way morally culpable and realises this. That said, Williams points out that 
one would be worried (and it would indeed be strange) if his guilt just evaporated in 
the face of people telling him that he was not morally blameworthy. Why? Consider 
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the earlier example concerning the pre-nuptial agreement. In this example it was 
shown that the agent getting married could not consider such an agreement in the 
same light as a third party, i.e. although the possibility of divorce exists, to insure his 
marriage would fly in the face of what marriage meant to him - and that is not to say 
he would just feel he was contradicting himself, it would be something he could not 
even seriously contemplate (unless he was corrupt). The point here is that he is a 
unique (and individual) perspective in the same way as the man who escaped from the 
underground, or the lorry driver who accidentally ran over the child. Thus, if an agent 
were to be persuaded to make a pre-nuptial agreement just because a third party said, 
"It's a possibility that you might divorce in the future!" one might (indeed should) 
doubt his certainty and integrity as an individual - and, on similar grounds, this is 
why it would be slightly unsettling and strange if the underground escapee 
immediately abandoned his shame when told he had no reason to be ashamed for his 
lack of courage. Gaita highlights that 'some regrets are directed not only to what we 
did or to its effects, but also at the fact that we did it.' (Gaita, R. G&E. p53 (emphasis 
orig.)). The person whose courage failed him in a situation in which the demands of 
courage were beyond him still has his shame conditioned by his perspective; it is his 
lack of courage irrespective of whether anyone else would have had the courage. 
Returning to the first point viz., that my understanding is incomplete. I want to 
relate this to my earlier discussion of wisdom in which I claimed that the acquisition 
of wisdom requires one to encounter and wrestle with concepts such as cowardice, 
greed, cynicism, sentimentality and so on. Wisdom, I maintained, could not be 
acquired independently of these things and consequently takes time to achieve. Moral 
corruption is perhaps best seen as one's understanding or wisdom falling away in the 
face of forms of temptation or, perhaps, because of temptation. Nevertheless, one can 
still be tempted without being corrupted, indeed temptation is a necessary requirement 
if we are to be seen (i.e. shown) as possessing moral integrity or wisdom - for if there 
were nothing to test one's certainty and integrity one could never truly be considered 
as such. In this sense, it is important to admit that one is tempted by something insofar 
as to deny it is a form of self-deception (in itself a form of corruption) that would, 
sooner or later, lead to a disintegration of what makes an individual good as a result. 
So what happens when we are led, or fall, into temptation? When this occurs, there is 
the temptation to suggest that it is because our desires overshadow and prevail against 
our better thoughts, and although this is certainly part of the reason, I believe it 
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neglects an important lesson raised by Socrates and highlighted by Gaita viz., that a 
good man cannot be harmed, and that if he knows what evil is he will not be able to 
commit it. This is what I was alluding to in my first point when I suggested that to be 
corrupted implied an incomplete understanding of what one becomes, and also a lack 
of understanding of the humanity of one's fellow human beings. The Socratic claim 
that a good man cannot be harmed means, I think, that he cannot be corrupted and 
thus cannot commit morally reprehensible acts. What does this mean? Fundamentally 
it describes someone who has a complete understanding of what they would be doing 
to themselves and others and suggests that, on such grounds, they would (and could) 
not fall into temptation. So, for instance, if I were tempted to steal money in order to 
finance what I considered to be a well earned and deserved holiday, but understood 
that I would become a thief and that my subsequent vacation would be tainted with 
that realization, then, the Socratic claim runs, I would not be able to steal. Gaita 
provides an excellent example of how succumbing to temptation is often the result of 
self-deception. The example centres around one man's love for another man's wife 
and that this man is tempted to murder the husband in order to be rid of him 
permanently. 'He wants what he would have if her husband left her or if he died in an 
accident and the desire which tempts him pretends that that is the achievable purpose 
of his deed. (Gaita, R. G&E. p233 (italics orig.)). What is self-deceiving about his 
desire and temptation is that it leaves out what he will actually get if he submits to it 
viz., 'a love and a life polluted by murder' (ibid.) 
Not to steal in the face of great temptation, no matter what the conditions 
surrounding it, is to fully understand the evil of the possible submission to it; it also 
shows that, provided one's understanding remains sound i.e. does not fall away and 
allow self-deception to creep in, a good man (one who understands and is sensitive to 
all aspect of humanity) cannot be harmed by it. Now, one might comment that there 
are plenty of intelligent individuals in the world who are willing to steal and I or 
commit murder and who would readily claim that they are not bothered by (or about) 
morality, as long as they get what they want. Given that intelligent people are 
generally held to have a good understanding of things and, by and large, understand 
what they're saying as a result, does this not cause considerable problems for the 
Socratic claim? - Only if one dismisses their villainous nature as extraneous to their 
achieving moral understanding. In other words, the objection only has force if one 
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considers what makes them villains as existing outside what it is to think and develop 
morally; their villainous nature has no bearing on how they understand morality .. 
Now, while I have maintained throughout (and still do) that morality should 
not be considered purely as a guide to conduct, its very nature means that it acts as a 
limit to one's behaviour, and that is what inextricably links the two- i.e. the particular 
individual's morality to his behaviour. Accordingly, provided we accept that there is a 
necessary link between morality and one's conduct, it is possible to reveal that even a 
highly intelligent murderer or thief who claims to understand moral requirements, but 
just chooses to flout them, does not understand them as fully as he believes. This is so 
inasmuch as one's behaviour reflects a moral capacity (i.e. ability to morally 
understand etc.). Someone whose behaviour reflects the abandonment of 
consideration for himself and others (i.e. one who has enacted his supposed flouting 
of morality) knows not fully what he does. - For instance, if a thief has abandoned 
such consideration to the point that he does not recognize what he has become by 
stealing (and by this act also implicitly violating the humanity of another), then he 
does not grasp anywhere near completely what he is doing, either to himself or to 
others52. It is therefore only possible for him to understand morality in a sense that 
places his being a thief outside, and as an irrelevancy to, morality - i.e. he sees 
morality as a set of rules that need only accidentally be his, should he choose to adopt 
them. This leads me into my final point concerning a purely cognitive approach to 
moral understanding. 
If we accept that villains who claim to reject morality and that those who 
succumb to temptation are only human, and that almost all human beings live lives 
punctuated by at least one of these characteristics, then are we to say that none of 
these people understand what they mean by morality? No, but that is not to say that 
they understand fully what they are doing when they kill or steal. This, I think, is 
where the confusion occurs and what encourages belief that genuine moral 
understanding can be separated from the person. There are two points to be raised in 
connection with this confusion. Firstly, there is confusion (as I discussed earlier) over 
the nature of moral understanding and whether it is as genuine as, say, mathematics-
the doubt over its reliability arising as a consequence of the belief that it IS 
52 In such a case as this, an illness would doubtless be diagnosed- it is unnatural for an individual to 
abandon his consideration for others so completely (even if they profess to). The fact that such an 
attitude is considered unnatural attests to the role that morality plays in making us normal human 
beings. Morality is an aspect of humanity, and without it we are considered ill in some way. 
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grammatically identical to mathematical understanding rather than possessing a 
genuine grammar all of its own. Secondly, and in ~elation to this, if we accept that the 
grammar of moral understanding is identical to that of mathematics (i.e. impersonal) 
then we can say that moral understanding and thus integrity is independent of an 
individual's character. That is to imply a cognitive approach to morality and one 
thereby in which the significance of one person's love for another can, in theory, be 
understood in exactly the same way by anyone - I have already revealed why this 
cannot be done and why the same thing applies to moral judgements. To understand 
that one is tempted, one must recognise what that temptation means i.e. a certain kind 
of guiltiness if one succumbs to it; to realise this is a part of its significance that, if we 
are sensitive to it, helps us to acquire wisdom (i.e. understanding of our thoughts and 
actions). If an individual fails in his resistance to temptation, then (provided he is not 
a villain) as Gaita highlights, his subsequent understanding will result in remorse and 
a 'shocked awakening to the reality of the evil [he] did' (Gaita, R. G&E. p232). Once 
again, the significance of his understanding of what he has done will bear on him in 
terms of his individuality i.e. who he is. In this sense, his individuality is inseparable 
from his character. His biography (i.e. what makes him an individual) and moral 
understanding (fashioned, in part, by the significance of events such as marriage and 
succumbing to temptation), whether it has increased or fallen away, changes him as a 
person and this in itself is incompatible with a cognitive impersonal model of moral 
understanding, insofar as such a model only allows such understanding to be 
contingently attached to the agent. 
Morality is a phenomenon the very essence of which demands recognition and 
understanding of humanity and individuality (with all that that entails) in both oneself 
and others; it also demands recognition and understanding of the relationship between 
the two. That is what it is (and means) to think and act morally. 
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CONCLUSION 
6.0. Conclusion. 
Throughout this thesis I have sought to demonstrate (and defend the view) that 
moral judgements are necessarily, but not simply personal and that this is necessarily 
so. I have argued that a tmly moral judgement relies on the recognition of an 'other's' 
humanity (and all that that entails- for instance, the protection of one's own life, and 
thus the recognition and understanding that others want to protect their lives for 
similar reasons e.g. the love of their family) and that, as such, moral judgements 
require more than strictly formal argument and should be considered as more than 
purely a guide to conduct. Within this, I make the distinction between public and 
personal morality and suggest that confusion often arises when we take political (i.e. 
public) decisions as moral ones. In such cases, what is often neglected is that the 
requirement for evil (such as the decision to go to war) is present before the political 
decision is made and, as such, the real moral element exists prior to it; all that can be 
done in political decisions of this kind is to try to limit the loss of human life, but they 
are decisions, as I have tried to show, that are not in themselves, strictly moral. 
However, I qualified this argument by maintaining that political and moral decisions 
are not unrelated. 
Much disagreement arises m areas of moral philosophy concerning 
subjectivity and objectivity, and I have argued that objectivity and rationality are 
possible without the need for external justification (although I'm not saying that this is 
always so) - i.e., I suggested that objectivity and external justification are not 
synonymous; in other words, objectivity need not be entirely impersonal. But how can 
one be objective and not impersonal?- This question led me to discuss what it means 
to be subjective and objective within ethics and I began with an outline of the position 
I was attacking, using arguments advanced by Thomas Nagel as paradigms. 
Moral subjectivity, I argue, is a kind of selfishness indicative of a lack of 
understanding of another individual's humanity and, to support this, I employ Gaita's 
example that someone who commits a morally reprehensible act, as a result of (say) 
giving in to temptation, finally gets more than he bargained for; - for although an 
individual may acquire great riches through robbing a bank, his subsequent enjoyment 
of them will be tainted by the realisation of what he has become viz., a thief. Moral 
objectivity (I tacitly equate this with moral understanding) involves the prior 
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recognition of the violation to the humanity of others, and also the realisation of what 
the perpetrator would become if tempted to commit a morally reprehensible act. But 
how does one learn morally?- How does one become morally objective? 
The answer to these questions, I believe, is to be found in examining how we 
acquire the ability to understand. This, I argued, involves much more than simple 
acquisition of facts. As human beings, we have the ability to wonder, be moved by 
things in ways that are mysterious and in ways that we cannot discount; we love, hate, 
possess courage and can be cowardly; we can be cynical and sentimental, and so on. 
These are things that, as human beings, we have the potential to understand (whether 
we realize it is another matter). In my examination of how we acquire moral 
understanding and objectivity I look at what it means to morally communicate, and 
argue that this in itself is a part of morality, insofar as morality rests on a 
consideration and understanding of others, and that this is made possible by the 
possibility and phenomenon of language. Such communication (language) rests on far 
more than a "words standing for objects" basis and words in particular combinations 
representing possible states of affairs, and in my analysis of language I examine (and 
follow) Wittgenstein's later conception of it. This language analysis provides the 
necessary conceptual apparatus to make coherent the possibility of an objective moral 
understanding that does not admit of external justification, insofar as it allows for 
meaningful discussion of concepts such as sentimentality, courage, cynicism and so 
on. I argue that while such concepts are necessarily personal, insofar as they do not 
admit of external justification and, as such, are the preserve of an individual and go to 
characterise his individuality in a way that is only derived historically, they are 
nonetheless transparent and public. In other words, concepts such as cynicism, 
sentimentality, and love allow the speaker to have an intimate relationship with the 
words he utters while not in any way compromising their public nature so that - for 
instance - we can appreciate the necessarily personal nature of one person's love for 
another while not having intimate access to the nature of that love. In connection with 
this, I argue that, in a moral sense, the individual is a component of the grammar of a 
situation and, as such, has the potential to influence meaning. I distinguish between 
situations and problems that remain the same irrespective of the individual involved-
for instance, mathematical problems or answers to the questions such as, "Which is 
the shortest way out of the wood from where I'm standing?" and those that are 
influenced by the presence of a particular individual. 
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In terms of those aspects of life in which an individual affects the grammar of 
a situation, I discuss what it means for an individual to stand behind the words that he 
utters, and argue that his individuality provides aspects of grammar to the particular 
language game in which he is involved, that consequently influence the meaning of 
his words (i.e. how they are taken). Within this discussion I suggested (and tried to 
show) that rationality does not always require formalism and that, in many cases, it 
requires us to reject it; in support of this I drew on Raimond Gaita's example of an 
individual who, at the very least, questions whether the person he has been introduced 
to has given the correct name. Thus, I argue that rationality often demands trust over 
formalism, and continue by asserting that this is often what is required when we are 
moved to believe what an individual is saying. I then tackle the possibility of being 
taken in by, say, a skilled orator. 
This is an important part of the thesis inasmuch as I discuss how one can 
distinguish genuine forms of speech etc., from counterfeit ones. I suggest that it would 
make no sense to speak of counterfeit examples if there did not also exist genuine 
ones. - But how does one distinguish between the counterfeit and the genuine? -
Ultimately, I argued, only by examples of what is not genuine. Of course, sometimes 
we will be conned and it is a fear of making such an error that entices us into trying to 
develop infallible (i.e. formal) methods upon which we can evaluate an individual's 
utterances. This attempt to develop a formal method can only consider proper 
understanding to possess the grammar of a propositional kind (i.e. true and false with 
valid and invalid inference) and has led to a belief, in some quarters, that words such 
as 'correctness' and 'understanding', which occur in both mathematical and moral 
realms, do not carry the same level of significance in the latter as they do in the 
former. The reason for this is that such vocabulary is believed to operate in the same 
way in both realms - consequently the inference is, since it is far more difficult to 
wield vocabulary (of an identical meaning) in the moral realm than in the 
mathematical one, that moral understanding is less of an important form or even a 
proper form of it. I argued that moral understanding and understanding of a 
mathematical kind are grammatically distinct insofar as the former allows for 
deepened understanding, while the latter does not and, as such both are genuine. One 
form can be separated from the individual, while the other cannot. - And it is possible 
(I claimed) to learn from being moved in a way that cannot be understood purely by 
exercising one's cognitive capacities (in a way one would if trying to solve a 
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mathematical problem). In other words, I argued that although a large part of our 
moral vocabulary might also be present in our mathematical vocabulary, meaning 
differs according to the realm in which such words operate, because the grammar of 
each is distinct. Thus (as philosophers), in terms of fear of error, the bewitchment we 
suffer through our desire to formulaically eliminate the possibility of error, also 
extends to only allowing words (such as 'correctness') to have strict meaning; 
consequently, when they are hoist upon a facet of our lives that admits of a different 
kind of grammar, a violation of grammar - and thus sense - occurs. But how can we 
be sure that moral understanding relies on a different kind of grammar? 
In answering this question, I concentrated on what it means for an individual 
to become wise, and on how understanding of the moral kind necessarily takes time to 
acquire; I also examined how moral understanding could fall away and tried to 
highlight the difference between what it would take to regain scientific or 
mathematical understanding as opposed to moral understanding53 . I argued that firstly, 
if the grammar of moral and scientific understanding was identical then, in theory, it 
would just be a question of learning a series of correct and incorrect propositions and 
acquiring a method by which they can be found - and, as such, moral understanding 
would not necessarily take time to achieve - rather, it could just be put there like 
information into a computer. Secondly, I attempted to demonstrate how moral 
understanding and wisdom does necessarily take time to achieve, by highlighting the 
requirement that, in order to become wise, one needs to wrestle with concepts with no 
absolute standards such as cynicism and sentimentality, and win. In this way I tried to 
illustrate the grammatical differences. Thirdly, I considered what it meant for one's 
understanding to fall away and how it could be regained in both the scientific and 
moral realms - I argued that, provided one re-acquaints oneself with the relevant facts 
and methodologies, it is a simple enough matter for anyone to regain scientific 
understanding. However, in terms of moral understanding, one has to re-examine the 
significance of aspects of one's life that once upon a time meant something and have 
now become idle - these aspects of life and their significance are necessarily personal, 
such as living a religious life or falling in love. As such, I have shown that there is 
53 In this respect, I have tacitly shown that such influences on an individual's life (among other things) 
form his perspective (i.e. his individuality); such perspective (individuality) being determined by 
various different points of view unique to him in terms of the platform from which he views things 
(lives). In other words, his understanding of love, religion etc., the decisions he makes based on such 
understanding, and the ways in which events influence his life, go to make up an historically achieved 
biography exclusive to him. 
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grammatical difference between scientific and moral understanding and thus, the onus 
is on those who believe that we should treat our vocabulary identically in both realms 
to justify their beliefs. 
In this thesis I have sought to question the validity of much of the 
methodology of moral philosophy and show that to be objective does not require an 
impersonal approach on pain of subjectivity. I have tried to show that, as morality is a 
peculiarly human phenomenon (i.e. a human capacity) one cannot treat it, in terms of 
enquiry, in a way that seeks to impersonalise it. As such, one must see genuine moral 
judgements as necessarily, but not simply personal. I have attempted to demonstrate 
that we should treat moral understanding as just as genuine as other kinds of 
understanding, and have tried to outline what it means to be moral and what it is to 
learn morally, as opposed to what it means to learn in other ways. I have implicitly 
argued against the notions of consequentialism, insofar as such doctrines rely on a 
kind of propositional grammar and I have argued more directly against the idea of 
universalizability (these two are, in any case, related). Moreover I have tried to show 
that we should see morality as more than purely a guide to conduct, since such a 
conception again relies on a series of propositions that are agent independent - and 
this can be related directly (and generally) to my criticism of consequentialism and 
universality; within this I have attempted to illustrate that moral concepts are not 
externally justifiable - the framework that gives them sense being one's own 
humanity and the humanity of others. As we are no more than human, external 
justification in such cases is not possible. 
Overall, I have tried to stress that a moral life is fundamentally a human one, 
and that one's ability to speak sensibly of rationality (or objectivity) and irrationality 
in the moral sphere is a recognition of humanity, with the only possible mode of 
justification (for moral rationality) being humanity itself. 
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